Modise v. CareOne Health Servs.

• Decision Date: 01 November 2022
• Docket Number: 3:20-CV-765 (SVN)
• Parties: MOTLALEPULA MODISE; MORWESI MMOLAWA; TIRELO MMOLAWA; and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CAREONE HEALTH SERVICES, LLC; ABEL N. OSAGIE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

MOTLALEPULA MODISE; MORWESI MMOLAWA; TIRELO MMOLAWA; and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CAREONE HEALTH SERVICES, LLC; ABEL N. OSAGIE, Defendants.

No. 3:20-CV-765 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

November 1, 2022

RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SARALA V. NAGALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Individual Plaintiffs Motlalepula Modise, Morwesi Mmolawa, and Tirelo Mmolawa were formerly employed by CareOne Health Services LLC (“CareOne”), as personal care assistants (“PCAs”) providing live-in care for elderly clients. They brought this collective action against CareOne and Abel Osagie (“Defendant”), the sole owner of the company.^[1] Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C § 201 et seq., and the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act (“CMWA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-58 et seq., by failing to properly compensate them for overtime hours worked, including time their sleep was interrupted by the clients' needs. Representing himself Defendant filed several state law counterclaims arising from Plaintiffs' alleged failure to inform him of times when the clients interrupted Plaintiffs' sleep.

Defendant has now moved for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' FLSA and CMWA claims, as well as his counterclaims. Though Plaintiffs have not specifically moved for summary judgment, their opposition to Defendant's motion asks the Court to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims. ECF No. 98 at 11; see also Tr. of Oral Arg., ECF No. 118, at 36. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims; however, as explained below, the Court will give both parties an opportunity to respond to the Court's notice that it is considering the entry of summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) with respect to two of Defendant's counterclaims.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following factual and legal background regarding in-home care for elderly individuals is relevant to the present action, and is undisputed unless otherwise noted. Pursuant to a statutory mandate, the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“DSS”) implements programs designed to regulate home healthcare and companion service agencies. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-342; Conn. Agencies Regs. § 17b-342-1. The agencies must comply with the regulations and procedures and, in turn, DSS reimburses the agencies for certain services provided to eligible clients. Conn. Agencies Regs. §§ 17b-342-1, 17b-342-2.

One such agency is CareOne, a limited liability company owned and operated by Defendant. Pls.' Local Rule (“L.R.”) 56(a)2 Statement (“St.”), ECF No. 97-1, ¶¶ 2-4. It is licensed by the State of Connecticut to provide home healthcare, homemaker, and companion services. Id. To do so, CareOne employs PCAs^[2] and assigns them to particular elderly clients based on their needs. Consistent with the DSS regulations, CareOne offers two relevant types of services: one live-in PCA pursuant to DSS Procedure Code 1023z, who provides daytime assistance with the client's daily living needs; or three PCAs who work eight-hour shifts to provide full-time assistance with the client's heightened needs. Id. ¶ 6; see also ECF No. 108-5 at 3 (defining the scope of PCA services pursuant to Procedure Code 1023z as “assisting an elder with tasks that the individual would typically do for him/herself in the absence of a disability”). Procedure Code 1023z requires an employer of a PCA providing services pursuant to that code to employ the PCA for no more than thirteen hours per day, so that the PCA can receive at least eight hours of sleep, at least five of which need to be uninterrupted, and three hours of meal break time per day. As part of the reimbursement for PCA services, DSS provides a questionnaire inquiring whether the client required care consistent with Procedure Code 1023z or a higher level of care, although it is unclear whether the client, the agency, or the PCA completes this form. ECF No. 108-6.

In the context of live-in PCA services pursuant to Procedure Code 1023z, both the agency and the client “share the supervisory responsibility” with respect to the PCA. Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 11. Relevant here, CareOne hired Plaintiffs to provide live-in PCA services pursuant to Procedure Code 1023z, although it never executed a formal employment agreement with them. Employees were provided with an employee handbook at the beginning of their employment that outlined certain expectations. Id. ¶ 21; ECF No. 81-2. In the CareOne office, posters on the wall explained employees' rights under the FLSA. Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 10; ECF Nos. 78-1, 87-4. It is undisputed that CareOne did not enter into a written agreement with any of the three named Plaintiffs to exclude their sleep time from their compensable hours. ECF No. 102 at 31 ¶ 14.

Plaintiff Precious Modise (“Modise”) was employed by CareOne as a PCA from April 30, 2017, to September 27, 2019. Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 23. During that time, she lived with her client, Ann, who provided food and housing for her. Id. ¶¶ 23, 29. Modise took approximately three breaks for personal time throughout each day, amounting to three hours total. Id. ¶ 30. It is undisputed that Modise observed that Ann “had a sleeping problem” since beginning to work with her. Id. ¶ 32. Modise attests that Ann typically went to sleep at 8:00 p.m.; then woke up around 11:00 p.m. and returned to sleep around midnight; then woke up around 2:00 a.m. for about thirty minutes; then woke up again around 5:00 a.m. Modise Aff., ECF No. 39-11, ¶¶ 26-28. It is further undisputed that Modise never documented the sleep interruptions in either of the two activity documentation systems provided by CareOne. Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 33. Modise contends that she orally informed Defendant about Ann's sleeping problems and that Defendant disregarded her concern, Modise Aff. ¶¶ 8, 22, but Defendant contends that Modise never informed him about Ann's sleeping problems, Def.'s L.R. 56(a)1 St., ECF No. 77-2, ¶¶ 32-33.

Plaintiff Tirelo Mmolawa (“T. Mmolawa”) was employed by CareOne as a PCA from March 2, 2017, to September 14, 2019. Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 38. Prior to his employment with CareOne, T. Mmolawa had been providing live-in PCA services to his client, Haddad, through a different agency. Id. ¶ 41. When Haddad sought PCA services from CareOne in March of 2017, T. Mmolawa was hired by CareOne, and thereafter he continued living with and providing services for Haddad. Id. ¶¶ 40, 51. T. Mmolawa took breaks throughout the day for meals, smoking, and other personal time.^[3] Id. ¶ 50. T. Mmolawa attests that Haddad typically woke up four or five times each night, but, as with Modise, the parties dispute whether T. Mmolawa orally informed Defendant about Haddad's sleeping problems. T. Mmolawa Aff., ECF No. 39-13, ¶¶ 23, 26; Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 47.

It is undisputed that T. Mmolawa did not document Haddad's sleeping problems in either of the two activity documentation systems provided by CareOne. Pls.' L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 47. In March of 2019, Defendant reassigned T. Mmolawa to provide services to a different client, who did not experience sleeping problems. Id. ¶ 58.

Plaintiff Morwesi Mmolawa (“M. Mmolawa”) was employed by CareOne as a PCA from March 20, 2017, to September 15, 2019. Id. ¶ 68. During that time, she lived with her client, Geraldine, who provided food and housing for her. Id. ¶¶ 68, 73. M. Mmolawa took breaks throughout the day for meals, personal hygiene, and phone calls. Id. ¶ 72. It is undisputed that Geraldine did not have routine sleeping problems. Id. ¶ 71. M. Mmolawa attests, however, that she had to care for Geraldine overnight in the emergency room twice per month and that she informed Defendant of these visits. M. Mmolawa Aff., ECF No. 39-12, ¶¶ 27-28.^[4]

Turning to the facts surrounding Plaintiffs' wages, it is undisputed that they were paid $1960.00 for every two weeks of work. ECF No. 102 at 28, ¶ 4 (Defendant admitting that, during the relevant time, Plaintiffs were paid $1960.00 when they worked fourteen days in two workweeks). The calculation of that wage, however, is hotly disputed. Plaintiffs attest that they were paid a daily flat rate of $140.00. Modise Aff. ¶ 15; T. Mmolawa Aff. ¶ 11; M. Mmolawa Aff. ¶ 15. Mathematically, this is consistent with the undisputed fact that they were paid $1960.00 for every fourteen days of work, given that $1960.00 divided by fourteen equals a daily wage of $140.00. Plaintiffs further represent that, during the course of their employment, they never received a paystub or other itemized breakdown of their overtime wages or food and housing deductions.

Defendant represents that Plaintiffs were not paid a daily flat rate and that his calculation of Plaintiffs' wages proceeded in the following manner. First, Defendant would determine the amount of a food and housing credit. To do so, Defendant would obtain the relevant expenses from the clients, such as their mortgage payment, utility bills, property insurance, and grocery bills. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 45-47; ECF No. 95-10. If the clients did not provide him with the actual bills, which appears to have frequently been the case, he would review “certain publications” to determine “what rates are in the area.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 45. After ascertaining the clients' food and housing expenses, either actual or approximate, he would calculate a weekly amount and credit that amount to Plaintiffs' wages. See id.; ECF Nos. 95-11, 95-12. For example, Defendant's records indicate that $469.66 were credited to Modise's weekly wage to...