Moen v. Dir. of Div. of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1949
• Citation: 85 N.E.2d 779,324 Mass. 246
• Parties: MOEN v. DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

324 Mass. 246

85 N.E.2d 779

MOEN

v.DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

April 26, 1949.

Petition for Review from Central District Court of Worcester; Walter D. Allen, Judge.

Proceeding by Peter F. Moen against the Director of the Division of Employment Security and others to recover unemployment benefits. From a decision of the Central District Court of Worcester, which affirmed a decision of the Board of Review in the Division of Employment Security and the Department of Labor and Industries, denying unemployment benefits, the claimant petitions for review.

Affirmed.

Before QUA, C.J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING, and WILLIAMS, JJ.

S. S. Grant, of Boston, for petitioner.

B. M. Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., and E. N. Boisclair, of Lynn, for Director of Division of Employment Security.

SPALDING, Justice.

The claimant appeals from a decision of the Central District Court of Worcester which affirmed a decision of the board of review in the division of employment security in the department of labor and industries denying unemployment benefits under the employment security law. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, as appearing in St.1941, c. 685, § 1, as amended. Proceedings in the District Court and appeal from that court directly to this court are under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, § 42, as appearing in St.1943, c. 534, § 6, as amended by St.1947, c. 434. Since by § 42 the findings of the board of review are conclusive ‘if supported by any evidence,’ only questions of law are reviewable in the District Court and here. Pacific Mills v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 322 Mass. 345, 346, 77 N.E.2d 413;Wagstaff v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 322 Mass. 664, 667, 79 N.E.2d 3;Rivers v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 323 Mass. 339, 82 N.E.2d 1;Farrar v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 45, 47, 84 N.E.2d 540.

The facts, which are not in dispute, are as follows: The claimant worked in the Worcester plant of The American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey (hereinafter called the company), and at all times here material was a member of the United Steelworkers of America (CIO), a labor union with which the company had entered into a collective bargaining agreement.¹ It appears that the union had been designated the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the company's employees and that it became a party to the agreement ‘in its capacity as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of such employees.’ The agreement provided that employees who had been in the service of the company for a certain period of time were eligible for a vacation with pay in any calendar year during the term of the agreement, and that ‘eligible employee[s] shall receive a vacation’ of one, two, or three weeks, depending on their length of service with the company. The agreement further provided that ‘It is understood and agreed that a period of temporary shutdown in any department for any reason between June 1 and October 1, unless other periods are mutually agreed upon, may be designated as comprising the vacation period for any employees of the department who are eligiblefor vacations.’ For the weeks ending on July 5 and July 12, 1947, the company's plant was shut down to enable its employees to take their vacations. Since the claimant had not been in the service of the company for the requisite length of time to make him eligible for a vacation with pay under the agreement, he received no compensation for the period of the shutdown and because of it was unable to render any services for the company. It is for this period that he claims compensation. Compensation was denied by the director. Upon review, an examiner ruled that the claimant was not entitled to compensation. The board of review by denying the claimant's application for further review adopted the decision of the examiner. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, § 41, as appearing in St.1941, c. 685, § 1; Wagstaff v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 322 Mass. 664, 665, 79 N.E.2d 3.

The question for decision, as the parties agree, is whether on the foregoing facts the board committed error of law in denying compensation to the claimant. The provisions of the employment security law pertinent to this question are the following: ‘Section 24. An individual, in order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter, shall * * * (b) Be capable of and available for work and unable to obtain work in his usual occupation or any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted * * *. Section 25. No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter for * * * (d) Any period with respect to which he is receiving or has received or is about to receive remuneration in the form of * * * (2) vacation allowances * * * (e) The period of unemployment next ensuing after an individual has left his employment; (1) Voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent.’

It is plain that the claimant's unemployment occurred as the result of a collective bargaining agreement between the company and a union of which the claimant was a member and which was the exclusive bargaining agency for those in the company's employ. Under this agreement employees who had been in the service of the...