Moffitt v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 03 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-1519
• Citation: 160 F.Supp.3d 786
• Parties: Joseph P. Moffitt, Plaintiff v. Tunkhannock Area School District and the Tunkhannock Area School District Board of School Directors, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

160 F.Supp.3d 786

Joseph P. Moffitt, Plaintiff

v.Tunkhannock Area School District and the Tunkhannock Area School District Board of School Directors, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-1519

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed February 3, 2016

Andrew J. Katsock, III, Law Offices of Andrew J. Katsock, III, Wilkes-Barre, PA, Plaintiff.

Frank J. Tunis, Wright & Reihner, P.C., Mark Joseph Kozlowski, Robin B. Snyder, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Scranton, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment filed by Tunkhannock Area School District (the “District”) and the Tunkhannock Area School District Board of Directors (the “Board”). (Doc. 39). The plaintiff, Joseph P. Moffitt, asserted four (4) Constitutional claims, one (1) claim for breach of contract, and one (1) claim for wrongful suspension after the defendants suspended him from his school principal position, without pay, for alleged improper administration of tests to students in the District. (Doc. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a principal in the Tunkhannock Area School District both at Evans Falls Elementary School and Mill City Elementary School. Prior to that, the plaintiff served as vice principal at Tunkhannock Area High School from 2006 to 2009. The plaintiff's supervisors are the District Superintendent, Michael Healey (“Healey”), and the District Assistant Superintendent, Dr. Ann Way (“Way”). The District is required to administer the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA), which is a standardized test. Prior to the PSSA test, the District would administer the 4Sight Benchmark Assessment, which created benchmarks for the students. Results from the 4Sight tests described how students were expected to perform on the PSSA if the PSSA were administered on the same day as the 4Sight test.

In October 2011, the District administered the 4Sight exam to its students for the first time online. (Doc. 40-2 at 22-23). The two-day exam consisted of 120 reading and math questions. Several of those questions were open-ended and administered on a split screen, where students would read the question on one side and respond to it on the other side. During the October 2011 administration of the exam, one of the teachers called the plaintiff and told him that she could not figure out how to use the split screen for the open-ended questions. Questions from the prep books for the PSSA test were then used as a substitute. The PSSA prep book questions were purportedly similar to the 4Sight questions. Id. at 24. Prior to substituting the PSSA questions for the 4Sight questions, the plaintiff did not consult with Healey. (Doc. 40-1 at ¶ 27, Doc. 44 at ¶ 27). Upon completion of the exams, it was the plaintiff's duty to enter the scores once teachers brought the plaintiff the roster of students with their corresponding scores. In this case, some of the teachers brought the roster with scores to the plaintiff to input in the system, but the plaintiff also admittedly distributed his username and password to teachers to input the scores directly. (Doc. 40-2 at 42-43). The plaintiff repeated this method for the January 2012 exam. (Doc. 40-2 at 41).

On June 7, 2012, the plaintiff's secretary notified the plaintiff that Superintendent Healey wanted to meet with him later that day at 2:30 p.m. (Doc. 40-1 at ¶ 8). According to the plaintiff, he inquired with his secretary about the purpose of the meeting, but she could not tell him. (Doc. 40-2 at 50). The plaintiff, along with Healey, Way, and the District's attorney, Jeffrey Tucker (“Tucker”), met at Healey's office, and the meeting lasted approximately one to two-and-a-half hours (Doc. 40-2 at 63, Doc. 40-3 at 26, Doc. 40-4 at 33). During the meeting, the District's attorney questioned the plaintiff about his username and password distribution and the 4Sight test. (Doc. 40-1 at ¶ 8, Doc. 40-2 at 51, Doc. 44 at ¶ 8). The plaintiff asked for an attorney during the meeting at least once, and the District's attorney told him that he was not entitled to one. (Doc. 40-1 at ¶ 9, Doc. 44 at ¶ 9). There were two breaks, and after the second break, Healey told the plaintiff that he was being suspended. (Doc. 40-1 at ¶ 15, Doc. 40-2 at 52).

The following morning, on June 8, 2012 around 10 a.m., the plaintiff had a meeting with Healey. In this second meeting, Healey informed the plaintiff that he was suspended without pay indefinitely pending further investigation. (Doc. 25 at 4, Doc. 40 at 9). Approximately one week later, the plaintiff received a letter from Healey notifying him that, as a result of investigations and the June 7, 2012 meeting, there was evidence supporting his termination. (Doc. 1 at 21, Doc. 25 at 4-5). The letter also confirmed the plaintiff's suspension without pay, but with benefits, effective on June 8, 2012 until the School Board held a termination hearing. (Doc. 1 at 21). The letter informed him that he could not step foot on school property or attend any sporting events, even though two of his children were District students. The letter did not describe the charges against him or the evidence purportedly supporting his termination. The plaintiff alleges that, in suspending the plaintiff, Healey was retaliating against the plaintiff for reporting that there was life-threatening mold in one of the school buildings, and that 4Sight testing was simply used as a pretext.

On July 23, 2012, the plaintiff received a letter from the Board President, Robert J. Parry, that notified him that Healey recommended his termination to the Board, described the charges against him, and informed him that a hearing would be held pursuant to 24 P.S. § 11–1127. (Doc. 40-6). The letter listed five charges as grounds for his possible termination under 24 P.S. § 11–1122 : “(1) immorality; (2) incompetency; (3) persistent negligence in the performance of duties; (4) willful neglect of duties; and (5) persistent and willful violation of or failure to comply with school laws of this Commonwealth, including official directives and established policy of the Board of Directors.” Id. The letter further states that the Board would determine specifically whether the plaintiff:

1. Shared District passwords with unauthorized individuals;

2. Permitted yourself to be impersonated with your knowledge and consent by allowing others to use your username and/or password to input 4Sight scores;

3. Knowingly failed to properly administer the 4Sight assessment;

4. Negligently failed to properly administer the 4Sight assessment;

5. Failed to properly oversee the administration of the 4Sight assessment; and/or

6. Lied to and/or misled supervisors regarding the administration of the 4Sight assessment.

Id. The first two charges relating to the plaintiff's unauthorized sharing of his password were later dropped. (Doc. 43 at 4, Doc. 44 at ¶ 3).

Board of Education Solicitor, Frank J. Tunis, Jr. (“Tunis”), presided over three days of hearings on the evenings of September 19, October 24, and November 8, 2012. (Doc. 40-2 at 67-68). The plaintiff attended all hearings and was represented by counsel. On November 16, 2012, the Board's attorney sent the plaintiff a letter stating that the Board rejected the District's recommendation to terminate and that he would be reinstated. (Doc. 1 at 27). Although the Board disagreed with Healey's recommendation, the Board further suspended the plaintiff without pay until reinstatement at the beginning of the next marking period. The plaintiff allegedly went without salary from June 7, 2012 until his reinstatement on January 28, 2013 for a total of 242 days. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 31).

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 6, 2013, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging eight different causes of action against the defendants and requesting compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and other damages. (Doc. 1). On August 19, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 8). The plaintiff submitted an opposing brief on September 16, 2013. (Doc. 15). On December 31, 2013, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (Doc. 22). The plaintiff then submitted an amended complaint on January 16, 2014. (Doc. 25). The plaintiff's amended complaint alleges the following six counts: Counts I & II for violation of plaintiff's due process rights and rights to equal access to justice; Count III for First Amendment retaliation; Count IV for violation of associational rights; Count V for breach of contract; and Count VI for wrongful suspension in violation of public policy. On February 21, 2014, the defendants filed their answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint. (Doc. 28).

At the conclusion of discovery, on October 1, 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, (Doc. 39), followed by a brief in support on October 15, 2014, (Doc. 40), and a statement of material facts on October 16, 2014, (Doc. 41). The plaintiff filed a brief in opposition, (Doc. 43), as well as an answer to the defendants' statement of material facts, (Doc. 44), on October 29, 2014. The defendants submitted a reply brief on November 12, 2014. (Doc. 45). The plaintiff then filed a surreply brief on November 21, 2014. (Doc. 47).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The defendants' motion for summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), which states that “the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant, and is material if it will affect...