Mogan v. Petrou

• Decision Date: 17 November 2021
• Docket Number: 21-cv-06959-TSH
• Parties: MICHAEL MOGAN, Plaintiff, v. IOANA PETROU, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

MICHAEL MOGAN, Plaintiff,
v.
IOANA PETROU, et al., Defendants.

No. 21-cv-06959-TSH

United States District Court, N.D. California

November 17, 2021

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS RE: DKT. NO. 8

THOMAS S. HIXSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Michael Mogan brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process case against Justice Ioana Petrou of the Court of Appeal for the State of California and Judge Ethan Schulman of the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco (“Defendants”), arising from his disagreement with their rulings related to the imposition of sanctions against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. Mogan filed an Opposition (ECF No. 11) and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 12). The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and VACATES the December 9, 2021 hearing. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties' positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for the following reasons.^[1]

II. BACKGROUND

Mogan is an attorney licensed to practice in California. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. He represented Veronica McCluskey in a civil action in California state court and in arbitration

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proceedings against several employees of Airbnb after the state court compelled arbitration based on an agreement executed between McCluskey and Airbnb. Id. ¶ 6. Mogan alleges the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) closed the arbitration proceedings because the Airbnb defendants failed to timely pay their filing fee. Id. ¶ 7. However, after Mogan filed a motion to lift the stay in superior court, Judge Schulman denied the motion, finding AAA made a clerical error by misapplying the Airbnb defendants' timely fees. Id. ¶ 13. Judge Schulman also found that once AAA acknowledged its mistake, it requested but did not receive confirmation from McCluskey that she wished to proceed. Id. ¶ 13. Judge Schulman stated: “The Court will not allow Plaintiff to take advantage of the AAA's clerical error and her own lengthy delays in order to evade her contractual obligation to arbitrate her claims, if she wishes to pursue them.” Id.

Following Judge Schulman's ruling, the Airbnb defendants filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. Id. ¶ 14. Judge Schulman granted the motion in part and awarded over $22, 000 in fees against Mogan (but not McCluskey), finding the motion to lift the stay was “both factually and legally frivolous.” Id. ¶ 15. Mogan and McCluskey appealed the order, arguing Judge Schulman abused his discretion in ordering sanctions, but in November 2020, Justice Petrou affirmed the sanctions award. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25. Mogan subsequently filed a petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeal, which was denied, and filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was also denied. Id. ¶¶ 28-36, 46.

Mogan filed the present complaint on September 8, 2021, alleging Defendants' actions resulted in the deprivation of his substantive and procedural due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 47-61. He seeks a declaratory judgment, “declaring the acts of the defendants to be a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights to freedom to procedural due process and substantive due process, ” a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the sanctions award and “further violating Plaintiff's civil rights.” Id. at 12:7-12.

Defendants filed the present motion on October 22, 2021, arguing Mogan's complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and because

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Mogan lacks Article III standing. Mot. at 1. Defendants further argue the complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the claims are based on official, judicial acts by Justice Petrou and Judge Schulman, and therefore any cause of action is barred by absolute judicial immunity. Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.; Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a party to move to dismiss a lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the attack is facial, the court determines whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Where the attack is factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The present motion is a facial attack.

Dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend should only be granted where the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by amendment. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rule 8

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provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility does not mean probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009). A complaint must therefore provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citation omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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