Mohamad v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-1189-L-BF |
| Parties | SHAHID MOHAMAD, Plaintiff, v. DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, et at., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31), filed January 9, 2012. On July 23, 2010, this case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney for pretrial management. The court vacates the aforementioned reference, and after careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, briefs, appendices, record, and applicable law, the court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
Plaintiff Shahid Mohamad ("Mohamad" or "Plaintiff") filed this action pro se in the 95th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, on May 18, 2010, against his former employer Dallas County Community College District ("DCCCD" or the "District") and several former co-workers, alleging violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as state law claims for breach of contract, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference witha contractual relationship. Mohamad's initial pleading sought compensatory damages for lost wages and mental anguish, exemplary damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 15, 2010, Defendants timely removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Thereafter, the court granted Defendants' motion for partial dismissal and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's section 1981 claim, all of his state law claims, including his claims against the individual Defendants, and his request for exemplary damages. See Doc. 18. Mohamad's only remaining claims are against the District for unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and disparate impact in violation of Title VII.
Mohamad is a Muslin Arab-American of Palestinian descent, who worked for the District as a campus police officer at Eastfield College from October 2003 until his termination on March 9, 2010. Pl.'s Resp. App. 53; Def.'s App. 13, ¶ 3. Mohamad contends that he experienced discrimination and harassment during his tenure at Eastfield College because of his race, or national origin and religion. According to Mohamad, the problems began in February 2007, shortly after Michael Horak ("Horak")was hired as a lieutenant with the Eastfield College police department. Pl.'s App. 67, 77-78; Def.'s App. 18, ¶ 2. Mohamad contends that in July 2008, Horak insulted him while describing a female student's upcoming class presentation. Def.'s App. 86-87, 94-96; see also Pl.'s App. 26. Horak attempted to explain to Mohamad and a campus security guard that the student would be wearing a hijab, the head scarf or veil traditionally worn by Muslim women, by stating that she would be wearing "the cover that the burka that you know, the what-do-you-call-it." Def.'s App. 96, 98. The security guard interjected, Id. at 96. Horak agreed, telling Mohamad, Id.When Mohamad objected to Horak's comparison of Muslims to terrorists, Horak allegedly refused to apologize, instead telling Mohamad that he was overreacting. Id. at 68-71, 96.
Mohamad alleges that the harassment intensified in 2009, after Horak was promoted to the rank of captain and Timothy Ellington ("Ellington") was hired as a lieutenant. Def.'s App. 18, ¶ 2; 21, ¶ 2. Horak allegedly wanted "an all white police department" and furthered his agenda by ordering Ellington to target Mohamad and other minority officers including Lieutenant Ray Hill and Corporal Leo Michael Pleasants, both African-American, and Officer Rodrigo Robles, a Hispanic-American for harassment and termination. Pl.'s App. 5, ¶ 6; Def.'s App. 92. Mohamad contends that Ellington removed him from prestigious assignments, such as firearms instructor and field training officer, transferred his job responsibilities to less-qualified junior officers, and denied him promotions. Def.'s App. 26-27, 80-83; Pl.'s App. 45. Ellington also allegedly relegated Mohamad to menial duties, excluded him from important meetings, threatened to change his work schedule, micromanaged his daily activities, and constantly harassed him about insignificant matters. Def.'s App. 28-36.
In February 2010, Mohamad informed Patricia Rayford ("Rayford"), Director of Human Resources for Eastfield College, that he intended to file a grievance with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regarding his alleged mistreatment by Lieutenant Ellington and other commanding officers in the Eastfield College police department. Def.'s App. 44. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division. Pl.'s Resp. App. 136-38. On February 23, 2010, Mohamad met with Rayford to discuss his complaints. Def.'s App. 42-43; 1, ¶ 3. Rodrigo Robles ("Robles"), another Eastfield College police officer, also attended the meeting. In the course of presenting hisgrievance against Ellington, Mohamad told Rayford, "[e]verything is recorded," adding "on paper" or "in writing." Id. at 44, 46, 47. Rayford immediately asked Mohamad if he had notified Ellington that their conversations had been recorded. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. Robles interjected that recording a conversation is legal as long as one participant in the conversation knows it is being recorded. Id. at 130. Mohamad never explained what he meant by his statement, and Rayford did not ask for further clarification. Id. at 2, ¶ 4.
After the meeting, Rayford informed Captain Horak, DCCCD Associate Vice Chancellor Luis Camacho ("Camacho"), and Eastfield College President Jean Conway ("Conway") that Mohamad may have violated the District's policy against unauthorized recordings by employees. Id. ¶ 5; 6, ¶ 4. Rayford, Camacho, and Conway decided to terminate Mohamad's employment based on his apparent admission that he recorded conversations with his supervisor without permission in violation of District policy. Id. at 2, ¶ 7; 6, ¶ 5. On March 9, 2010, Mohamad was summoned to a meeting with Horak, Ellington, Rayford, and Camacho where he was given the option of resigning his position. Id. at 2, ¶ 8. When Mohamad refused to resign, he was terminated. Id.; see also id. at 53-55.
On January 9, 2012, the District moved for summary judgment on Mohamad's remaining claims for unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and disparate impact in violation of Title VII. Mohamad responded to the District's motion on April 19, 2012, and on May 21, 2012, Mohamad filed a response to the District's reply brief to address its objections to the affidavit testimony relied on by Mohamad in response to the District's summary judgment motion.
Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, "if the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). "[When] the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine [dispute] for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586 (citation omitted). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summaryjudgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that...
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