Mohamad v. Rajoub
Decision Date | 30 September 2009 |
Docket Number | Civil Case No. 08-1800 (RJL). |
Citation | 664 F.Supp.2d 20 |
Parties | Asid MOHAMAD, Shahid Mohammad, Said Mohamad, Shahed Azzam Rahim, Mashhud Rahim, Mohamad Rahim, Asia Rahim, Plaintiffs, v. Jibril RAJOUB, Amin Al-Hindi, Tawfik Tirawi, Palestinian Authority, Palestine Liberation Organization, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Robert Joseph Tolchin, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Laura G. Ferguson, Mark J. Rochon, Richard A. Hibey, Miller & Chevalier, Chartered, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs in this case are the widow and sons of Azzam Rahim, a U.S. citizen, who was tortured and killed in the West Bank of Israel in September 1995. The defendants are three individuals (i.e. Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, and Tawfik Tirawi), the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), the Alien Tort Statute, and federal common law. Defendants Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("defendants") have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted under the TVPA, the Alien Tort Statute,1 or federal common law2 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion.
Plaintiffs first allege defendants violated the TVPA, which creates a cause of action for torts committed by "individual[s]" "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1350 & 1350 note § 2(a)(1)-(2). Plaintiffs argue that the Court should broadly interpret "individual" to include organizations, such as the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, similar to the way courts often interpret "person." (See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") [Dkt. # 14] at 5-7.) Defendants, not surprisingly, argue that "individual" is limited to human beings. (Mem. of Law in Support of the Palestinian Authority's and the Palestine Liberation Organization's Mot. to Dismiss ("Mot. to Dismiss") [Dkt. # 11] at 9-13.) I agree.
A plain reading of the statute and applicable case law in this jurisdiction, leads this Court to overwhelmingly conclude that the term "individual" includes only human beings, and does not encompass the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 n. 13, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998) ( ); Fisher v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 541 F.Supp.2d 46, 50 n. 2 (D.D.C.2008) (); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 496 F.Supp.2d 1, 18 (D.D.C.2005) ( ); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F.Supp.2d 20, 28 (D.D.C.2005) (); Collett v. Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 362 F.Supp.2d 230, 242 (D.D.C.2005) ( ); Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 01-2224, 2005 WL 756090, *31 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.Supp.2d 539, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (); but see Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1265 (11th Cir.2005) ( ). Of course, this conclusion is also consistent with Congress's decision to use the term "individual" in the TVPA to describe both those who commit torture and extrajudicial killings and those who are victims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note §§ 2(a)(1)-(2).
Moreover, the TVPA's legislative history further supports the conclusion that the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization are not proper defendants under the TVPA. See H.R.Rep. No. 102-367 (1991), 1992 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1991, pp. 84, 87 (); S.Rep. No. 102-249, 1, 6 (1991) (). Simply stated, Congress's plain intent as reflected in the text (which specifies only individuals) and the legislative history (which could not be clearer) "was to confine liability for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing to private individuals." Dammarell, No. 01-2224, 2005 WL 756090 at *31. Therefore, this Court finds plaintiffs cannot bring a TVPA claim against the Palestinian Authority or the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Court dismisses these claims.
Next, plaintiffs claim to have a cause of action under federal common law against these two organizations. I disagree. Plaintiffs' claim that "torture carried out by a public official or one acting in an official capacity" is a violation of federal common law, as reflected in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the United Nations' Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, (Pl.'s Opp'n at 14), is, at best, strained. Unfortunately, plaintiffs' additional argument that the Supreme Court held this in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004), is similarly exaggerated. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 12 ( ).)
The question in Sosa was which causes of action would be permissible under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Plaintiffs' claim that the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, provides this Court with jurisdiction to fashion a cause of action for them out of federal common law is not supported by the Sosa decision. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Sosa explicitly limited its discussion to the Alien Tort Statute and specifically excluded § 1331:
Our position does not ... imply that every grant of jurisdiction to a federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop federal common law (so that the grant of federal-question jurisdiction would be equally as good for our purposes as § 1350).... Section 1350 was enacted on the congressional understanding that some courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations; and we know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable congressional assumption. Further, our holding today is consistent with the division of responsibilities between federal and state courts after Erie [v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)] as a more expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 might not be.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n. 19, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (internal citation omitted).
Our Circuit Court has similarly noted that describing actions that are brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (and presumably, the Alien Tort Statute) as "federal common law" is a "misnomer." Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C.Cir.2003). Those...
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