Mohave Valley Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Norton, 99-16927

• Decision Date: 11 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-16927,99-16927
• Citation: 244 F.3d 1164
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2001) MOHAVE VALLEY IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1164

244 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2001)

MOHAVE VALLEY IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-16927

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2001

Filed April 11, 2001

Terrence S. Leek, Prescott, Arizona, for the plaintiffappellant.

Jeffrey C. Dobbins, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.CV-95-02640-JWS

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, J. Clifford Wallace, and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

SCHROEDER, Chief Judge:

The Mohave Valley Irrigation and Drainage District ("District"), located in western Arizona, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Gale Norton, in her capacity as Secretary of the Interior ("Interior"). The District alleges that Interior breached a 1968 contract entitling the District to 41,000 acre feet of water annually from the Colorado River system. The District and Interior differ on whether that entitlement encompasses water delivered to landowners in the District who hold present perfected rights ("PPRs") to Colorado River water.

The Supreme Court has defined PPRs as those rights to water from the Colorado River system existing as of June 25, 1929, acquired under state law and having been put to beneficial use, as well as all rights created under federal law. It defined the scope of such rights as follows:

[Any water right] acquired in accordance with state law, which right has been exercised by the actual diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been applied to a defined area of land or to definite municipal or industrial works . . . [as well as ] rights created by the reservation of mainstream water for the use of federal establishments under federal law whether or not the water has been applied to benefi cial use.

Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 341 (1964). Pursuant to 43 U.S.C. S 617e, the Department of Interior is obligated to use water from the Colorado River system to supply holders of present perfected rights. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 364-65 (1980)(recognizing that present perfected rights constitute a limitation on Interior's power to distribute water from the Colorado River).

The District entered into a contract in 1968 to establish its limited entitlement to water from the lower Colorado River, its related reclamation projects, and wells fed by the River's groundwater and Interior's projects. The contract establishes the District's annual allotment of water (currently set at41,000 acre feet) and provides specific procedures through which the entitlement can be adjusted every ten years. The contract does not explicitly mention the impact of water deliveries to holders of PPRs located within the District's boundaries.

Interior maintains it fulfills its responsibility if it calculates the District's allotment by subtracting water provided to holders of PPRs located within the District from the amount fixed by the contract. The district court agreed with Interior. It found that the allotment of water in the contract encompasses all the water delivered to the District, even if some of that water goes to landowners who hold PPRs. The District appeals, contending that the contract is ambiguous and that a trial is necessary to establish its entitlement to the full water allotment under the contract, in addition to the water delivered to holders of PPRs.

Federal law governs the interpretation of contracts where the United States is a party. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1995). This Court has consistently applied federal law to interpret reclamation contracts. See, e.g., Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999); Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 1989). We interpret the 1968 contract between the District and Interior by considering whether a reasonable person would find the contract's terms to be ambiguous. Castaneda v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1981). On its face, the contract language supports Interior's interpretation. The contract broadly defines the District as...