Mohler v. Department of Labor

• Decision Date: 22 March 1951
• Docket Number: 31829,Nos. 31828,s. 31828
• Citation: 97 N.E.2d 762,409 Ill. 79,24 A.L.R.2d 1393
• Parties: , 24 A.L.R.2d 1393 MOHLER v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al. PRATT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 762

97 N.E.2d 762

409 Ill. 79, 24 A.L.R.2d 1393

MOHLER v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al.

PRATT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al.

Nos. 31828, 31829.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 22, 1951.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen., (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow and James C Murray, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

No appearance for appellees.

DAILY, Justice.

In two separate hearings held in the summer of 1949, the board of review of the Department of Labor of this State entered decisions finding that Hattie E. Mohler and Mary Pratt, the respective claimants, were ineligible for benefits provided by the Unemployment Compensation Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 48, pars. 217-250.) Each claimant then filed a complaint in the circuit court of Iroquois County seeking review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 110, pars. 264-279.) The circuit court, after first remanding the cause to the board to hear subsequently discovered evidence, entered orders reversing the board in each case, and holding that the claimants were entitled to benefits. The Department of Labor, its Director and the board, have perfected separate appeals to this court from each order. We have consolidated them for purposes of review because they present identical issues of law under substantially similar facts.

With respect to appellee Hattie E. Mohler, the record discloses her to be a woman sixty-five years of age, who, for twenty-eight years, had been employed by the Milord Canning Company, Milford, Illinois, during the asparagus pack which lasts from six to eight weeks in the spring of each year, and during the corn pack which lasts from four to six weeks in late summer of each year. She had never worked for any other industry, and during the periods the canning factory was not operating, worked at such jobs as baby sitting, washing, practical nursing and housework in the vicinity of her home at Stockland, which is some seven miles from Milford. During the canning seasons, appellee found transporation to Milford in private cars, or else took a bus which was in service while the cannery operated. In 1948, after each seasonal period of employment, appellee filed claim for unemployment compensation benefits, which were paid to her up until she filed a claim for the week of September 25, 1948. The refusal of the Department of Labor to pay the latter claim has generated this litigation. She testified that subsequent to the termination of her employment in September, 1948, she sought work at restaurants both in Milford and Stockland, but that she made no other effort to secure employment in that year. In December, 1949, she applied for work at two stores in Watseka, Illinois, but made no application to industries of that city which employed women.

The facts appearing in the record relative to the appellee Mary Pratt are substantially to the same effect. It appears that she also is sixty-five years of age and that she lives with her husband in Milford, Illinois; that she has worked for the Milford Canning Company during the corn and asparagus packs for twenty-seven years; that she had no other industrial experience; and that in the off season she occasionally did laundry and housecleaning for others. She stated that after the factory closed in September, 1948, she had tried to find work at several stores in Milford, and had applied at an industrial plant in Watseka which hired women.

At each hearing the board of review called as its own witness one Darrel Nelson, an employee of the Division of Unemployment Compensation with offices in Kankakee, who professed knowledge of the labor market in the Milford area. He testified that there were no calls for labor in Milford outside those for two seasonal industries, viz., the cannery and a hybried seed company, and that the town did not offer suitable work prospects during the off season of these industries. He related that Milford is located between Hoopeston and Watseka, both of which were considered to be labor markets because of the industries there, and both of which, he concluded, would be the practical labor market for residents in and near Milford. He admitted that there was no satisfactory means of public transportation from Milford to either city, and that Milford people who do work in these places must use private transportation. Neither of the appellees, it appears, had means of transporation.

On the records thus made, the board of review denied benefits to appellees, with a finding that appellees were not 'available for work' within the meaning of section 6(c) of the Unemployment Compensation Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 48, par. 222.) The section reads as follows: ' § 6. Eligibility for benefits. An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Director finds that: * * * (c) He is able to work, and is available for work; provided that during the period in question he was actively seeking work.'

The phrase 'available for work' is nowhere defined in the act, nor have we been previously asked to construe or interpret it. It appears, however, that the phrase is used in the unemployment compensation laws in all fifty-one American jurisdictions, and has been the subject of litigation and scholarly discussion in many of them. Appellants urge that we adopt the standards and criteria of these neighboring jurisdictions in construing our own act and in applying it to the facts of the appeals before us. Appellees have filed no written briefs and thus we do not have the advantage of their argument against the positions taken by the appellants.

It is said that the phrase 'available for work' is designed to test the currentl laborforce attachment of the claimant for unemployment compensation. The though is that if the individual is to be compensated for wage loss or loss of income under a compulsory unemployment insurance system, then there must be assurance that he is available for work and that he is ready to accept employment. The requirement that a claimant, in order to be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, shall have earned a specified amount of wages during a designated period, (section 6(c),) is one of the eligibility requirements that tests the individual's past status as a worker and indicates that he has earned wages. The requirement that he be available for work is designed to test the individual's continued and current attachment to the labor force. Dwyer v. Appeal Board, 321 Mich. 178, 32 N.W.2d 434; 55 Yale Law Journal, pp. 123-124; Altman, Availability for Work, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 2.

An examination of the many cases cited from other jurisdictions leads to the conclusion that no hard-and-fast rule as to what constitutes availability for work can be adopted; that availability depends in part on the facts and circumstances in each case, and that in general the availability requirement of the statutes is satisfied where a worker is ready and willing to accept suitable work at a point where there...