Mohrhusen v. McCann

• Decision Date: 05 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 322,322
• Parties: Stella MOHRHUSEN and Stella Mohrhusen, Personal Representative of the Estate of Alfred Mohrhusen, Appellant, v. E. Michael McCANN, District Attorney, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 560

215 N.W.2d 560

62 Wis.2d 509

Stella MOHRHUSEN and Stella Mohrhusen, Personal Representative of the Estate of Alfred Mohrhusen, Appellant, v. E. Michael McCANN, District Attorney, et al., Respondents.

No. 322.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March 5, 1974.

Burton A. Strnad, Milwaukee, for appellant.

Robert W. Warren, Atty., Gen., Robert D. Martinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondents.

WILKIE, Justice.

A single issue is involved on this appeal: Did the trial court err in dismissing the plaintiff's petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the district attorney and the medical examiner of Milwaukee county from conducting an inquest into the death of Alfred J. Mohrhusen?

Was prohibition the proper remedy and did plaintiff meet the requirements for issuance of the writ? The writ of prohibition is commonly defined as one to prevent a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance, or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. ¹ We conclude that an inquest is a quasi-judicial proceeding against which a writ of prohibition may properly lie. Recently this court enlarged the scope and use of the writ of prohibition to include non-jurisdictional error. ² However, this court also recently reemphasized that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy and that it will be issued only in cases where (1) there is no effective remedy and (2) extraordinary hardship is shown. In State ex rel. Jefferson v. Roraff ³ this court said that the burden is on the petitioner seeking the writ to allege sufficient facts to meet this twofold prerequisite to the issuance of a writ. In the Roraff Case the court concluded that mere inclusion in the petition of a general conclusionary statement that there is no adequate remedy and that grave hardship will result if the writ does not issue will not suffice. Facts must be alleged in support of such conclusions. In some cases the harm could be inherent in the situation. This is not such a case.

Here, the petition is similar to the one held to be inadequate in the Roraff Case. The affidavit of Stella Mohrhusen in support of her petition concludes with the following paragraphs:

'That the District Attorney and Medical Examiner well knowing the premises, yet contriving, as affiant believes, unjustly and unlawfully to oppose affiant and against the laws and customs of this State, and contrary to all conception of justice and fair play, and to her manifest damage, prejudice and grievance, the District Attorney and Medical Examiner's Office refused to and still do refuse to dismiss the inquest.

'That there is no adequate remedy at law, and irreparable harm will be done to affiant unless the District Attorney and Medical Examiner are restrained and prohibited from proceeding with the inquest.'

As in Roraff, the briefs and oral arguments on appeal were directed to the merits of the petitioner's claims and not to the prerequisites to the issuance of the writ. Nor do the transcripts of the two hearings before the dismissal of the petition and the alternative writ reveal any presentation of facts to show the type of harm which would flow if the writ of prohibition did not issue. The type of harm the petitioner contemplates appears in the affidavit of the petitioner where she states:

'That petitioner is informed and believes that because of the circumstances it is impossible for the petitioner and the members of her family to have a fair and impartial hearing and that said hearing will infringe upon their right of privacy.'

In State ex rel. Schulter v. Roraff ⁴ the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in a criminal case against him. The petitioner alleged that an inquest which resulted in charges against him was so unfair and raised such prejudicial publicity that it effectively denied him a chance to receive a fair trial. This court stated that if the petitioner were correct in his contentions he should not be put to a trial and that prohibition would be proper. However, this court found that the pretrial publicity was not so outrageous that it necessitated the ending of the criminal proceedings.

In this case the petitioner has not demonstrated that the inquest will not be fair and impartial. The inquest will be conducted by the medical examiner's office and the petitioner has not shown that the medical examiner will not conduct a fair and impartial proceeding. This court has already stated that an inquest is not per se unconstitutional. ⁵ The petitioner appears to raise this issue in her affidavit where she states:

'. . . That there are no rules promulgated for the holding of an inquest, nor is there any superintending body or court regularly appointed to control the procedure. That petitioner believes the procedure violates her rights to due process and infringes on her right of privacy and other privileges provided by the Constitution of the United States, State of Wisconsin, and certain privileges granted to witnesses by the State of Wisconsin.'

In the Schulter Case we rejected a broadside constitutional attack on the inquest procedure. The inquest is mainly an investigative tool; witnesses at such an inquest are entitled to due process and the manner of the conducting of the inquest may give rise to legitimate constitutional complaints. In the present case, however, claims of violation of due process are speculative. The record reveals no reason to believe that violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights is so clear and imminent that the inquest should be restrained before it is commenced.

The petitioner referred several times to her right to privacy. Although the respondents are correct in stating that this state does not recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy, ⁶ some recognition of rights to privacy is implicit in many constitutional protections afforded the individual. However, any right to privacy of an individual witness at an inquest would be outweighed by the public interest in the investigation of possible criminal actions. While an individual may perhaps claim certain constitutional and statutory privileges when being questioned by authorities investigating possible criminal activity, he cannot refuse to cooperate because his privacy is being invaded by the questions put to him.

It is clear, as in State ex rel. Jefferson v. Roraff, that the petition in the present case does not demonstrate that extraordinary hardship will result if the writ does not issue and that, therefore, the petition and alternative writ were properly dismissed. Since we have determined that the requisite showing of extraordinary hardship has not been made, we do not reach the question of whether there exist other adequate remedies which would make the writ of prohibition unavailable.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the writ in spite of the petitioner's statutory objections to the district attorney's order? We agree with the trial court's decision, based on State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon ⁷, that the trial court 'lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the functions of the district attorney in ordering an inquest.' Implicit in the trial court's decision is a rejection of the contention of the petitioner that the district attorney does not have the statutory power to order the medical examiner to hold an inquest.

In Kurkierewicz we stated:

'Our statute (sec. 966.01, Stats.1967, now sec. 979.01) is an unusual one. The briefs cite no other state which confers authority upon the district attorney to compel the coroner or medical examiner to commence an inquest. Milwaukee is the only county of the state that employs a full-time medical examiner, who has the authority and duty of coroners in other counties.' ⁸

Thus this court clearly held in Kurkierewicz that the district attorney of Milwaukee county has the same power to order inquests as the other district attorneys in Wisconsin.

Sec. 979.15, Stats., vests 'exclusive jurisdiction and power to take inquests' in the medical examiner in counties of over 500,000 population. ⁹ However, the power to take inquests is not the same as the power to order them. Sec. 979.01, which directs the district attorney to order inquests under certain circumstances makes clear that 'taking' an inquest means to conduct an inquest.

Sec. 979.01, Stats., ends with these sentences:

'. . . In any inquest ordered by the district attorney he shall appear in the inquest representing the state in presenting the evidence. For the purpose of taking the inquest, deputy coroners may perform all the duties and exercise all the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon coroners by this chapter and shall be entitled to the same fees as the coroner for the performance of like duties. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as preventing such coroner from holding an inquest under the circumstances hereinabove specified without being first notified by the district attorney to hold such inquest. Such inquest may be held in any county, if within this state, in which there would be venue for the trial of the offense.' (Emphasis supplied.)

A complete reading of sec. 979.15, Stats., also reveals that the duties referred to which are all to be performed by the medical examiner are those related to the conducting of inquests. The section ends by indicating that an assistant medical examiner may 'attend to such duties' and 'conduct the inquest' when the medical examiner is unable to do so himself. Thus it is clear that 'such duties' refer to 'taking' and 'conducting' inquests.

Sec. 59.34, Stats., ¹⁰ which created the office of medical examiner, states that the duty of the coroner to '(t)ake inquest of the dead when required by law' is to be performed in counties having a population of 500,000 or more by the office of the medical examiner. The duty of the coroner to take inquests when required by law includes the duty to take...