Mojtabai v. Mojtabai

• Decision Date: 02 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1591,20-1591
• Citation: 4 F.4th 77
• Parties: Fatemeh MOJTABAI, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Zary MOJTABAI; Shaparak Mojtabai, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

4 F.4th 77

Fatemeh MOJTABAI, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.Zary MOJTABAI; Shaparak Mojtabai, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 20-1591

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

July 2, 2021

Philip H. Cahalin for appellant.

Darian M. Butcher, with whom Jonathan I. Handler and Day Pitney LLP were on brief, for appellees.

Before Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges, and Smith,^* District Judge.

BARRON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises out of a suit that Fatemeh Mojtabai filed in the District of Massachusetts against her two sisters, Zary and Shaparak Mojtabai, in connection with the estate of all three sisters' mother. The defendants, each of whom is a New Jersey resident, were appointed as co-executors of the estate upon the 2017 death of the mother, who was herself a resident of that state. The District Court dismissed Fatemeh's complaint on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants as to any of her claims and then denied her motion to set aside the judgment of dismissal. Fatemeh now appeals those rulings. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

I.

The following facts are not in dispute. In 2005, the parties' mother, Assayesh Nasseh, and father, Jamshid Mojtabai, executed wills in New Jersey. The wills left the entirety of Assayesh's and Jamshid's respective estates to each other.

Each of the wills identified all three daughters -- Fatemeh, Shaparak, and Zary -- as equal residual beneficiaries. Assayesh's will named Jamshid as sole executor, with Zary and Shaparak as successor co-executors. In 2011, Jamshid passed away in New Jersey. Assayesh passed away in New Jersey some years later in 2017.

Following Assayesh's death, the Passaic County Surrogate's Court in New Jersey certified her will, admitted it to probate, and formally appointed Zary and Shaparak as co-executors of the estate. In that capacity, Zary and Shaparak provided Fatemeh with a copy of a final accounting of Assayesh's estate.

This final accounting listed as assets Assayesh's New Jersey residence, a checking account, and a savings account. It also provided that Fatemeh's one-third share of the estate after expenses was $105,291.19.

On December 26, 2019, Fatemeh filed this action in the District of Massachusetts. The complaint contains two counts, each of which sets forth various claims against Zary and Shaparak.

Count One sets forth a number of state law tort claims that relate to Zary and Shaparak's actions during and after their parents' life with respect to assets that Fatemeh contends should have been part of the estate and thus included in the final accounting. The claims include breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence, conversion, and alienation of affection.

In support of these claims, the count alleges that Zary and Shaparak tortiously gained control of certain Mojtabai family assets -- namely, various real properties in Iran, as well as certain works of art, rugs, and antiques in both Iran and the United States. The count also alleges that Zary improperly holds the title to real property in Iran that is rightfully Fatemeh's, and it seeks the return to Fatemeh of that title.¹ Finally, the count alleges that Fatemeh suffered various hedonic damages as a result of alleged tortious actions by the defendants leading up to their final accounting.

Count Two of the complaint sets forth a number of Massachusetts law claims that relate to the discharge of a mortgage that Assayesh held on Fatemeh's Massachusetts condominium. In support of these claims, the count alleges that Zary and Shaparak, as co-executors of the estate, are successors to the holder of a mortgage on Massachusetts real estate, that the two sisters refused to discharge the mortgage as they were required to do as the estate's co-executors, and that this failure has both clouded the title to the real property that is subject to the mortgage and prevented Fatemeh from obtaining an equity line of credit.

On March 27, 2020, Zary and Shaparak filed a motion to dismiss all the claims set forth in the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss argued that the claims in Count One must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The motion to dismiss asserted that the claims in Count Two must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Fatemeh filed a brief in opposition to her sisters' motion to dismiss. Fatemeh asserted in the brief in opposition that there was federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in both counts of the complaint and that the complaint stated claims for which relief may be granted. Fatemeh's brief in opposition did not address whether there was personal jurisdiction as to any of the claims, but it did argue that the case should not be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The District Court granted Zary and Shaparak's motion to dismiss on April 13, 2020. Citing the "defendants' persuasive argument that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over Zary and Shaparak" and finding that Fatemeh failed to "me[et] th[e] challenge" to "show a prima facie case authorizing personal jurisdiction," the District Court found the "lack of personal jurisdiction ... conclusive of the case."

The District Court went on to suggest in its ruling that the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction would deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction "to the extent that Fatemeh is disputing the settling of her mother's estate in the New Jersey Probate Court." The District Court also suggested that it was "patently ill-suited" to resolve this dispute, given that it involves "real estate matters being litigated in the national courts of Iran," and thus that dismissal pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens might be appropriate in the event that the court did have jurisdiction.

Fatemeh filed a motion to set aside the judgment on May 11, 2020. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). She asserted in that motion that the District Court's dismissal of the claims in Count Two for lack of personal jurisdiction was improper because her sisters' only argument for the dismissal of those claims was based on there being a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She argued that her sisters had therefore waived any argument that a lack of personal jurisdiction barred the claims set forth in that count from going forward. Fatemeh also argued that, waiver aside, it was "clear that personal jurisdiction exists in Massachusetts to litigate [her] claims in Count Two to discharge the mortgage on her Massachusetts property and recover damages." She further contended that, in part because her sisters had waived any argument for dismissing the claims in Count Two for lack of personal jurisdiction, the claims in Count One also should not be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Here, she argued among other things that there was "pendent personal jurisdiction" over the claims in that count because they were sufficiently related to the claims in the other count, as to which any argument that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction had been waived.

In an electronic order, the District Court denied the motion to set aside the judgment dismissing the claims in the two counts. The order denying that motion did not expressly address Fatemeh's arguments that there was personal jurisdiction over the Count Two claims or pendent personal jurisdiction over the Count One claims. The District Court instead merely concluded that it was "plain on the face of the Complaint that Count Two does not meet the jurisdictional amount prerequisite for diversity jurisdiction to attach" and thus that there could be no subject matter jurisdiction over the Count Two claims. In so ruling, however, the District Court appeared to be implicitly rejecting Fatemeh's argument for pendent personal jurisdiction over the Count One claims based on the Count Two claims, as it was holding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the Count Two claims and thus no anchoring claim for which there was jurisdiction.

II.

We begin with Fatemeh's challenge to the dismissal of her Count Two claims. After setting out the relevant factual background, we turn to Fatemeh's contention that the District Court erred in ruling that there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. As we will explain, we conclude that Fatemeh's challenge on that score is persuasive.² As a result, we then move on to address her further contention that her sisters are wrong to contend that the District Court's order dismissing these claims nevertheless must be affirmed because there is a lack of personal jurisdiction as to them. Here, too, we agree with Fatemeh, even if we assume that she is wrong to contend that her sisters waived any personal-jurisdiction-based argument for dismissing these claims.

A.

The following facts are not in dispute. In 2010, Assayesh paid the $400,000 purchase price of a condominium unit in Weston, Massachusetts, to buy it for Fatemeh. Thereafter, Fatemeh held the title to that property.

Fatemeh subsequently granted Assayesh a mortgage on that property pursuant to a mortgage agreement between the two. The mortgage agreement did not require Fatemeh to pay back the amount that Assayesh paid to purchase the home. It did require her, however, to maintain the property in good condition and to pay all expenses related to the property. The agreement further provided that if Fatemeh defaulted on these terms, Assayesh would have the right to foreclose on the property.

These terms were set forth in a written agreement that was notarized on July 1, 2010. The agreement was signed by Fatemeh in Massachusetts and by Assayesh in New Jersey. It was secured by a mortgage deed recorded in Massachusetts at the Middlesex County Registry of Deeds.

The agreement provided that the mortgage was to "automatically discharge upon Assayesh's death provided...