Molina v. Allison
| Decision Date | 10 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | ED CV 22-1986-SB(E) |
| Parties | ANDREW S. MOLINA, Petitioner, v. KATHLEEN ALLISON, ET AL., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Stanley Blumenfeld Jr., United States District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
On November 2, 2022, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Petitioner filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C § 2254 By a Person in State Custody.” On November 14, 2022, this Court received a transfer of the Petition.
On December 5, 2022, Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition. On December 15, 2022, Petitioner filed a “Traverse to Respondents [sic] Answer.”
A Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Reporter's Transcript (“R.T.") 930-33). Petitioner appealed the resulting conviction, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed (Lodgment 6). The California Supreme Court summarily denied review (Lodgment 8).
Subsequently Petitioner filed habeas corpus petitions in the state courts, raising claims of: (a) allegedly ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (b) allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (c) alleged jury misconduct; and (d) allegedly suggestive identification. The Superior Court denied Petitioner's ineffectiveness claims in reasoned decisions (Lodgments 10, 12). The Superior Court denied Petitioner's other claims under the rule of In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953) (“Dixon"). Dixon established a California state law procedural rule generally barring habeas claims not raised on direct appeal. Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d at 759. Petitioner subsequently filed habeas corpus petitions in the California state appellate courts, but all such petitions were denied summarily (Lodgments 13-16).
In June 2016, the victim lived on Stover Street in Riverside. He used the backyard shack to drink beer and smoke methamphetamine with his friends. His friends included Alex Arzate and defendant. Defendant's cousin,[1]Jacob Gamboa, lived with Jessica Valdivia in a house nearby. Gamboa and the victim did not get along; however, they were “keeping the peace” for defendant's sake. The victim and Arzate were associated with the La Sierra Brown Knights gang; defendant was a member of the Hillside gang; and Gamboa was a former member of the 5150 gang, a rival of the La Sierra Brown Knights.
During the afternoon of June 25, 2016, Arzate encountered Valdivia, a former schoolmate, while waiting for the victim to purchase beer and return to the car. Arzate did not know Valdivia was dating Gamboa. When he talked to her, she “wasn't really talking.” The victim returned, saw Valdivia, and told Arzate, Arzate threw his “hands up” and said, “La Sierra up in this motherfucker.” Although Arzate meant the comment to be a joke, Valdivia interpreted it as an act of disrespect.
Later in the day, Gamboa went to the victim's home and yelled, “You guys banging on my lady?” and Arzate aid, “[I]t wasn't like that,” apologized, and offered to fight Gamboa one-on-one and apologize to Valdivia. The victim supported Arzate, saying, “My homie didn't bang on your lady like that.” In response, Gamboa pulled out a handgun and began “talking shit.” While the victim yelled back, Arzate pushed him toward the backyard. Gamboa left, but returned, driving by the victim's house “real slow.” The victim returned to the front yard holding a shotgun.
The victim, Arzate, and others continued to party at the victim's home into the evening. In the early morning hours of June 26, 2016, defendant arrived and spoke with the victim and Arzate. Defendant said he was there to help resolve their conflict with Gamboa and not to take sides. Arzate conveyed what happened, explaining he meant no disrespect to Valdivia, and he proposed a one-on-one fight with Gamboa, followed by an apology to Valdivia. Defendant left.
When defendant was leaving, Arzate saw him walking away with another person, who Arzate assumed was Gamboa. A short while later, while Arzate was inside the house, he saw defendant and Gamboa approach. Gamboa was holding a handgun, and defendant was carrying a shotgun. Arzate testified he saw both of their faces clearly and recognized both people. He also recognized defendant based on his clothing. Arzate ran outside and warned the victim, who was standing by the side gate holding a shotgun. Arzate told the victim, “Fucking Sonic and Maniac are in the front yard, fool.” At the victim's request, Arzate ran toward the backyard to get help and, on his way, he heard gunshots.
Defendant's younger brother and a family friend both testified that on June 25, 2016, defendant was home attending a “going-away party” the entire night, except from 10:00 p.m. to midnight. The party ended around 2:00 a.m., and defendant's car was parked in front of the house at the time.
Defendant testified that he was very good friends with both the victim and Gamboa. During the afternoon of June 25, 2016, the victim told defendant that Gamboa had disrespected the victim at his home. Defendant called Gamboa who was also agitated. That evening, defendant left the “going-away party” at his home to talk to Gamboa, who was at a mutual friend's house. When Gamboa and Valdivia left the friend's house, defendant followed in his car. At Valdivia's house, defendant saw Gamboa's cousin, Victor Gastelum, in the driveway. Defendant did not particularly like Gastelum, so he did not go inside Valdivia's house. As he was leaving, defendant had a “bad feeling” and decided to stop at the victim's house and talk to the victim.
Defendant parked his car away from the victim's house because he did not want his car, which appeared stolen, to draw attention to the house given the illegal activities happening in the backyard. As he approached the house, defendant saw a group of people across the street. He went to the backyard and talked to the victim and Arzate. The victim was still upset and showed defendant a shotgun. Defendant attempted to diffuse the situation; however, the victim remained angry and was convinced the conflict could not be resolved. Defendant left, thinking he was walking alone, but he was not paying close attention, and the unfamiliar group of people was still across the street. He returned home around midnight and went to bed.
On June 26, 2016, defendant woke up around 9:00 a.m., went to a friend's house, and drank heavily. As he attempted to drive home, he passed out and was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and booked into county jail. Upon his release, defendant went home and slept until June 27. When he woke up, he immediately left for Mexico because he had multiple DUI convictions and did not want to go back to prison. He was ignorant of the victim's death until a friend informed him that he and Gamboa had been charged with murder. Defendant did not return to the United States because he was worried that his hasty relocation “made [him] look really bad.” Since he knew he was innocent, he assumed the police would eventually find and charge the actual killer and then drop the charges against him. In October 2016, defendant was extradited to the United States and taken into custody.
Petitioner alleges:
Under the “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996” (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-26 (2002); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-09 (2000).
“Clearly established Federal law” refers to the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision on the merits. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if: (1) it applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court law; or (2) it “confronts a set of facts . . . materially indistinguishable” from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 8 (citation omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
Under the “unreasonable application” prong of section 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief “based on the application of a governing legal principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.” Lockyer v Andrade,...
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