Molina v. Moody

• Decision Date: 25 March 2022
• Docket Number: 4:20-cv-10102-JLK/Becerra
• Parties: ALFREDO MORALES MOLINA, Petitioner, v. ASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

ALFREDO MORALES MOLINA, Petitioner, v. ASHLEY MOODY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.

No. 4:20-cv-10102-JLK/Becerra

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

March 25, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254^[1]

JACQUELINE BECERRA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Alfredo Morales Molina's (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the “Petition”) with Memorandum in Support thereof (the “Memorandum”) challenging his conviction following a jury verdict and resulting sentence for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer by vessel entered in Monroe County Circuit Court, Case No 2016-CF-000186-A-P. ECF Nos. [1], [3]. The State of Florida (the “Respondent”) filed its Response to Order to Show Cause (the “Response”), ECF No. [8], as well as a Notice of Filing Index to Appendix, ECF Nos. [9], [9-1]. Petitioner filed a Reply. ECF No. [10]. Upon review of the Petition, ECF No. [1], the Memorandum, ECF No. [3], the Response, ECF No. [8], the Petitioner's Reply, ECF No [10], and the governing law, for the reasons stated below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND INSTANT MOTION

On September 4, 2016, Petitioner was arrested while “lobstering in the Card Sound Lobster Sanctuary.” ECF No. [4] at 15. On September 13, 2016, Defendant was charged with (1) molesting, taking or trapping spiny lobster in a sanctuary, in violation of FAC 68B-l l.003 (2 M), and (2) fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer by vessel, in violation of Florida Statute 843.18 (3 F). Id. at 17.

A trial began on June 1, 2018 (the “First Trial). See Id. at 130. Alexander Diaz (the “State Witness”), a Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission investigator, was the sole witness. ECF No. [8] at 2. On direct examination, the State Witness testified regarding the stop and arrest of Petitioner. See ECF No. [4] at 159-171. On direct examination, the State Witness explained that he was in the process of stopping another vessel when he “observed a very familiar boat and operator coming into the creek” which was Petitioner's vessel. Id. at 162. The State Witness also testified that he was “familiar with [Petitioner] that he's a commercial lobster fisherman in the area.” Id. The State Witness testified that he observed Petitioner in the water “with a mask on” and after initiating pursuit of the vessel, saw Petitioner's brother dump lobster out of a bucket back into water. Id. at 167, 170.

On cross examination, Defense counsel asked about the State Witness' testimony that he recognized Petitioner, and the State Witness testified regarding a prior arrest of Petitioner:

Q: But while you intercepted that group, you testified that you recognized my client, who is a commercial lobster fisherman --

A: Yes.

Q: -- pass by in his boat, correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. And at that point, he's done nothing illegal, right?

A: No.

Q: Nothing suspicious about him being in the water on his vessel with he and his brother?

A: Well, he's a commercial bully-net lobster fisherman. They usually go out at night. They don't bully-net during the day. So him being in that area of the sanctuary where, actually, I have written -- I've had an encounter with him and have written him in 2011 for that.

Id. at 172-73. Following this testimony, the trial judge held a sidebar with counsel for both sides, wherein the State prosecutor informed the Court that he had “talk[ed] to [the State Witness] about talking about [Petitioner's] prior history.” Id. at 173. Outside the presence of the jury, the State Witness confirmed to the court that the prosecutor had instructed him not to testify to prior contact with the Petitioner. Id. at 174. The Court granted Petitioner's motion for a mistrial, finding that Defense counsel did not invite error, but rather the State Witness volunteered the information concerning prior contact with Petitioner. Id. at 174-76.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss based on Double Jeopardy. Id. at 64-67. Petitioner assets that said motion “was denied orally by the trial court at a proceeding held July 31, 2018, although there is no Clerk's notation to that effect on the Court Minutes of that date.” ECF No. [3] at 3. Petitioner renewed his motion (collectively with the first motion, the “Motions for Dismissal Based on Double Jeopardy Grounds”) on November 13, 2018. ECF No. [4] at 74. The Court again denied the motion. Id.

The second trial was conducted the next day, on November 14, 2018. Id. at 75. The Court granted Petitioner's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to Count 1, taking crawfish in the Biscayne Sanctuary. Id. at 90. A jury convicted Petitioner of Count 2, fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer by vessel. Id. at 75, 93, 286. Petitioner received a sentence of ten days in the Monroe County Sheriff's Office Jail and three years of probation, with a special condition that he not enter Monroe County waters. Id. at 75, 102-04.

Petitioner appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial court's denial of Petitioner's Motions for Dismissal Based on Double Jeopardy Grounds was error, as Petitioner was forced to request a mistrial due to the State Witness' misconduct as the testifying officer. See ECF No. [9-1] at 9-31. The Third District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences in a decision without written opinion. See Molina v. State, 303 So.3d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (3D18-2493), review dismissed, SC20-1174, 2020 WL 4668086 (Fla. Aug. 11, 2020). Petitioner filed a Motion for Rehearing, Request for a Written Opinion, Request for Certification of Issue of Great Public Importance, and Motion for Rehearing En Banc, which were denied on July 14, 2020, without written opinion. ECF No. [9-1] at 104.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Notice to Invoke the Discretionary Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. Rule 9.120, which was dismissed by the Florida Supreme Court on August 11, 2020 on the grounds that the Third District Court of Appeal did not issue a written opinion. Id. at 98-100.

In the instant Petition and Memorandum, Petitioner argues that the State court erred in denying his Motions to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds. See ECF No. [3]. Specifically, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to an exception barring retrial due to the prosecutor's and/or testifying law enforcement officer's intent to provoke a mistrial, evidenced by the officer's testimony concerning Petitioner's prior history. Id.

II. ANALYSIS^[2]

The court's review of a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007); Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). The AEDPA ensures that federal habeas corpus relief works to “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.” See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642.

“Under § 2254(d), a federal court may grant habeas relief from a state court judgment only if the state court's decision on the merits of the issue was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Lumpkins v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 449 F. App'x. 879, 883 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Indeed, under the AEDPA, “a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court ‘must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011). In other words, the Court cannot grant relief unless Petitioner can show that “no fairminded jurist could agree with that [state] court's decision.” See id.

“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Indeed, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lumpkins, 449 F. App'x. at 883 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)). For purposes of federal habeas review, “clearly established federal law” consists of the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Moreover, “[u]nder AEDPA, we accord a presumption of correctness to a state court's factual findings.” Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 2010).

“The Supreme Court repeatedly has admonished that ‘the petitioner carries the burden of proof' and that the § 2254(d)(1) standard is ‘a difficult to meet' and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'” Id. (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011)). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit “has stressed that in applying AEDPA deference federal courts are not to take a magnifying glass to the state court opinion or grade the quality of it.” See Meders v. Warden,...