Molina v. State
| Citation | 87 P.3d 533,120 Nev. 185 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 40598.,40598. |
| Parties | Edward MOLINA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Goodman & Chesnoff and Richard A. Schonfeld, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Brian Sandoval, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, and James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
Before SHEARING, C.J., ROSE and MAUPIN, JJ.
Edward Molina appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon pleas of guilty to one count of sexual assault1 and one count of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen.2 He claims on appeal that the district court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
More particularly, Molina contends that his guilty pleas were the product of his lawyer's inadequate assistance and thus not the result of knowing, voluntary and intelligent waivers of his trial rights. He also contends that the district court improperly allowed his attorney to reveal the substance of privileged attorney-client communications at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. We affirm.
On February 22, 2002, following proceedings in justice court, the State filed a criminal information charging Molina with three counts of sexual assault with a minor under fourteen years of age, two counts of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age, and one count of annoying a minor. Molina, represented by a deputy public defender, pleaded not guilty at his arraignment in district court. Thereafter, the State presented a proposed plea bargain agreement, which required Molina to plead guilty to one count of sexual assault and one count of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen.
At this point, Molina discharged his public defender and, through his spouse, secured the services of private counsel, Brent Heggie, Esquire. Heggie was unable to negotiate a better arrangement. After two trial continuances, Molina entered pleas of guilty to an amended information drafted in conformity with the original plea proposal.3
The district court canvassed Molina before accepting his plea. Molina affirmed that he read and understood the plea agreement before signing it, that he freely and voluntarily signed the agreement, and that he believed the agreement was in his best interest. The district court explained to Molina the possible sentences, parole eligibility, fines, and lifetime supervision inherent in the plea arrangement, and further questioned Molina in graphic detail concerning the charges to which he was entering pleas of guilty. Molina unequivocally admitted to subjecting the minor victim to acts of anal intercourse and lewd misconduct. More particularly, the record reflects the following colloquy between the district court and Molina:
The district court accepted Molina's plea after concluding that Molina freely and voluntarily entered the pleas. Before sentencing, Molina moved the district court to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to proceed to trial. The moving papers claimed that Heggie met with Molina on only one occasion, failed to discuss the State's evidence or the substance of the State's case until the evening before Molina was to appear for trial, failed to adequately discuss the options of proceeding to trial and failed to provide a defense. The motion also alleged that Heggie advised Molina that he "had" to plead guilty because Heggie would not take the case to trial. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion before proceeding with formal sentencing.4
Heggie was the only witness at the hearing. He testified to the limitations placed upon his retention, i.e., that Mrs. Molina hired him solely to negotiate a better plea agreement. Heggie initially believed that the case involved an "accidental touching" and that he could improve upon the State's pending offer. However, after discussions with Molina's former public defender, Heggie learned that the case involved anal rape and that Molina had arguably admitted the allegations to Mrs. Molina.
Heggie also testified to conducting six telephonic interviews with Molina and twice visiting Molina in jail. According to Heggie, he reviewed the State's evidence with Molina,5 informed Molina of the charges and elements of proof the State would have to satisfy at trial, discussed the apparent lack of a defense to the charges and advised Molina that the State's offer was likely the best he could obtain.
Over objection, Heggie testified that Molina admitted the sexual abuse allegations during one of the interviews in the presence of Mrs. Molina. According to Heggie, after a lengthy conversation with Mrs. Molina, Molina decided it was best to accept the plea agreement as then presented. Thereafter, Heggie reviewed the plea agreement with Molina, gave Molina an opportunity to ask questions, and discussed Molina's options if he wanted to go to trial without Heggie as trial counsel. Heggie believed they could still put on a defense at trial, but because of Molina's admissions of guilt, Heggie explained they could not present a defense of actual innocence, including testimony from Molina, without informing the district court that Molina or the trial witnesses might commit perjury. Heggie did not conduct an extensive pretrial investigation because the ultimate goal of his representation was to improve upon the then current negotiations rather than proceed to trial.
The district court denied the presentence motion to withdraw the pleas and imposed two concurrent sentences of life in prison, with the possibility of parole in 120 months, and lifetime supervision in the event of release on parole. The court gave Molina credit for 269 days served in local custody. Additionally, the court ordered Molina to submit to genetic marker testing, to pay a $25 administrative assessment fee, a $150 DNA testing fee, and $446 in restitution.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Notwithstanding the limited nature of Heggie's retention, Molina argues that his counsel was deficient by not being ready for trial.6 In this, Molina charges that Heggie failed to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation, citing failures to interview witnesses, develop alibis through the victim's brother, obtain a psychological examination of the child victim, and Heggie's refusal to take the case to trial. Molina also argues that he did not enter his guilty pleas voluntarily or intelligently because of Heggie's failure to visit and adequately discuss the State's evidence with him, provide Molina with copies of discovery obtained from the district attorney, and fully inform Molina regarding the pleas.
The question of whether a criminal defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of law and fact, and is subject to independent review.7 We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.8 Under Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.9 However, "[i]n order to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, courts indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's representation falls within the broad range of reasonable assistance."10 We need not consider both prongs of the test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one.11
"A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may attack the validity of the guilty plea by showing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution."12 However, guilty pleas are presumptively valid, especially when entered on advice of counsel, and a defendant has a heavy burden to show the district court that he did not enter his plea knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily.13 To establish prejudice in the context of a challenge to a guilty plea based upon an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must "`demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."'14 Because the district court ruled on Molina's motion before imposition of sentence, we may review its denial on direct appeal from the subsequent judgment of conviction.15
"A district court may, in its discretion, grant a defendant's [presentence] motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any `substantial reason' if it is `fair and just.'"16 Accordingly, Nevada trial and appellate courts must apply a more relaxed standard to presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas than to post-sentencing motions.17 A district court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.18 "A thorough plea canvass coupled with a detailed, consistent, written plea agreement supports a finding that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently."19 "When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this court presumes that the district court properly assessed the plea's validity, and we will not reverse the lower court's determination absent abuse of discretion."20
We conclude that Molina has failed to substantiate his ineffective assistance claims. First, the district court carefully canvassed Molina on his understanding of the proceedings, the...
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