Molina v. State

• Decision Date: 23 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2380,No. 2537,2380,2537
• Parties: ANA BETI MOLINA v. STATE OF MARYLAND JAVIER MOLINA v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

ANA BETI MOLINA v. STATE OF MARYLAND

JAVIER MOLINA v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2380

No. 2537

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

December 23, 2019

Evidence > Circumstantial Evidence

Circumstantial evidence may be just as relevant as direct evidence, and our cases do not require any "greater degree of certainty [] when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for in either case the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused." Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 226-27 (1993) (internal citations omitted).

Evidence > Circumstantial Evidence

The significance of a single strand of circumstantial evidence may be unclear when isolated from the larger tapestry. See Sewell v. State, 239 Md. App. 571, 614 n.12 (2018). To determine relevance, then, we must not view a piece of circumstantial evidence "in a vacuum, devoid of consideration of the other circumstances in the case." Cf. Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573, 590 (2011).

Evidence > Defendant's Financial Status > Special Circumstances

There is a distinction of legal significance between offering evidence of a defendant's impecuniosity to show motive for theft, and offering evidence of a defendant's impecuniosity combined with other "special circumstances"—such as evidence that the defendant acquired money contemporaneously with the theft—to show that the money the defendant acquired was connected to the theft.

Criminal Procedure > Joinder and Severance of Defendants > Discretion of Trial Judge

Appellate review of a trial judge's denial of separate trials is to resolve whether the trial judge abused the discretion endowed by Rule 4-253(c).

Criminal Procedure > Joinder and Severance of Defendants > Prejudice

Within the meaning of Rule 4-253, prejudice "is a term of art, and refers only to prejudice resulting to the defendant from the reception of evidence that would have been inadmissible against that defendant had there been no joinder." Hines v. State, 450 Md. 352, 369 (2016) (citation and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Thus, in the absence of non-mutually admissible evidence, a trial judge is not required to engage in the second part of the Hines analysis to "determine whether the admission of such evidence will unfairly prejudice the defendant seeking a severance." Id. at 379.

Criminal Procedure > Inadmissibility of Evidence

An appellant may not assert, as a ground for reversal, the inadmissibility of evidence when she elicited substantially the same evidence herself. See Miller v. State, 421 Md. 609, 629 (2011) (holding that the defendant's cross-examination of the State's expert witness "'opened the door' to the opinion that was elicited on redirect examination").

Criminal Procedure > Inadmissibility of Evidence > Cumulative Evidence

Opinion testimony—even if admitted erroneously—that is cumulative of opinion evidence offered by several other witnesses may render the error undoubtedly harmless. See Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743-44 (2010) ("In considering whether an error was harmless, we also consider whether the evidence presented in error was cumulative evidence.").

Criminal Procedure > Jury Instructions > Accomplice Liability

When there is no direct evidence of an alleged accomplice's communications with the principal and, consequently, no direct evidence that the alleged accomplice communicated with the principal his willingness to participate in or lend support to her crimes, circumstantial evidence may satisfy the State's burden to produce some evidence that the accomplice knowingly aided the principal in the commission of the crimes charged.

Criminal Procedure > Jury Instructions > Accomplice Liability

To generate a jury instruction on a defendant's liability as an accomplice in another's crimes, the State need not prove the defendant's knowing participation beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. The State need adduce only some evidence that the defendant acted as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. See Arthur v. State, 420 Md. 512, 526 (2011).

Criminal Law > Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Adults

Evidence that supports a jury's findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that an individual was a vulnerable adult, or that an individual was at least 68 years of age; and, that the defendant "knowingly and willfully" exploited the individual by obtaining his or her property by deception, intimidation, or undue influence, is sufficient to support a conviction for financial exploitation. CR § 8-801(b).

Criminal Law > Theft > Required Knowledge

Under each of the three theft modalities contained in section 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article—(1) unauthorized control over property, (2) unauthorized control over property by deception, and (3) possession of stolen property—the State is required to prove the defendant's scienter—either that she "willfully or knowingly" deprived another of the property or that she knew the property was stolen.

Criminal Law > Conspiracy > Required Evidence

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is an unlawful agreement, which "need not be formal or spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose and design." Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 145 (2001) (citations omitted). To prove conspiracy, the State may rely on "circumstantial evidence, from which a common scheme may be inferred." Hall v. State, 233 Md. App. 118, 138 (2017). The State does not have to show an "overt act in furtherance of the agreement" because the conspiracy "is complete when the unlawful agreement is reached[.]" Bordley v. State, 205 Md. App. 692, 723 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Criminal Law > Conspiracy > Multiple Convictions

In Maryland, "only one sentence can be imposed for a single common law conspiracy no matter how many criminal acts the conspirators have agreed to commit" because the "unit of prosecution [for conspiracy] is the agreement or combination rather than each of its criminal objectives." Tracy v. State, 319 Md. 452, 459 (1990). The conviction of a defendant for more than one conspiracy turns, therefore, "on whether there exists more than one unlawful agreement." Savage v. State, 212 Md. App. 1, 13 (2013). "If a defendant is convicted of and sentenced for multiple conspiracies when, in fact, only one conspiracy was proven, the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated." Id. at 26.

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case Nos. 131134C & 131135

REPORTED

CONSOLIDATED

Kehoe, Leahy, Adkins, Sally D., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Leahy, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND

The Indictments .................................................................................... 4

Pre-Trial Motions .................................................................................. 5

Trial ................................................................................................... 6

A. The Molinas .............................................................................. 6

B. Gustave Shapiro .......................................................................... 6

C. Ana Assumes the Care of Gustave .................................................... 9

D. Dementia and Other Diagnoses ...................................................... 15

E. A Second APS Investigation in 2015 ................................................ 17

F. The House on Wilton Oaks ............................................................ 21

G. The Third APS Investigation in 2016 ................................................ 25

H. End-Stage Dementia .................................................................. 32

I. Additional Financial Evidence ........................................................ 34

J. Motions for Judgment of Acquittal .................................................. 40

K. The Defense ............................................................................ 41

L. Renewed Motions for Judgment ..................................................... 42Verdict and Sentencing .......................................................................... 44DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of Gambling and the Molinas' Financial Status ........................ 47

A. Motions in Limine ................................................................. 47

B. Parties' Contentions on Appeal .................................................. 49

C. Gambling and Finances: Special Circumstances .............................. 50

II. Motion to Sever ........................................................................ 60

A. Pre-Trial Ruling .................................................................... 62

B. Analysis ............................................................................. 63

III. Lay Opinion Evidence ................................................................. 67

A. Motion in Limine .................................................................. 68

B. Testimony on Duty of Fiduciary ................................................ 69

C. Testimony on Gustave's Capacity ............................................... 70

IV. Accomplice Liability .................................................................. 72

V. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Ana ........................................... 78

VI. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Javier ........................................ 88

A. Financial Exploitation ............................................................ 88

B. Theft Scheme ....................................................................... 91

C. Conspiracy .......................................................................... 96

VII. The State's Rebuttal Closing Argument ........................................... 101

Gustave Shapiro, a widowed nonagenarian, depended on others for his transportation and daily care—he was a vulnerable adult.¹ In 2016, Montgomery County Adult Protective Services ("APS")...