Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 91-0007-B.,CIV.A. 91-0007-B.
• Citation: 76 F.Supp.2d 695
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: Jo D. MOLINARY, Trustee of the Susan Pruitt Cloud Land Trust, Plaintiff, v. POWELL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, INC., doing business as Wax-Coal Company, Defendant.

76 F.Supp.2d 695

Jo D. MOLINARY, Trustee of the Susan Pruitt Cloud Land Trust, Plaintiff, v. POWELL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, INC., doing business as Wax-Coal Company, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 91-0007-B.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Big Stone Gap Division.

September 21, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel Robert Bieger, Copeland, Molinary & Bieger, P.C., Abingdon, VA, Walton Davis Morris, Jr., Charlottesville, VA, for Jo D. Molinary, Trustee of the Susan Pruitt Cloud Land Trust, plaintiffs.

Timothy Ward Gresham, Penn, Stuart & Eskridge, Abingdon, VA, Stephen M. Hodges, Penn, Stuart & Eskridge, Abingdon, VA, for Powell Mountain Coal Company, Inc. dba Wax Coal Company, defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILSON, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on a motion by plaintiff Jo D. Molinary ("Molinary") for relief from final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Molinary requests that the court reopen three claims which this court disposed of in a Final Order entered February 7, 1996. For reasons stated below, the court denies Molinary's motion.

I.

This lawsuit originated in January 1991 as a class action citizen suit against Powell Mountain Coal Company, Inc. ("Powell Mountain"), for damages arising from the alleged unlawful mining of coal on a fifty-acre tract of land (the "Pruitt Tract") in Lee County, Virginia. Molinary is the trustee for the Susan Pruitt Cloud Land Trust (the "Pruitt Heirs"), a class of persons who, in 1990, owned over a 99% undivided interest in the surface estate of the Pruitt Tract. At the time, Powell Mountain owned an approximately .14% undivided interest in the surface estate of the Pruitt Tract, in addition to complete ownership of mineral rights below the surface. The Pruitt Heirs utilized the Pruitt Tract primarily for recreational purposes — hunting, hiking, camping, and the like.

In February 1990, Powell Mountain applied to the Virginia Division of Mined Land Reclamation (DMLR) for a permit to conduct surface coal mining operations in an area that included part of the Pruitt Tract. In its application, Powell Mountain listed "Pruitt Heirs" as the surface owners of the tract but failed to list each owner individually. Powell Mountain listed itself as the sole owner of the mineral rights and informed the DMLR that it had obtained a legal opinion that no lease to extract the coal by the auger mining method was required from the other owners of the surface estate. Without further information, the DMLR issued the permit. Powell Mountain then extracted 4423.51 tons of coal from the three-acre tract by the auger mining method. Powell Mountain sold the coal for $190,122.46, clearing $35,909.05 in profit.

After receiving complaints about the permit's issuance, the DMLR determined that Powell Mountain's permit application did not comply with certain state permitting regulations. Consequently, the DMLR revoked Powell Mountain's permit, issued a cessation order, and ordered Powell Mountain to reclaim the three-acre tract. Subsequently, the Pruitt Heirs filed suit in this court.

The Pruitt Heirs' Second Amended Complaint alleged six counts. In Count I, the Pruitt Heirs alleged that Powell Mountain's failure to comply with Virginia's permitting regulations misled the DMLR into issuing the permit, which in turn led to the mining of the Pruitt Tract. The Pruitt Heirs brought Count I pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(f) (West 1999), seeking the entire proceeds of Powell Mountain's sale of the coal as damages. Count I included a claim alleging that Powell Mountain's conduct in auger mining the Pruitt Tract without the consent of the class members implied a contract under the SMCRA between Powell Mountain and the class members for surface coal extraction rights. Counts II and V set out independent but overlapping claims under federal and state law, respectively, for Powell Mountain's failure to reclaim the Pruitt Tract to a condition suitable for its prior recreational purposes. Count III alleged precisely the same implied contract theory as alleged in Count I, only under Virginia law. As in Count I, the Pruitt Heirs sought in Count III the entire proceeds of Powell Mountain's sale of the coal as damages. Count IV asserted a claim for wheelage royalties on coal mined from other lands and hauled across the Pruitt Tract. Finally, Count VI sought a declaratory judgment that "Powell Mountain may not lawfully obtain a coal surface mining permit for the Pruitt Tract in the future without the consent of every surface owner." (Second Amen. Compl., ¶ 75).

On the eve of trial, Molinary agreed to withdraw class claims for damages to the surface estate and to pursue reclamation through the administrative process. However, Molinary did not move to dismiss the reclamation claims stated in Counts II and V of the complaint. The court subsequently proceeded to trial. After taking evidence, the court submitted to the jury a single interrogatory to determine whether Powell Mountain's regulatory violations were wilful, reckless, or grossly negligent.¹ Prior to submitting the interrogatory to the jury, the court offered both Molinary and Powell Mountain an opportunity to object to the interrogatory. Molinary objected on one ground: that the interrogatory did not instruct the jurors to disregard the legal opinion obtained by Powell Mountain prior to mining the coal. (See Trial Tr. Supp. at 3). The court overruled Molinary's objection, and the jury subsequently returned a verdict in Molinary's favor.

After the trial, the court conducted a post-trial hearing in which the court sought to resolve all remaining issues. At that time, Molinary raised her Count VI claim for declaratory relief, and the court declined to grant the judgment. Molinary did not raise any other claims at that time. Molinary also submitted, with the court's permission, a post-trial memorandum, in which Molinary addressed the issue of damages but did not mention Counts III V, and VI. (See The Trustee's Post-Trial Memorandum, filed September 22, 1994).

The court awarded the class $190,622.46 in damages, an amount equal to the gross sales price of the coal. The court hoped that the ruling would "discourage the kind of intentional conduct that occurred in the present case ...." Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 892 F.Supp. 136, 141 (W.D.Va.1995) ("Molinary I"). The court also awarded the class $91,644.92 in costs and attorney's fees. In its Final Order, the court entered judgment in Molinary's favor for Count I, and in Powell Mountain's favor for Counts III, IV, V, and VI.

Powell Mountain appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to this court to enter summary judgment in favor of Powell Mountain. Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 125 F.3d 231 (4th Cir.1997) (Molinary I). Despite the fact that Counts III and VI were never at issue in the Fourth Circuit's decision, Molinary argued on remand that this court should construe the Fourth Circuit's decision as vacating this court's decision in Molinary I entirely, but only directing entry of final judgment in favor of Powell Mountain on Count I, thus allowing the Pruitt Heirs to relitigate Counts III and VI. This court rejected Molinary's argument and entered final judgment in favor of Powell Mountain on Count I. The Pruitt Heirs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed this court's judgment. See Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 173 F.3d 920 (1999) (Molinary II).

After Molinary I became final, the Pruitt Heirs sold their entire interest in the Pruitt Tract to Powell Mountain and its affiliates. The Pruitt Heirs now return once again to this court, and request that the court relieve them of the court's final judgment as to Counts III, V, and VI, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II.

Molinary first contends that the court must grant relief under Rule 60(b)(4) for Counts III and V. Rule 60(b)(4) states that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [if] ... the judgment is void ...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). A judgment "is not void merely because it is erroneous. A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 871 (4th Cir.1999) (quotations omitted). Rule 60(b)(4) is not subject to any time limitation, and the court has no discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b)(4) motion — if the judgment is void, the court must grant relief. See Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.1994); Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir.1993); Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.1992); Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1988); Rodd v. Region Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir.1986) ("[T]he reasonable time criterion of Rule 60(b) as it relates to void judgments means no time limit.").

Molinary claims that the court's judgments on Counts III and V are void because those claims were moot when the court entered judgment on them. Alternately, Molinary contends that the judgments are void because the court deprived her of procedural due process rights by denying her an opportunity to be heard on Counts III and V, and rendering judgment on Counts III and V without submitting findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court finds that Counts III and V were not moot when the court in Molinary I issued its Final Order, and that Molinary was afforded all of the process due to her under the Constitution. Consequently, the court rejects Molinary's Rule 60...