Molloy v. Allied Van Lines, Inc
| Decision Date | 28 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 602CV402ORLJGG.,602CV402ORLJGG. |
| Citation | 267 F.Supp.2d 1246 |
| Parties | John MOLLOY, Plaintiff, v. ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Luis A. Gonzalez, L.A. Gonzalez Law Offices, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff.
Gilda M. Chavez, Dombroff & Gilmore, PC, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
This cause came on for a hearing on March 13, 2003 on the following motion:
THEREON it is ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
On March 14, 2002, plaintiff John Molloy hired defendant Allied Van Lines Inc. ["Allied"] to transport his belongings, including personal belongings, furniture, antiques, and work-related material from Mahwah, New Jersey, to Eustis, Florida. Pursuant to an instraction from Allied's salesman, Molloy prepared an inventory of the property to be transported. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 26, Ex. 26. Molloy consigned his property to Allied for interstate shipment under a bill of lading. The bill of lading required Molloy to pay Allied, on delivery, $4,523.83 for the transportation services rendered. See Bill of Lading & Freight Bill, Docket No. 30, Ex. A. In case of loss or damage, the bill of lading also required Molloy to provide Allied with a written notice of his claim within nine months from the date of delivery as a condition precedent to recovery.1 Docket No. 30, Ex. A On April 3, 2000, Allied's van and agent arrived at Molloy's Florida residence to deliver the property transported from New Jersey. Allied's agent began unloading. According to Molloy, a considerable amount of his property was missing, and many of the items being delivered were damaged. Molloy refused to sign a release recognizing the delivery of the shipment. Molloy also refused to pay Allied $4,523.83 for the transportation. As discussed in greater detail below, Molloy's attorney sent two letters to Allied on May 31, 2000 and July 7, 2000 claiming compensation for the lost and damaged household goods.
On August 29, 2002, Molloy filed an amended complaint against Allied in the United States District Court, Docket No. 26, claiming damages during the interstate transportation of Molloy's property. On January 13, 2003, Allied filed the pending motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Molloy's action on two grounds. Docket No. 30. First, Allied argues that Molloy's claims are barred by his failure to give Allied adequate and timely written notice of his claim as required by the bill of lading. Second, Allied argues that Molloy's claims are barred by his failure to pay $4,542.83 in shipping fees due to Allied on delivery. Allied contends that it is entitled to recover the shipping charges from Molloy as a matter of law before Molloy may pursue a claim for non-delivery or damage.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir.1995); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1991). A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by showing the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, All U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rule 56 permits the moving party to discharge its burden with or without supporting affidavits, and to move for summary judgment on the case as a whole or on any claim. Id. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and by its own affidavits or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324,106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989); Samples on Behalf of Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988). The Eleventh Circuit has explained the reasonableness standard:
in deciding whether an inference is reasonable, the Court must "cull the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing each against the abstract standard of reasonableness." [citation omitted]. The opposing party's inferences need not be more probable than those inferences in favor of the movant to create a factual dispute, so long as they reasonably may be drawn from the facts. When more than one inference reasonably can be drawn, it is for the trier of fact to determine the proper one.
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir.1995), quoting WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.1988).
Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. Augusta Iron and Steel Works v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52. On a summary judgment motion the Court may not weigh the credibility of the parties. See Rollins v. Tech-South, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1987). If the determination of the case rests on which competing version of the facts or events is true, the case should be presented to the trier of fact. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that the party making a motion for summary judgment may submit affidavits to support its argument as to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(e) provides as follows regarding the materials that the non-movant must submit in response: Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
The non-movant must adduce significant probative evidence that would be sufficient for a jury to find for the non-movant. LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, 146 F.3d 832, 834 (11th Cir.1998), citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A reviewing court generally cannot consider inadmissible hearsay evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.1999). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a reviewing court must consider all the proffered evidence and cannot disregard a party's affidavit merely because it conflicts to some degree with an earlier deposition. Kennett-Murray Corporation v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir.1980). However, when a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony. Van T. Junkins and Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.1984).
Congress has enacted statutes that govern transportation, including the transportation of "household goods" by motor carrier.2 See generally, 49 U.S.C., Part B, Chapters 131-49. It is the policy of the United States to oversee interstate motor carrier transportation in a manner that promotes competitive and efficient motor carrier transportation services, and meets the needs of shippers and consumers. 49 U.S.C. § 13101(a)(2). Congress directs that the transportation law be administered and enforced to carry out that policy and to promote the public interest. 49 U.S.C. § 13101(b).
Congress has enacted a statute—often referred to as the Carmack Amendment— governing the liability of motor carriers (like Allied) to shippers (like Molloy) who claim loss or damage to shipped property. 49 U.S.C. § 14706.3 A carrier that ships goods, including household goods, is liable to the shipper for...
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