Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery, LLC

• Decision Date: 09 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-56418.,No. 06-56385.,06-56385.,06-56418.
• Citation: 531 F.3d 1043
• Parties: Jarek MOLSKI, an individual, Plaintiff, and Disability Rights Enforcement, Education, Services: Helping You Help Others, a California public benefit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOLEY ESTATES VINEYARD AND WINERY, LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant-Appellee. Jarek Molski, an individual, Plaintiff, and Disability Rights Enforcement, Education, Services: Helping You Help Others, a California public benefit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery, LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

531 F.3d 1043

Jarek MOLSKI, an individual, Plaintiff, and Disability Rights Enforcement, Education, Services: Helping You Help Others, a California public benefit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOLEY ESTATES VINEYARD AND WINERY, LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant-Appellee.

Jarek Molski, an individual, Plaintiff, and Disability Rights Enforcement, Education, Services: Helping You Help Others, a California public benefit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery, LLC, a California limited liability company, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-56385.

No. 06-56418.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 9, 2008.

Filed July 9, 2008.

Julia M. Adams and Thomas E. Frankovich, Law Offices of Thomas E. Frankovich, San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Barry Clifford Snyder and Sean R. Burnett, Snyder Law, Santa Barbara, CA, for the defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Consuelo B. Marshall, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-03-09393-CBM.

Before: HARRY PREGERSON, D.W. NELSON, and FERDINAND F. FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case involves a paraplegic who encountered discriminatory barriers to access when he visited a winery with his grandmother. Unwilling to remove barriers to the historic wine-tasting room, Foley Estates Vineyard and Winery ("Foley") began providing services on a gazebo with a "big bell" where individuals barred from the wine-tasting room could ring for service. Jarek Molski and Disability Rights Enforcement, Education, Services ("DREES") sued Foley for injunctive relief and damages to redress physical barriers to wheelchair accessibility. The district court ordered barrier removal within the building, but determined that it would not be readily achievable to make an accessible ramp to the entrance. We affirm the injunction requiring barrier removal within the building and we remand for the district court to apply 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 and the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36 App. A § 4.1.7 ("ADAAG § 4.1.7" or "§ 4.1.7") when evaluating whether an accessible ramp would be readily achievable.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 18, 2003, Jarek Molski¹ visited the Foley Estates Winery with his grandmother. While attending a wine-tasting, Molski encountered multiple physical barriers to entry with his wheelchair. An accessibility expert, Rick Sarantschin, conducted a sub rosa investigation of the property on October 12, 2003. Sarantschin confirmed the existence of barriers to entry including a ramp with a slope that varies between 6% and 20%; a raised threshold measuring 4.5"; a round door knob; a rear door width of only 30"; another door width of 31.25"; and a wine-tasting counter height of 42". Jarek Molski and DREES filed suit against Foley on December 22, 2003.

Prior to the commencement of litigation, Foley undertook $23,994 in renovations to provide all services on a wheelchair-accessible gazebo. Renovations included an accessible ramp from the parking lot and a "big bell" to summon for service. Nearly two years into the court proceedings, the Santa Barbara County Historic Landmarks Advisory Commission declared Foley Estates a "Place of Historical Merit" by way of resolution No. 2005-01.

At trial, the court heard expert testimony regarding proposed methods of barrier removal and associated costs. The court also heard testimony from Foley's architectural historian, who opined that an access ramp would have a severe impact on the historical nature of the cottage. The judge determined that it would cost $34,074 to construct an access ramp to the rear of the building, and it would cost $5,130 to remove all physical access barriers inside the building. The judge found that removal of interior barriers would be readily achievable, but removal of exterior barriers would not be readily achievable because it would threaten the architectural significance of the property. In reaching this finding, the judge held that 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 and ADAAG § 4.1.7 do not apply to barrier removal for existing facilities. Thus, the judge allocated the burden of production to the plaintiff to show that the proposed alteration would not threaten the historic significance of the building. The trial judge issued a permanent injunction requiring barrier removal inside the cottage.

DREES timely appeals the district court's findings regarding the applicability of 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 and ADAAG § 4.1.7, and the ready achievability of constructing an accessible ramp. Foley cross-appeals and challenges the permanent injunction requiring removal of interior physical barriers.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

DREES filed the underlying action for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300, in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We exercise jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

"The interpretation of [the ADA] is a question of law subject to de novo review." Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir.2002). We also review the district court's allocation of the burden of proof de novo. Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir.1991). We review the court's decision whether to grant equitable relief under the ADA for an abuse of discretion. Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

I. EXTERIOR RAMP

A. APPLICABLE REGULATIONS

On appeal, we are asked to decide whether 28 C.F.R. § 36.405 and ADAAG § 4.1.7 apply to barrier removal in existing facilities. By their terms, these regulations apply to "alterations;" however, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) extends their application to readily achievable barrier removal in existing facilities. Despite this regulatory directive, the district court declined to apply § 36.405 and § 4.1.7. We reverse and remand.

Our analysis begins with 28 C.F.R. § 36.304, which regulates barrier removal in existing facilities of public accommodation. That section requires "[a] public accommodation [to] remove architectural barriers in existing facilities ... where such removal is readily achievable."² 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a). The regulation goes on to specify that, "measures taken to comply with the barrier removal requirements of this section shall comply with the applicable requirements for alterations in § 36.402 and §§ 36.404-36.406...." 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) (emphasis added). If compliance under those additional regulations would not be readily achievable, "a public accommodation may take other readily achievable measures to remove the barrier that do not fully comply with the specified requirements." 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(2).

In this case, we look to the regulations governing historic buildings because the Santa Barbara County Historic Landmarks Advisory Commission designated the building as a place of local historic merit. Through its plain language, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) directs vendors to comply with 28 C.F.R. § 36.405³ when making readily achievable accommodations. Section 36.405 requires qualified historic buildings to "comply to the maximum extent feasible with [ADAAG § 4.1.7]." 28 C.F.R. § 36.405(a). Under § 4.1.7, "if the entity undertaking the alterations believes that compliance with the requirements . . . would threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building ... the entity should consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer." ADAAG § 4.1.7(2)(b). "If the State Historic Preservation Officer agrees that compliance with the accessibility requirements for accessible routes (exterior and interior), ramps, entrances or toilets would threaten or destroy the historical significance of the building or facility, the alternative requirements in 4.1.7(3) may be used." Id. Under our reading, 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(d)(1) requires compliance with § 36.405, which incorporates § 4.1.7(2)(b) and provides a procedure for businesses to seek alternative requirements for historic properties.

Our reading of 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 preserves the leniency allocated to existing facilities under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA only requires barrier removal in existing facilities "where such removal is readily achievable." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Section 36.304 integrates the "readily achievable" standard into both § 36.304(a) and § 36.304(d)(2). Section 36.304(a) ensures that only readily achievable barrier removal triggers the incorporation of § 36.405 and § 4.1.7, and § 36.304(d)(2) allows for partial compliance if full compliance with those regulations would not be readily achievable. Thus 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 incorporates § 36.405 and § 4.1.7 into the ready achievability framework, and retains the flexible standard reserved for existing facilities.

Additionally, § 4.1.7 establishes a procedure for determining whether barrier removal in existing facilities will be readily achievable. According to the ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual ("ADA Manual") § III-4.4200, "[b]arrier removal would not be considered `readily achievable' if it would threaten or destroy the historic significance of a building or facility that is ... designated as historic under State or local law." The standard set in § 4.1.7 is identical to the standard of ready achievability proffered by the ADA Manual. This similarity between the language suggests that application of § 4.1.7 is consistent with the standard for existing historic facilities. Therefore, the procedure set forth in § 4.1.7 may be used to determine what is readily achievable in existing historic facilities.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred when it refused to apply § 36.405 and § 4.1.7 to readily achievable barrier removal in existing facilities. We acknowledge...