Molski v. Gleich
| Decision Date | 06 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-57099.,No. 01-55068.,No. 01-55066.,00-57099.,01-55066.,01-55068. |
| Citation | 318 F.3d 937 |
| Parties | Jarek MOLSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Walter DeGroote; Equal Access Association, Suing on Behalf of Walter Lee DeGroote and its Members, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Martin L. GLEICH, Trustee of the Gleich Family Revocable Trust (12/22/93), Defendant, and BP America, Inc; Amanallah H. Al; Khalid H. Ali; GHM Enterprises; Atlantic Richfield Company, Atlantic Richfield Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; Ramona A.M. P.M., Defendants-Appellees. Jarek Molski; Walter Degroote; Equal Access Association, Suing on Behalf of Walter Lee DeGroote and its Members, Plaintiffs, and Roberto Frias, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Martin L. Gleich, Trustee of the Gleich Family Revocable Trust (12/22/93), Defendant, and BP America, Inc; Amanallah H. Al; Khalid H. Ali; GHM Enterprises; Atlantic Richfield Company, Atlantic Richfield Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; Ramona A.M. P.M., Defendants-Appellees. Jarek Molski, Plaintiff-Appellee, Amy B. Vandeveld, Objector-Appellant, and Walter DeGroote; Equal Access Association, Suing on Behalf of Walter Lee DeGroote and its Members; Roberto Frias, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Martin L. Gleich, Trustee of the Gleich Family Revocable Trust (12/22/93), Defendant, and BP America, Inc; Amanallah H. Al; Khalid H. Ali; GHM Enterprises; Atlantic Richfield Company, Atlantic Richfield Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; Ramona A.M. P.M., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David C. Wakefield (argued), Theodore A. Pinnock, Michelle Martin-Wakefield, Pinnock & Associates, San Diego, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellants and objector-appellant; Amy B. Vandeveld (argued), San Diego, CA, for the objector-appellant.
Timothy B. Taylor (argued), Martha H. Sottosanti, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, San Diego, CA, for the defendant-appellee; Russell C. Handy (argued), Center for Disability Access, San Diego, California for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California; Irma E. Gonzalez, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-00951-IEG.
Before: FERGUSON, TASHIMA and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
The opinion in this case, Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.2002), is withdrawn. An opinion will be filed replacing it.
Named Plaintiff/Appellee Jarek Molski brought this action against Defendant/Appellee Atlantic Richfield Company on behalf of a class of mobility-impaired individuals, alleging denial of access to public accommodations and discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and California disability laws. The District Court certified a mandatory class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) and approved a proposed consent decree pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). Under the consent decree, ARCO agreed to undertake certain accessibility enhancements at its locations, pay monetary damages to Molski and the class counsel's fees, and make donations to eight disability rights organizations. In exchange, the class members agreed to release all claims for statutory damages and certain actual damages.
Objectors/Appellants appeal the certification of class and approval of the consent decree, asserting that the District Court (1) erred by finding that actual damages were not released by the consent decree; (2) erred by certifying a mandatory class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2); (3) failed to provide adequate notice to the class members; (4) erred by determining that the consent decree was fair, adequate, and reasonable; and (5) erred by finding that the class representative and class counsel adequately represented the class.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In light of the broad release provision, which released the claims of the class members and left them with little or no relief, we determine that the certification of a mandatory class was violative of the class member's due process rights and that the consent decree was inadequate and fundamentally unfair. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
Defendant/Appellee ARCO owns, leases, and/or operates approximately 1,200 gas stations and mini-markets in the State of California.1 Each is a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b)(2), 12181(7)(f). Molski is the sole named plaintiff for the class. ARCO and Molski are collectively referred to as "Appellees."
Plaintiffs/Appellants Walter Lee DeGroote and Equal Access Association ("EAA") are collectively referred to as "DeGroote." DeGroote filed a complaint against ARCO, styled DeGroote v. Ramona A.M. P.M., No. 00-CV-1689 in the District Court, which was later consolidated with the Molski action. The DeGroote complaint was substantially similar to the Molski amended complaint with respect to the claims, relief sought, and identity of the class. Upon ARCO's motion and the non-opposition of DeGroote, the District Court consolidated the two actions. Appellants Roberto Frias ("Frias") and Amy Vandeveld ("Vandeveld") filed objections to class certification and the proposed consent decree. DeGroote, Frias, and Vandeveld are collectively referred to as "Appellants."
On May 20, 1998, Mark D. Potter ("Potter" or "class counsel") filed a complaint against ARCO on behalf of Molski, alleging that Molski was denied access to ARCO filling and service stations in violation of the ADA and various state laws, including the Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code sections 51, 52, and 54). Shortly after filing the complaint, Potter contacted ARCO's local counsel through both a demand letter and a phone call, informing ARCO that he planned to amend the complaint to include class allegations.
Between June 1, 1998 and October 2, 1998, Potter engaged in multiple settlement negotiations with various ARCO attorneys. These negotiations resulted in the parties' agreement as to the primary components of the consent decree, including payment of $195,000 to disability rights organizations, $50,000 in attorney's fees to Potter, and $5,000 in damages to Molski. Following this initial agreement, ARCO and Molski continued negotiating the details of the terms of the consent decree.
On July 26, 1999, Molski filed an amended complaint, presenting class allegations. On July 26, 2000, ARCO and Molski filed a joint motion for an order granting preliminary approval of the proposed consent decree, directing notice to the class, and conditionally certifying the settlement class. The District Court granted the joint motion on September 6, 2000.
In its order, the District Court directed that notice be issued to the putative class members in three manners:2 (1) posting of the two-page notice near an exterior or interior cash window or an interior entrance window of each gas station or mini-market owned, leased, or operated by ARCO-branded facility in California; (2) publication of the notice in the Los Angeles Times, the San Diego Union-Tribune, the Sacramento Bee, and the San Francisco Chronicle/Examiner; and (3) mailing of the notice to over 80 disability rights organizations in California.
In addition, the District Court set a deadline for the filing and service of written objections and/or notices of intent to appear at the fairness hearing. On or around October 31, 2000, thirty-three objectors, including DeGroote, EAA, Frias, and Vandeveld filed their objections to the proposed consent decree and requested the right to opt-out of the class. Most of the objections focused on the consent decree's release of state statutory damages. Some of them focused on concerns regarding the adequacy of the injunctive relief provided in the decree.
On December 4, 2000, the District Court held a fairness hearing regarding the certification of the class and the proposed consent decree. The Court then entered an order certifying a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(2) and approving the proposed consent decree. The Court also entered the consent decree as its final judgment. Each of the Appellants timely filed his or her notice of appeal, challenging the District Court's order certifying the class and approving the decree.
The consent decree defines the settlement class as follows:
[A]ll persons with Mobility Disabilities who: (1) have visited any ARCO-Branded Facility in the State of California as customers; (2) who have been deterred from availing themselves of the goods and services otherwise available to customers at these ARCO-Branded Facilities; (3) who could have asserted claims against ARCO and/or its Lessee Dealers under ADA or could have asserted California Disability Law Claims; or (4) who have been and/or are being denied the right to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of ARCO's service stations in California due to disability violations.
The consent decree provides for injunctive relief. In particular, ARCO is required to complete certain accessibility enhancements (i.e., structural modifications to improve accessibility for mobility-impaired individuals) within six years of the District Court's final approval of the decree.3 These accessibility enhancements include removing barriers to restrooms, stores, and self-service card stations by constructing ramps and sidewalks, installing grab bars, widening entrance doors, and clearing space. However, ARCO is not required to complete an enhancement if it is "Structurally Impracticable, Technically Infeasible or Virtually Impossible; or if completion of such Enhancement would involve a Significant Risk or Loss of Selling or Serving Space," or if it would violate a federal, state, or local law....
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