Moment v. Dubuque Cnty. Jail
| Decision Date | 06 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. C19-1040-LTS,C19-1040-LTS |
| Parties | YOOSUF MOMENT, Plaintiff, v. DUBUQUE COUNTY JAIL, JOSEPH KENNEDY, SHEA CHAPIN, and DAVID RINIKER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This matter is before me pursuant to a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint (Doc. No. 1)1 and pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) filed by plaintiff Yossuf Moment.2
Plaintiff did not submit the statutory filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (requiring filing fee). In order for a court to authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of the filing fee, a person must submit an affidavit that includes a statement of all the assets the person possesses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In addition, a prisoner must submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint,obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner was or is confined. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).
Moment, an inmate at the Dubuque County Jail, has submitted documents (Doc. No. 2) that substantially comply with those requirements. Because it is clear that he does not have the assets necessary to pay the filing fee, his application is granted.
However, even though the court deems it appropriate to grant a prisoner-plaintiff in forma pauperis status, that plaintiff is required to pay the full $350.00 filing fee by making payments on an installment basis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see also In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997) (). The full filing fee will be collected even if the court dismisses the case because it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of twenty percent of the greater of his average monthly account balance or average monthly deposits for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Based on the documents that plaintiff submitted, the court finds that initial partial filing fee is $73.68. See Doc. No. 2. Plaintiff shall submit $73.68 by no later than thirty days from the date of this order. If the court does not receive payment by this deadline, the instant action shall be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (); Hutchins v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 116 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (8th Cir. 1997) (). If necessary, plaintiff may request in a written motion an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee.
In addition to the initial partial filing fee, plaintiff must "make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account." 28U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner's institution to collect the additional monthly payments and forward them to the court. Specifically:
[a]fter payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Therefore, after plaintiff pays in full the initial partial filing fee, the remaining installments shall be collected by the institution having custody of the plaintiff. The clerk's office shall send a copy of this order and the notice of collection of filing fee to the appropriate official at the place where plaintiff is an inmate.
A pro se complaint must be liberally construed. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). However, the Court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant that is immune from a monetary judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) ().
In reviewing a prisoner or in forma pauperis complaint, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless, they must be weighed in favor of the plaintiff. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). Pro se complaints, however, must allege sufficient facts to support the plaintiff's claim. Stone, 364 F.3d at 914. A claim is "frivolous" if it "lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); accord Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 1994). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), courtsgenerally rely on the standards articulated pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), a court may review the complaint and dismiss sua sponte those claims that fail "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Id. at 555., or that are premised on meritless legal theories or clearly lack any factual basis, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .
§ 1983 was designed to provide a "broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides no substantive rights. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). "One cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of [42 U.S.C] § 1983' — for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything." Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (); Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94 (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) the alleged deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Moment's claim is that he was inappropriately charged the costs associated with his incarceration. Because I must liberally construe a pro se complaint, I interpret his allegation to be that he was charged costs associated with his confinement without due process of law. He attached to his motion an exhibit (Doc. No. 1 at 14), which is titled "County Prisoners - Room and Board Fees." That document states that pursuant to Iowa Code § 356.7, he was charged $850 by the Dubuque County Sheriff on November 14, 2019.3
Costs associated with Iowa Code § 356.7 can be imposed either as restitution as part of a criminal judgement or as a separate judgement. State v. Abrahamson, 696 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 2005). There is currently an open question whether the laterprocess, a judgment initiated by a county sheriff, runs afoul of due process, at least under the Iowa Constitution, if the process used does not consider the inmates ability to pay the judgment. See State v. Gross, --- N.W.2d ----, 2019 WL 6040803, at *8 (Iowa 2019), where the Iowa Supreme Court considered a case in which an inmate contested a § 356.7 claim and stated:
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