Monaco v. City of Jacksonville
| Decision Date | 30 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:09–cv–1169–J–32PDB. |
| Citation | 51 F.Supp.3d 1251 |
| Parties | Scott MONACO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Andrew D. Abramowitz, Daniel Mirachi, Spector, Roseman, Kodroff & Willis PC, Philadelphia, PA, D. Marcus Braswell, Jr., Robert A. Sugarman, Noah Scott Warman, Sugarman & Susskind, PA, Coral Gables, FL, Mark David Bogen, Bogen Law Group, PA, Boca Raton, FL, Mark S. Willis, Spector, Roseman, Kodroff & Willis, PC, Washington, DC, Tanisha Nunn Gary, Willie Edward Gary, Gary, Williams, Parenti, Watson & Gary, PL, Stuart, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Adina Teodorescu, William Wallace Deem, Office of General Counsel, Carol Mirando, City of Jacksonville, Cindy A. Laquidara, Akerman Senterfitt, LLP, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.
Up to 2,000 employees of the City of Jacksonville filed this class action alleging that the City violated the Americans With Disabilities Act by excluding them from the City's Retirement System because of “pre existing medical conditions.” At first, the City fell on its sword, agreeing to allow the case to proceed as a class action and enrolling all class members into the retirement system. Then, the City altered course and decided to contest the case, resulting in this protracted litigation. Following the City's change of heart, this case came before the Court on the parties' Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment and related filings. In a September 11, 2012 Order (Doc. 91), the Court identified several significant and complex legal issues that required further argument:
Because of the complexity of the issues and the parties' evolving positions on them, as well as the uncertainty of how to apply the relevant law, the Court finds it necessary to have another hearing on the pending Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment.... [However, before doing so] the Court finds it appropriate to provide the parties with the opportunity to mediate the case before they embark on what might be a difficult and uncertain path. Indeed, the parties may be able to achieve through settlement a fair and equitable result that might not be attainable under the law's strictures.
Order at 11–12. Thus, the Court directed the parties to participate in mediation, believing (as I still do) that they should reach a settlement. The parties mediated on December 4, 2012, and continued their settlement discussions for 10 months. (Docs. 94–99).
However, on October 2, 2013, the mediator informed the Court that the parties were at an impasse. (Doc. 102). Accordingly, the Court reopened the case and directed the parties to rebrief the matter in light of the issues identified in the Court's prior Order and the current state of the law. See Order (Doc. 104). The matter is now before the Court on the parties' renewed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 107, 109, 110, 113). The Court held oral argument on May 22, 2014. (Doc. 117; the Hearing). Following argument, at the Court's request, the parties filed proposed orders on August 15, 2014. See City's Proposed Order (Doc. 128); Plaintiffs' Proposed Order (Doc. 129).
The Court concludes that, while the City's process which resulted in excluding so many employees based on “pre-existing conditions” was, at best, haphazard, it did not violate the ADA on a class-wide basis. Thus, while some of these employees may seek to prosecute individual ADA actions against the City, this case may not proceed as a class action. Because the ADA is the only basis upon which the class has brought suit, the Court has no occasion to determine whether the City's actions violated some other local, state or federal law. However, nothing in this Order prevents the City from voluntarily offering a remedy to the employees who may have been unnecessarily excluded from the City's Retirement System. My detailed reasoning follows.
Summary judgment is proper “when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th Cir.2011) ; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). The inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rylee v. Chapman, 316 Fed.Appx. 901, 905 (11th Cir.2009). See T–Mobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 564 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1340 (M.D.Fla.2008).
The Charter for the City of Jacksonville provides that “[a]ll officers and employees of the consolidated government employed after the effective date of this Charter shall be members of ... the retirement and pension system for the consolidated government.” Defendant's Motion, Ex. B (Doc. 68–3): Jacksonville, Fla. Charter, art. 16, § 16.01. The City of Jacksonville Retirement System (the System) consists of two separate pension plans: the General Employees Retirement Plan (GERP), and the Corrections Officers' Retirement Plan (CORP). Defendant's Motion, Ex. B at 9: Jacksonville, Fla., Code § 120.101(b). The City of Jacksonville's Ordinance Code (the Code) previously required all applicants for membership in either the GERP or the CORP “to undergo a physical examination for the purpose of determining pre existing medical conditions.” See Defendant's Motion, Ex. C (Doc. 68–4) at 3; see also Code § 120.302(c). This prior version of the Code provided that “[n]o condition of health shall preclude a person elected or hired by the City from membership, but no application for disability retirement shall be based on a pre existing medical condition revealed by the physical examination provided for in this paragraph.” Id. Thus, the Code mandated that “[a]ny applicant determined to have a pre existing medical condition shall, as a condition of admission to the System, waive the right to receive a disability or pre retirement death benefit based on that condition in a form acceptable to the Board [of Trustees].” Id. Additionally, “[m]embership in the System shall be deemed to commence after an applicant has completed the required physical examination, has executed any appropriate waiver forms, has submitted all required enrollment forms, and shall be coincident with the first pay period in which employee contributions are made.” Id. The Code was amended, effective September 15, 2008, to remove the physical examination and waiver requirements as to the GERP. See id.; see also Code § 120.202. However, the Code still requires a physical examination and waiver of pre-existing conditions prior to joining the CORP. See Code § 120.302(c)-(d).
Plaintiffs are employees of the City who, upon employment, were each required to undergo a medical examination to determine their eligibility to participate in one of the pension plans of the System. See Second Amended Complaint ¶ 5(a); Answer (Doc. 20) ¶ 5(a). As a result of medical issues revealed by the examinations, Plaintiffs were not admitted into the System at the time their employment with the City commenced. See Second Amended Complaint ¶ 5(b); Answer ¶ 5(b). Plaintiffs maintain, and the City admits, that Plaintiffs were “denied entry” into the System based on a “medical issue” identified in their examinations.1 See Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 5(b)-(c), 13; Answer ¶ 5(b)-(c). However, the City now argues that Plaintiffs were not actually excluded from the System, but merely delayed in entering the System because they did not complete the application process as defined in the Code, either by failing to provide the requisite waiver or by failing to provide documentation of specific medical tests.See Defendant's Renewed Motion (Doc. 109) at 3–4. Employees that were not admitted into the System participated in the federal Social Security program instead. Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs filed this case on December 2, 2009, alleging that they were excluded from the City's System because of their actual or perceived disabilities in violation of the ADA. In apparent response to the suit, in February of 2010, the City voluntarily admitted into the System “all civil service employees who were not members, unless they specifically asked to remain in the Social Security program.” See Defendant's Motion (Doc. 68) at 5, Ex. J; Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief (Doc. 89) at 16. Having achieved membership in the System, “Plaintiffs are now seeking only equitable relief, in the form of a court order providing for the correction of their membership date back to their date of hire.” See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief (Doc. 89) at 16. If Plaintiffs achieve this relief, it would potentially affect both the amount of their retirement benefit and how long they have to remain with the City to receive the maximum benefit.
On March 1, 2010, Plaintiffs moved to certify this case as a class action. See Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 16). Significantly, the City agreed to class certification subject only to the limitation that the City denied that the Class Members have any “entitlement to a reduced-price buy-back.” See City's Response to Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 19) at 1. The Court held a hearing (Doc. 22), and on June 21, 2010, entered an Order (Doc. 35) granting class certification. Both parties agreed to the form of the...
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