Monaco v. Hogan
| Citation | 576 F.Supp.2d 335 |
| Decision Date | 29 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-98-3386 (CPS)(RML).,CV-98-3386 (CPS)(RML). |
| Parties | Gregory B. MONACO, etc., et ano., Plaintiffs, v. Michael F, HOGAN,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> etc., et alia, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Michelle Marie Buescher, The City Of New York Law, Department Office Of Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, William M. Brooks, Central Islip, NY, for Plaintiffs* Defendants.
Christine E. Morrison, Edward J. Curtis, Michael E. Peeples, Attorney General of the State of New York, Lisa Fleming Grumet, Emily Sweet, Corporation Counsel, Erika B. Stein, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, New York, NY, Brian P. Callahan, Hauppauge, NY, Derrick Jeffrey Robinson, Devitt, Spellman, Barrett, LLC, Smithtown, NY, Gary P. Schulz, Nixon Peabody, LLP, Jericho, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Gregory B. Monaco ("Monaco"), on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, and the Mental Disability Law Clinic, Touro Law Center (the "Clinic")2 (collectively "plaintiffs") bring this class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the following defendants: Sharon Carpinello, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH");3 Catherine Cahill, in her official capacity as Justice of the East Hampton Town Justice Court, on behalf of herself and all other local criminal court judges in New York State;4 Benjamin Chu, in his official capacity as the Director of the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation ("HHC"); Mark Sedler, M.D., in his official capacity as Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at University Hospital of the State University at Stony Brook; Kenneth Skodnek, in his official capacity as Chairman of Psychiatry at Nassau University Medical Center; Alfred Tisch, in his official capacity of Sheriff of Suffolk County; and Martin Horn, in his official capacity of Commissioner of the New York City Department of Corrections.5
Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for false imprisonment negligence, and medical malpractice. As amended, the complaint contains two major components: 1) a challenge to the constitutionality of the practices of Cahill, Horn, and Tisch, who are alleged to have unnecessarily prolonged the confinement of individuals found incompetent to stand trial for minor felonies and misdemeanors and those awaiting such a determination; 2) a challenge to the constitutionality of the procedures allegedly used by defendants Commissioner, Chu, Sedler, Skodnek, and Licht to hospitalize individuals deemed mentally ill involuntarily.6
Now before this Court is defendant Commissioner's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action and defendant Cahill's motion for abstention and dismissal of the First and Second Causes of Action or, in the alternative, an order decertifying the defendant class of local criminal court justices. For the reasons set forth below, defendant Commissioner's motion and defendant Cahill's motion are granted.
A brief description of the statutory scheme at issue is necessary to understand plaintiffs' claims.
When a criminal court determines that a defendant lacks capacity to stand trial, N.Y.Crim. Pro. Law ("CPL") § 730.40(1) requires the court to "issue a final or temporary order of observation, committing him to the custody of the [Commissioner of Mental Health] for care and treatment ... for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date of the order." If the charge is a misdemeanor, the order must be a "final order of observation." If the accusatory instrument is a felony complaint, the order must be a "temporary order of commitment" unless the District Attorney consents to a final order. Id. A final order of observation bars any further prosecution on the charge in the accusatory instrument, as the court, upon its issuance, is required to dismiss the charges against the defendant. The issuance of an order of observation results in the remand of the defendant to the custody of the OMH Commissioner. Id.
In Ritter v. Surles, 144 Misc.2d 945, 545 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y.Sup.1988), the court found that aspects of CPL § 730.40 violated the United States Constitution. To comport with Ritter, the OMH instituted a policy that directed its facilities to confine individuals remanded pursuant to § 730.40 for a period not to exceed 72 hours, rather than the 90-day period provided in the statute, see Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 355-56 (2d Cir.2000),7 and to determine in this period whether civil commitment was appropriate for the defendant. Id. If the criteria for civil commitment are not met, the defendant is to be released.
Article 9 of New York's Mental Hygiene Law sets out the state's civil commitment scheme. Under Article 9, a psychiatric hospital may involuntarily admit a patient upon the certificates of two physicians and a confirmation of the need for hospitalization by a third physician. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law ("MHL") § 9.27(a) & (e). In an emergency, a hospital may admit a patient upon the certificate of one doctor who has determined that the patient has a mental illness that requires immediate inpatient care and is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others.8 See id. §§ 9.37(a); 9.39(a); 9.40(a). The need for immediate hospitalization must be confirmed by a staff physician prior to admission. See id. § 9.37(a).
Although not explicitly stated by MHL § 9.27, several court decisions have made clear that involuntary commitment under this section requires a finding that the mentally ill individual poses a threat of harm to himself or others. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 572, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir.1983) (); In re Harry M., 96 A.D.2d 201, 206-08, 468 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1983); In re Scopes, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205-06, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911 (3d Dep't 1977).
On March 12, 1999, I certified Gregory Monaco as the representative of a plaintiff class ("Original Plaintiff Class") of all individuals who have been or will be (1) charged with a minor felony or misdemeanor, (2) evaluated to determine whether or not they are competent to stand trial; (3) found by court appointed psychiatrists to lack the capacity to stand trial and awaiting a determination of the competency issue by the local criminal court. Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Monaco I"). I also certified a subclass ("Original Plaintiff Subclass") of all individuals who have been or will be (1) charged with a minor felony or misdemeanor, (2) evaluated to determine whether or not they are competent to stand trial, (3) found by court appointed psychiatrists to lack the capacity to stand trial, and (4) confined to a local jail pending a determination of competency by the local criminal court. Id. at 63-64. I further certified a defendant class, represented by defendant Cahill, of all local criminal court judges who have the authority pursuant to CPL § 730.40 to involuntarily commit incompetent defendants. Id. at 64.
In 2002, plaintiffs sought to certify a new class and two subclasses. The new class was to comprise of persons who satisfied one or more of the following criteria: (1) they are or will be confined to a jail pending a competency determination; (2) they have been or will be found incompetent to stand trial and remanded to an OMH facility pursuant to CPL § 730.40; and/or they are or will be subject to a civil commitment evaluation pursuant to Article 9 of the MHL. I declined to certify this class, as plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality requirement. Monaco v. Stone, 2002 WL 32984617, at *37 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.18, 2002) ("Monaco II"). I did, however, certify what I and the parties termed subclasses because Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(c)(4)(B) (2002) required subclasses be treated as classes for the purposes of certification.
The first subclass, to be represented by Monaco and the Clinic, comprises all individuals who have been or will be (1) charged with a minor felony or misdemeanor, (2) evaluated to determine whether or not they are competent to stand trial, (3) found by court appointed psychiatrists to lack capacity to stand trial, who are awaiting a determination of the by the local criminal court, and (4) if remanded pursuant to CPL § 730.40, subject to a civil commitment evaluation pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law article 9 ("Incompetency Subclass"). Monaco II, at *37. I further divided the Incompetency Subclass into two sub-subclasses. Id. at **37-38.
I also certified a Civil Commitment Subclass, to be represented by the Clinic, which consists "of all individuals in the counties of Kings, Queens, Richmond, Nassau, and Suffolk9 who are subject to civil commitment evaluations pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 9 at facilities operated by the Office of Mental Health or other state entities, local governments, and private entities." Id. at *43.10 The subclass was subsequently modified to delete the reference to private entities. Monaco v. Stone, Memorandum Opinion & Order, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003).11
On December 17, 2004, plaintiffs filed a Fifth Amended Complaint. The causes of action relevant to these motions are one, two, seven through nine, and eleven.12
The First Cause of Action alleges:
By maintaining a system by which defendants who may lack capacity to stand trial are required to...
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