Monaco v. WV Parkways Auth.
| Decision Date | 02 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-cv-00517 |
| Parties | BLAZINE MONACO Plaintiff, v. WV PARKWAYS AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the court is Defendant West Virginia Parkways Authority's Motion to Dismiss. [ECF No. 17]. Parties have responded, [ECF No. 23], and replied, [ECF No. 28]. Parties have also submitted supplemental briefs as directed by the court. [ECF Nos. 36, 37]. This motion is ripe for decision.
In September 2018, Plaintiff Blazine Monaco "drove through the state of West Virginia and on four occasions encountered cash only toll booths on the West Virginia Turnpike." [ECF No. 1, at 5]. "Plaintiff did not have cash and was unable to use a debit/credit card" to make payment at the toll booths. Id. Plaintiff then received an "Unpaid Toll Violation Notice." Id. Plaintiff was assessed $8 in unpaid tolls, $120 in administrative fees, and a $10 notice fee. Id. Plaintiff paid all three of the fees. Id.
Plaintiff then brought this action on behalf of herself and as a representative of all others similarly situated, alleging that the Parkways Authority "has been unjustly enriched by collecting administrative fees and notice fees not permitted by any statute, regulation, or rule." Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Parkways Authority unlawfully imposes a $5.00 administrative fee if drivers pay their toll within 15 days, a $30.00 administrative fee if drivers pay their toll within 25 days, and a $105.00 administrative fee if drivers pay their toll after 25 days." [ECF No. 1, at 4.]. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that the $10.00 notice fee is unlawful. Plaintiff argues that these administrative and notice fees constitute an unjust enrichment on behalf of the Parkways Authority.
The West Virginia Parkways Authority filed this Motion to Dismiss asserting five grounds for dismissal: 1) Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-17-3(a)(1); 2) this suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; 3) this suit is barred by Article VI, § 35 of the Constitution of West Virginia; 4) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because the Parkways Authority is authorized to fix and collect these fees by statute; and 5) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. For the reasons stated below, the Parkways Authority's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
The Parkways Authority was created by the West Virginia Legislature in 1989 as a successor to the West Virginia Turnpike Commission. It is charged with, among other things, operating the West Virginia Turnpike, an 88-mile stretch of Interstate 77 between Charleston and Princeton, West Virginia.
The Parkways Authority is governed by Chapter 17, Article 16A of the West Virginia Code. The Parkways Authority is empowered to do a number of things including issuing bonds and acquiring property. The Parkways Authority is authorized to "to charge, fix and revise, from time to time, tolls or fees for transit over each parkway project constructed or improved or financed by it . . . ." W. Va. Code§ 17-16A-6(8). The Parkways Authority funds its projects and operations by issuing revenue bonds and charging tolls, rents, and fees. W. Va. Code §§ 17-16A-6, -10, -11a, -12, -13.
The West Virginia Legislature passed the Electronic Toll Collection Act in 2014. W. Va. Code § 17-16D-1, et seq. The Electronic Toll Collection Act was passed to make "toll roads, highways and bridges in this state safer and collection of tolls more efficient" through "the use of electronic and video technology for collection of tolls on roads, highways and bridges." W. Va. Code § 17-16D-1.
In general, a pleading must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015) (). To withstand a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 647 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Well-pleaded factual allegations are required;labels, conclusions, and a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) .
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court first "identif[ies] pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court then "assume[s] the[] veracity" of the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations" and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. "[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged." Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, the Parkways Authority argues that this case must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to provide the Parkways Authority with 30-days' notice before commencing this action. Section 55-17-3(a)(1) of the West Virginia Code states that "at least thirty days prior to the institution of an action against a government agency, the complaining party or parties must provide the chief officer of that government agency and the Attorney General written notice, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the alleged claim and the relief desired." The Parkways Authority asserts that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because "[c]ompliance withthe pre-suit notification provisions set forth in W. Va. Code § 55-17-3(a) is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing an action against a State agency." [ECF No. 17, at 5] (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Motto v. CSX Transp., Inc., 647 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 2007)). "However, West Virginia's notice-of-claim law does not apply to suits filed in federal court." Durstein v. Alexander, No. 3:19-cv-0029, 2019 WL 6833858, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 13, 2019) (Chambers, J.) (citing Smith v. Allred, No. 15-cv-06026, 2016 WL 3094008, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 1, 2016) (Copenhaver, J.)). Therefore, the Parkways Authority's Motion to Dismiss on this ground is DENIED.
Second, the Parkways Authority argues that this case must be dismissed because it is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment provides that the "Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the amendment to apply to a suit by a citizen of a state against that state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Further, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits naming an arm of the state as a defendant. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 845 F.2d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 1988). The Amendment applies to state law and federal claims. Id.
The "Supreme Court identified six factors considered useful in determining whether an entity qualifies as an arm of the state: (1) the characterization of the entity by the language of its creating statutes; (2) the origin of the entity's funding;(3) whether the state is financially responsible for the liabilities and obligations incurred by the entity; (4) the source of the power to appoint the entity's officers or members; (5) whether the function performed by the entity is traditionally state or municipal; and (6) whether the entity's actions are subject to a veto by the state." Ristow v. South Carolina Port Authority, 58 F.3d 1051, 1052 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979)). "[O]ne factor dominates the inquiry—whether the state treasury is 'obligated' for 'the losses and debts' of the entity under scrutiny." Id. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 51 (1994).
The Parkways Authority argues that it is an arm of the state because it was created as a state agency, serves public purposes and...
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