Monarch v. Mclaughlin

• Decision Date: 01 January 1877
• Citation: 1 Idaho 650
• Parties: The Monarch G. & S. M. Co., Appellant, v. Peter Mclaughlin Et Al., Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

1 Idaho 650

The Monarch G. & S. M. Co., Appellant, v. Peter Mclaughlin Et Al., Respondents.

Supreme Court of Idaho

January 1, 1877

NEW TRIAL.-After two concurring verdicts, the court will not grant a new trial if the questions to be tried wholly depend upon matters of fact, and no rule-of law has been violated even though in the opinion of the court the verdict be against the weight of evidence.

APPEAL from the Second Judicial District, Alturas County.

V. S Anderson, Brumback & Cahalan, and George Ainslie, for the Appellant. R. A. Sidebotham and Huston & Gray, for the Respondents.

CLARK J.,

delivered the opinion.

HOLLISTER J., concurred. PRICKETT, J., having been of counsel, took no part in the case.

This action was commenced on the twenty-fourth day of July, 1875, in the district court of the second judicial district for Alturas county. It is brought for the recovery of the possession of certain silver ore mentioned in the complaint, or the value thereof, to wit, four thousand dollars, in case a return cannot be made.

The records of this court show that this action was tried

by the district court of the second judicial district for Alturas county, at a term thereof held A. D. 1875, and that the jury in the case returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, upon which verdict judgment was rendered accordingly. That afterward the plaintiff, now appellant, moved for a new trial on the grounds of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and that the law known as the statute of limitations had not been correctly given by the court to the jury. The judge who tried the cause, after hearing the motion for new trial, denied the same, and plaintiffs appealed therefrom to this court. At the January term, 1876, said appeal was heard, and the order refusing a new trial overruled.

This court, in its opinion on that appeal, say, in substance, that because the law governing this case was not given to the jury in writing, and the evidence strongly preponderating against the verdict, the jury must have misconceived the law, or the facts, or were influenced by passion, or prejudice, in order to find their verdict. It is evident from the opinion, that this cause was ordered to be submitted again to a jury, because this court had doubts as to whether justice had been done in the premises.

This cause was tried for the second time in said district court, before a different judge and jury, and a verdict rendered again for the defendants, and judgment accordingly. The plaintiff moved again for a new trial, which was denied by the judge who tried the cause, and an appeal from that order and the judgment is perfected and the cause again submitted to this court. The transcript shows that no exception was taken to any ruling or order of the court made during the progress of the trial. The instructions were given to the jury in writing, and the same is admitted by the counsel for appellant to cover the law in the case. So far as the record shows, the appellant had a fair and impartial trial.

In this case two juries have passed upon the facts and returned concurrent verdicts, and the several judges before whom these trials were had, have in each instance denied the plaintiff a new trial. Hence we conclude that the judges considered the evidence sufficient to warrant the verdict.

It has been a debated and vexed question, as to whether, after the court that tried the cause has decided that the verdict must stand, an appellate court can, notwithstanding, order a new trial. The presiding judge has heard, and what is more important, has seen the witnesses testify, noticed their demeanor, listened to their cross-examination; minute circumstances which are often the turning-point in a case have not escaped him. The evidence has been presented full and fresh to his mind after passing through the slow and severe ordeal of judicial scrutiny. He has the benefit of the siftings of counsel. On the other hand, the appellate court has enjoyed none of these advantages; it receives the testimony on paper, and thus presented, it is always tame meager, and unsatisfactory. Its whole knowledge of the case being thus derived, it is but illy qualified to pass an enlightened judgment upon it. The reasons, therefore, for denying to the appellate court the right to...