Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140911.,20140911.
• Citation: 368 P.3d 846
• Parties: Jesus MONARREZ, Petitioner, v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

368 P.3d 846

Jesus MONARREZ, Petitioner,

v.UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.

No. 20140911.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 9, 2016.

F. Kim Walpole, Matthew G. Koyle, Ogden, for petitioner.

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Stanford E. Purser, Reed M. Stringham, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Chief Justice DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in which Associate chief Justice LEE, Justice DURHAM, and Justice HIMONAS joined. Justice JOHN A. PEARCE became a member of the Court on December 17, 2015, after oral argument in this matter, and accordingly did not participate.

On Certiorari to the Court of Appeals

Chief Justice DURRANT

, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶ 1 We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) barred Jesus Monarrez's claims. Mr. Monarrez, after being injured when forced to stop suddenly near a construction crew on a Utah road, attempted to bring a negligence claim against the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) and several unnamed "John Does." The parties agree that Mr. Monarrez properly filed a notice of claim pursuant to the GIA but disagree as to the effect of a letter sent by UDOT after Mr. Monarrez's claim had been deemed denied. We granted certiorari to interpret the relevant portion of the GIA, Utah Code section 63G–7–403

, and clarify the effect, or lack thereof, that a denial letter sent after the date a claim is deemed denied has on a claimant's time to file a lawsuit. We also granted certiorari to determine whether the State should be estopped from asserting its statute of limitations defense due to the statements contained within the letter and whether Mr. Monarrez's claims against the "John Doe" defendants were properly dismissed. We affirm.

Background

¶ 2 This case arises out of Jesus Monarrez's attempt to sue UDOT for negligence. The facts of the accident giving rise to Mr. Monarrez's claim against UDOT are not particularly relevant to the legal issues we are called upon to decide today. In brief, Jesus Monarrez was riding his motorcycle in Garfield County in August 2010 when he rounded a corner and came upon a construction zone and crew. He was forced to stop suddenly, tipping over his motorcycle and sustaining injuries. He claims that UDOT breached its duty to keep the roadway safe and adequately warn about the construction and should accordingly be held liable for his injuries. In compliance with the GIA, Mr. Monarrez timely submitted a notice of claim against UDOT on August 23, 2011. In the cover letter sent with the notice of claim, Mr. Monarrez requested a response "within the 90 days as required by that statute or otherwise."¹ The GIA provides, however, that "the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied" "[w]ithin 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim."²

¶ 3 UDOT did not respond to the notice of claim within sixty days. Accordingly, Mr. Monarrez's claim was "considered to be denied" no later than October 24, 2011.³ On November 15, 2011—after the date Mr. Monarrez's claim was deemed to be denied pursuant to the statute—UDOT, through the Utah Division of Risk Management,⁴ sent a letter to Mr. Monarrez stating that UDOT had "completed an investigation of [Mr. Monarrez's] claim and [had] concluded that [UDOT was] not liable for [Mr. Monarrez's] damages.... Therefore, we respectfully deny your claim." The letter also contained a clause stating that the letter does "not constitute a waiver of any of the provisions or requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act[,] ... nor does it confirm or verify the sufficiency of the claimant's notice of claim as required by the Act."

¶ 4 The GIA provides that "[t]he claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period ... has expired."⁵ Mr. Monarrez filed suit on November 9, 2012—over one year from the deemed denied date, but less than one year from the date of the letter. The complaint also named as defendants several "John Does" (Doe Defendants)—described as "construction companies and/or their employees"—who Mr. Monarrez alleged were also negligent. UDOT answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the GIA barred Mr. Monarrez's claim because he did not file within a year of the date on which it was deemed denied. Mr. Monarrez countered that the letter had restarted the year-to-file period provided for in the GIA and, even if it had not, UDOT should be estopped from asserting the time limitation provisions of the GIA because of the letter. He also argued that the Doe Defendants should not be dismissed until their identities and relationship to UDOT were known. The trial court granted UDOT's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Monarrez's entire suit with prejudice, including his claim against the Doe Defendants.

¶ 5 Mr. Monarrez appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the GIA required Mr. Monarrez to file within a year after his claim had been deemed denied and that the letter sent by UDOT was "functionally superfluous."⁶ The court distinguished two cases dealing with other statutes containing similar limitations that had permitted a government response sent after a deemed denial to restart the time to file.⁷ Although Mr. Monarrez asked the court to apply this decision prospectively, the court of appeals did not do so after finding that its interpretation of the GIA "has minimal impact and does not result in substantial injustice."⁸ Judge Voros dissented from this particular holding, arguing the decision should be applied purely prospectively because "the ‘prior state of the law’ in this general area consisted of two supreme court cases interpreting similar provisions ... and reaching a contrary result."⁹ The court of appeals also held that UDOT was not estopped from asserting the limitations defense because its letter had not contained "an affirmative representation that the Limitations Provision may be interpreted as [Mr.] Monarrez contends."¹⁰ Finally, the court also affirmed the dismissal of the Doe Defendants, holding that Mr. Monarrez had either alleged that the Defendants were employees of UDOT—and thus protected under the GIA—or had failed to state a claim against them at all.¹¹ Mr. Monarrez petitioned for certiorari on each of these issues, which we granted.

Standard of Review

¶ 6 We granted certiorari to address four issues: (1) whether the court of appeals was correct that the proper interpretation of the limitations provision in the GIA barred Mr. Monarrez's claim; (2) whether the court of appeals' majority was correct that a decision interpreting the GIA in favor of UDOT should be applied retrospectively; (3) whether the court of appeals was correct in determining that UDOT was not estopped from asserting the limitations defense; and (4) whether the court of appeals was correct in affirming the dismissal of the Doe Defendants.

¶ 7 Statutory interpretation and the grant of summary judgment are legal questions reviewed for correctness.¹² And we "giv [e] the court of appeals' conclusions of law no deference."¹³ To the extent an issue involves a factual question, we "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," Mr. Monarrez.¹⁴ We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(a)

.

Analysis

¶ 8 We granted certiorari to address four issues: first, whether the language of Utah Code section 63G–7–403

permits a denial letter sent after a claim is deemed denied to restart the GIA's limitations period; second, if we decide that a late letter does not restart the limitations period, whether we should apply our holding purely prospectively; third, whether UDOT should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense based on its representations in the letter; and fourth, whether the court of appeals was correct in dismissing Mr. Monarrez's claims against the Doe Defendants. We address each issue in turn and, for the reasons discussed below, affirm the decision of the court of appeals in its entirety.

I. UDOT's Letter Was a Legal Superfluity Because the Plain Language of the GIA Is Clear that a Claim Can Be Denied Only Once

¶ 9 The first issue in this case is the meaning of Utah Code section 63G–7–403

, which reads as follows:

(1)(a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied.

(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60–day period, the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.

(2)(a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.

(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.

Mr. Monarrez argues that this statutory language provides for two alternative timelines for filing: either one year after the sixty-day denial period expired or, regardless of whether a claim has previously been deemed denied, one year after the government accepts or denies the claim in writing. He bolsters his statutory language analysis by pointing to two cases dealing with similar statutory schemes in which we held that a written response sent after a deemed denial restarted the time to file. The court of appeals rejected this interpretation, holding that the letter sent by UDOT was "functionally superfluous" because the two alternative timelines provided for in the statute were mutually exclusive and our prior cases were distinguishable.¹⁵ We first...