Mone v. United States

Decision Date26 March 2019
Docket Number2018-2208
PartiesSADE MONE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:17-cv-01819-PEC, Judge Patricia E. Campbell-Smith.

SADE MONE, Savannah, GA, pro se.

TANYA KOENIG, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, TARA K. HOGAN, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.

Before LOURIE, O'MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Sade Mone appeals from a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims (the "Claims Court") dismissing her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and declining to transfer the case to district court. Mone v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 (2018). Because the Claims Court did not err in its dismissal and because any error in its analysis of the transferee court's jurisdiction was harmless, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Sade Mone, formerly known as Tabitha Robinson, filed a complaint in the Claims Court alleging that she was subjected to illegal housing conditions and illegal eviction proceedings by the Housing Authority of the City of Charleston ("CHA") while she was a resident at one of the city's housing projects. See id. at 280. CHA is a public housing agency created under state law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 31-3-310. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") is a federal agency that provides annual contributions to help the public housing agencies maintain and operate low-income housing projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.

Mone's complaint details the distressing living situation she experienced including (1) construction resulting in water damage; (2) the manager distributing "the master key to [her] unit so that random people could enter without [her] prior knowledge or consent"; (3) CHA employees giving "tenants permission to impose themselves, their friends, children, other relatives, companions, etc. upon [her]"; (4) offensive behaviors such as loitering, profanity, drug use and dealing, alcohol, loud music, and vandalism; (5) CHA instructing the police "not to file a police or incident report whenever a call came in" from her address; (6) CHA harassing her with "meritless" ejection proceedings that were unsuccessful; and (7) HUD's annual inspections in 2009, 2010, and 2011 resulting in a pass even though there was "black mold" throughout the house and CHA's own inspection detailed that there was "mold covering every room of the unit including walls, windows, and attic." Complaint ¶ 4, Mone v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 (2018) (No. 17-1819C), ECF No. 1; J.A. 9-11 ("Complaint").

Because of these conditions, Mone sent a letter to HUD's Columbia Field Office on June 19, 2010 complaining about the conditions and CHA. See Plaintiff's Motion of Opposition, Ex. 2, Mone v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 (2018) (No. 17-1819C), ECF No. 12. According to Mone, she received no response. See Complaint ¶ 4. On November 16, 2011, Mone was evicted. Mone was then homeless for the next two years and her health declined. She had to be hospitalized multiple times and was diagnosed with several illnesses. During this time, she sent another letter on September 13, 2012—this time to HUD's Atlanta Regional Office—but again, she states that she received no response. Id.; see Plaintiff's Motion of Opposition, Ex. 3, Mone v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 279 (2018) (No. 17-1819C), ECF No. 12. On November 17, 2017, Mone filed her complaint at the Claims Court alleging that the "gross negligence of HUD employees who refused to respond to [her] complaints and falsified inspections" resulted in her "permanent health problems." Complaint ¶ 4. Mone requested $13.5 million in damages. Id. ¶ 5.

The Claims Court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Mone's claims sounded in tort, which is expressly excluded from the court's jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The court then declined to transfer the case to another district court because it determined that Mone's tort claims were time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court determined that her claim accrued on her eviction date of November 16, 2011. According to the court, the statute of limitations thus expired on November 16, 2013 based on the two-year statute of limitations in § 2401(b). Her complaint was not filed at the court until November 17, 2017, which was at least four years too late. See Mone, 138 Fed. Cl. at 282. Because her claims were time-barred, the court held that no district court could exercise jurisdiction and the case could not be properly transferred. See id. The Claims Court thus dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Id.

Mone timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review de novo dismissals by the Claims Court for lack of jurisdiction. Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We review for abuse of discretion a decision by the Claims Court concerning whether to dismiss or transfer a case to another court. See Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). "The underlying determination of whether the transferee court has jurisdiction over the claim is a question of law," which we review de novo. Id. at 1342-43.

I

Mone argues that the Claims Court erred by failing to address HUD's violation of its own regulations as well as her constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states that no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. According to Mone, while CHA's actions "were of tort, the actions of HUD were not." Appellant's Br. 1. She contends that the court erred by not addressing the implied contract she had with HUD through HUD regulations as defined in HUD's Title VIII "Fair Housing Complaint Process." Id.

The government responds that the Claims Court did not fail to take into account any relevant facts. The government contends that the court properly reviewed the facts alleged in her complaint and found that all the claims sounded in tort, which that court lacks jurisdiction to consider. To the extent that Mone alleged a constitutional violation, the government also argues that the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. While the Claims Court did not address her implied contract claim, Mone never raised it before the court, and the government argues it is waived on appeal. Thus, according to the government, the court properly dismissed her complaint.

We agree with the government that the Claims Court properly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Mone's claims. The Tucker Act grants the Claims Court jurisdiction over claims against the United States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Tucker Act is "only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). "Instead, to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a contractual relationship, constitutional provision, statute, or regulation that provides a substantive right to money damages." Khan v. United States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Mone's allegations against HUD are based on its asserted negligence in failing to address her housing problems and falsified inspections. Both the negligence and fraud claims sound in tort, which the Claims Court does not have jurisdiction to hear. See § 1491(a)(1). Mone's claims may be read to arise under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), see Mone, 138 Fed. Cl. at 281, and Congress has provided that "the district courts" have "exclusive jurisdiction" over those claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The Claims Court also lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it does not mandate payment of money by the government. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). We therefore agree that the Claims Court correctly determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mone's claims.

II

We also conclude that the Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to transfer the case to a district court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631,

[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed . . . .

Id. We have interpreted § 1631 to require satisfaction by a transferring court that a "transferee court has jurisdiction to hear the case" before transferring it. See Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FAA, 525 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Gonzales & Gonzales Bonds & Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 490 F.3d 940, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Claims Court purported to do so here and determined that there was no court in which the claims could have been filed because the FTCA claims were time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b),1 and, based on that finding, decided not to transfer the case. Cf. Robleto v. United States, 634 F. App'x 306, 308 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding that becausethe claim was time-barred, dismissal instead of transfer of case was proper even though §...

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