Monette v. Cratt
| Decision Date | 01 January 1862 |
| Citation | 7 Minn. 176 |
| Parties | OLIVER MONETTE et al. vs. OLIVER CRATT et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
The complaint sets forth that Mrs. Cratt, one of the plaintiffs below, located Sioux Half-breed scrip, owned by her, upon a certain governmental subdivision, and that afterwards Mrs. Monette, one of the defendants, located other similar scrip, owned by her, upon the same land; and that after a contest before the local land office, the secretary of the interior disallowed the Cratt location and allowed that of Monette, and a patent accordingly issued to her; and that the Monettes conveyed to defendant Sharp, who knew the facts. It prayed that the plaintiff might be adjudged to be the owner of the land. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and defendants below appealed.
Points and authorities for appellants: —
It appears from the complaint in this action that the rights of the parties herein have been adjudicated upon and determined by the land department of the United States government, and decided against the respondents, and in favor of the appellants. That decision is final.
By the instructions of the commissioner of the general land office, dated March 21, 1857, authority is specially given to the register and receiver of the land office at Red Wing to hear and determine all the questiens upon which the right of the Half-breeds to locate their scrip depends.
The adjudication before the land department is equally as conclusive, as it would be before a judicial tribunal. United States v. Arredondo, 10 Curtis, 340, and cases there cited; see also, p. 355, same book; White v. Coatsworth, 6 N. Y. 137, 143; Embery v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 523; C. & H. Notes to Phil. Ev., part 2, p. 31; State v. Batchelder, 5 Minn. [223]; Edwards' Lessees v. Dorby, 7 Curtis, 129.
Points and authorities for respondents: —
1. Before examining the questions really at issue in this case, it may be proper to call the attention of the court to the first point urged by the counsel for the appellants, which is, that the rights of the parties to this controversy have been already adjudicated. That this point should be, or can be, urged in this case, is equally a matter of surprise. We submit that no such question can arise. The demurrer interposed does not raise this question, nor was it either directly or indirectly passed on by the court below. (See demurrer and decision.) This court held in the case of Babcock & Hollinshead v. Sanborn & French, 3 Minn. [141], that it "will not entertain questions which have not received the actual decision of the tribunal from which they come." This ruling has been in terms affirmed since. See Daniels v. Bradley, 4 Minn. [158], and has become the settled practice of the court after a just examination of the powers and authority conferred upon this court.
2. We dissent entirely from the doctrine sought to be enforced, and claim, that the position is most clearly untenable under the decisions of this court, and not sustained by reason or authority. It is admitted to be right and sound policy, that the decision of the register and receiver in a pre-emption case should be conclusive upon all questions judicially submitted to them. This court has laid down and established the rule in the case of State v. Batchelder, 5 Minn. [223], and in the case of Leech v. Rauch, 3 Minn. [448]. Policy requires that when a tribunal having jurisdiction has decided a question involving the stability of land titles, that such decision should stand. Congress, in conferring the right of pre-emption and fixing the requirements of the pre-emptor, in terms provided the tribunal, and defines and directly confers the jurisdiction. The law says "that the proof shall be made to the satisfaction of the register and receiver." Under the law, therefore, a question is judicially submitted to them and they try the case in the first instance — their decision is then, upon appeal, reviewable by the commissioner of the general land office, and lastly upon like appeal, by the secretary of the interior. The law, in terms, confers judicial authority, and defines the manner of its exercise. Not so with Sioux Half-breed scrip and its location, for here neither does the necessity for a judicial tribunal exist, nor is the jurisdiction conferred, nor is the tribunal created either in terms or indirectly, nor are the powers, duties, or the manner of their exercise defined. First, the law of congress, approved July 17, 1854 (10 U. S. Stat. at Large, 304), and this alone with two explanatory sections in the Indian appropriation bills for 1854 and 1855 (vol. 10, pp. 332, 699), make up the entire legislation upon this subject. Second, the scrip issued (see Schedule "A") is unlike any similar issue of warrants or scrip locatable on government land before that time granted; carrying upon its face full and complete directions as to the mode and manner of its location, and how and where, and when, it could be used. As between the government and the scrip holder, the president may make certain and specified regulations; but as between scrip holders themselves or between scrip holders and third parties, the law is entirely silent — not even by an obscure intimation affording a chance to guess how disputes arising in these latter cases shall be decided, except by courts of general jurisdiction. From these most patent facts, the necessary logical inference is, that in the absence of other authorized tribunals all their disputes must be settled by the courts. Will it be presumed that jurisdiction is given by implication to the register and receiver, or the commissioner of the general land office, or secretary of the interior? These officers are one and all ministerial officers of defined and limited power, and in such officers judicial jurisdiction can never be presumed. They can go no farther than the law allows, for they are its creatures. The law gives them no authority. The scrip is silent, and "the power to hear and determine a cause not existing, jurisdiction does not exist." 10 Curtis U. S. 322.
6 N. Y. 137, 3 N. Y. 523, and other authorities cited by appellants' counsel, assert when a court of competent jurisdiction has once decided a case, then it is res adjudicata. This is begging the whole question. We deny the jurisdiction. The secretary of the interior, not an officer of general judicial powers, must acquire that jurisdiction somehow. As to the general principles involved in and decisive of this case, we need only refer the court to its decision in the case of State v. Batchelder, 5 Minn. [237-38], and cases there cited; 18 Curtis' U. S. 159. In 7 Curtis, 601, the court says that "if the register and receiver (secretary of the interior in this case) act without authority, their judgments are nullities; not voidable, but simply void." Also, 2 Curtis, 187, decides that jurisdiction may be assailed collaterally even (this is between the parties) for the purpose of ascertaining whether the matter is subject to the jurisdiction of the court passing sentence. As between parties, there can be no doubt on this point. Williamson v. Berry, 17 Curtis, 669; Rogers v. Dill, 6 Hill, 415 J. N. Murdock, and Masterson & Simons, for appellants.
W. W. Phelps, and S. L. Campbell, for respondents.
The first objection urged by the appellants before this court, is, that this case, as appears from the complaint, is res adjudicata. The appellants demurred to the complaint in the court below, assigning as the general ground of demurrer, that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Under this general ground, were several specifications, but not the objection here specifically urged. And it is claimed by respondents, that the objection, not having been made in terms in the court below, cannot here be considered.
The objection here stated by appellants, if it appears upon the face of the complaint, would be appropriately urged under the general ground specified in the demurrer. It has been repeatedly held that a general demurrer to a pleading, that it does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense, is sufficient, without further specifications. 3 How. Pr. R. 280; 4 How. Pr. R. 226; 7 How. Pr. R. 316; 8 How. Pr. R. 159; 4 N. Y. 359. This principle has been, impliedly at least, recognized in Brown v. Manning, 3 Minn. [35], and in the State v. Batchelder, 5 Minn. [223]. In the latter case, there was a general demurrer to the reply, for the reason that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute ground for a reply. That case was decided on the ground that the subject matter was res adjudicata. If a party under such general ground of demurrer, does make certain specifications, we do not think he is necessarily confined in his argument to those specifications, but may urge any which are pertinent to the general objection. Under the general objection the pleader is advised what he is to meet, and should be prepared to sustain his pleading against any specification that may be urged under this general ground. And especially against a specification of the kind here urged, which, if well taken, must be fatal in any stage of the case at which it is raised. We may, therefore, appropriately consider this objection here, and we do so with the less hesitation in this case, from the fact that the respondents have elaborately argued the objection upon the merits, and the court is fully advised of the reasons to be urged against the views of the appellants herein.
By the treaty of Prairie du Chien (7 U. S. Stat. at Large, 328), a reservation of certain lands on the west side of Lake Pepin (embracing the lands in dispute), was made for the benefit of the mixed bloods of the Dakota or Sioux nation of Indians. By the 10th article of said treaty it is provided, "that the president of the United States may hereafter assign to any of said...
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