Money v. Banner Health
| Decision Date | 09 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | 3:11-cv-00800-LRH-WGC |
| Parties | SHERRY MONEY, an individual and as administrator for the ESTATE OF KENNETH MONEY; and KENNY MONEY, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. BANNER HEALTH, dba BANNER CHURCHILL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, a foreign non-profit corporation; DONALD GANDY, D.O., an individual; WARREN P. THAI, M.D., an individual; DOE Defendants 1 through X, inclusive, ROE CORPORATIONS A through Z, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Before the court is the Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. #18)1 of Defendants Banner Health, dba Banner Churchill Community Hospital ("Banner Hospital") and Warren P. Thai ("Dr. Thai"). Defendants seek to postpone discovery pending the disposition of the Defendants' motions to dismiss. (Doc. ## 6, 9, 10). Defendant Donald Gandy, D.O. ("Dr. Gandy") joined in the motion to stay. (Doc. # 19.) Plaintiffs Sherry Money, the Estate of Kenneth Money, and Kenny Money ("Plaintiffs") have filed an opposition to the motion to stay (Doc. # 20) and Banner Hospital and Dr. Thai have replied (Doc. # 21).
According to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' complaint, at approximately 2:30 p.m. on November 4, 2010, Kenneth Money ("Mr. Money") presented at the emergency room at Banner Hospital in Fallon, Nevada, complaining of chest pain radiating to his jaw. (Compl. #1 at 3:6-10.)
Mr. Money was initially assessed by a Banner Hospital nurse and subsequently seen and treated by Dr. Gandy. (Id. at 3-4.) Following a review of Mr. Money's medical history and a physical examination, Dr. Gandy ordered a series of medications for him, including Clonidine and morphine. (Id.) Mr. Money was subsequently also examined by Dr. Thai, who diagnosed hypertension, back pain, and morbid obesity. (Id. at 4:19.)
An EKG was then performed. (Pls.' Expert Affidavit (#1-1) at 3:9.) Although Mr. Money's EKG reading "was essentially normal," his condition apparently started deteriorating. (Id.) Drs. Thai and Gandy then ordered additional EKGs, several blood tests, a chest x-ray, a CT scan, and "repeated cardiac lab" reports. (Id. at 4-7.) A 11:45 p.m., after ruling out a diagnosis of aortic dissection, Drs. Thai and Gandy diagnosed Mr. Money with acute myocardial infarction. (Id. at 3:13.) He was treated for a heart attack and for cardiac ischemia (Id. at 6:17.) Soon thereafter, Mr. Money was transferred to Banner Hospital's intensive care unit (ICU). (Id. at 7:1.)
At 12:33 a.m., an unidentified doctor signed a request to air transfer Mr. Money to St. Mary's Hospital in Reno. (Doc. #1 at 4:21-22.) Plaintiffs' complaint does not specify whether the unidentified doctor's request to transfer Mr. Money was denied or granted. (Id.) From the information in Plaintiffs' pleadings, the court's interpretation of the events is that Mr. Money was not transferred. At 12:39 a.m., Mr. Money went into cardiac arrest. (Id. at 4:23-24.) Despite the attempts of Dr. Thai and other Banner Hospital personnel to revive him, Mr. Money was pronounced dead at 1:12 a.m.
(Id. at 5:42.)2
On November 3, 2011, Mrs. Money, the Estate of Mr. Money, and Kenny Money filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Nevada against Banner Hospital, Dr. Thai, andDr. Gandy. (Doc. #1.) Federal question jurisdiction is predicated by Plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 solely on the component of the action asserted against Banner Hospital (Doc. #1 at 2:22.) More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Money's death give rise to a federal cause of action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, ("EMTALA").
EMTALA, commonly known as the "Patient Anti-Dumping Act," was enacted in response to congressional concern about the quality of medical services provided primarily to the indigent and the uninsured who seek care from hospital emergency rooms. Jackson v. East Bay Hospital, 246 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2001). Congress suspected that hospitals were "dumping" patients who were unable to pay for care, either by refusing to provide basic emergency treatment (i.e., "failure to screen") or by transferring patients to other hospitals before the patients' conditions sufficiently stabilized to allow transfer ("failure to stabilize"). See H.R. Rep. No 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 27 (1985) (cited in Jackson, 246 F.3d at 1254)).
In an attempt to remedy this problem and provide legal recourse to such patients, EMTALA created a new federal cause of action against hospitals for failing to appropriately screen hospital patients. Bryant v. Adventist Health System West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). EMTALA also prohibits hospitals from "dumping" the patient on other hospitals by transferring the patient before the patients' conditions stabilize. Jackson, 246 F.3d at 1254-55.3 However, EMTALA is not a medical malpractice statute and provides no cause of action for what would traditionally be considered medical malpractice. Causes of action under EMTALA are limited to suits against hospitals. Id.
According to Plaintiffs, Banner Hospital violated both elements of EMTALA, first, by failing to screen Mr. Money and, second, by failing to stabilize him. (Doc. # 1 at 5-10.) In addition, Plaintiffs asserted state law claims (traditional medical malpractice and wrongful death) against Banner Hospital, Dr. Thai, and Dr. Gandy pursuant to the federal court's pendent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). Plaintiffs' complaint was accompanied by the medical expert affidavit as required by Chapter 41A,Nev. Rev. Stat. (Doc. #1-1).4
On January 14, 2012, and January 17, 2012, Banner Hospital and Dr. Thai filed two Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. (Doc. ## 9, 10.) Of importance here is the second motion (Doc. # 10), which questions federal jurisdiction. The substance of Banner Hospital's and Dr. Thai's motion is that Plaintiffs' claims against Banner Hospital should be dismissed because of Plaintiffs' failure to articulate a viable EMTALA claim, without which this court would not have a jurisdictional basis to hear this case. (Doc. # 10 at 7:7-9.)5
In that regard, Banner Hospital and Dr. Thai argue that no "patient dumping" occurred because Mr. Money was both screened (i.e., the "failure to screen" cause of action) and stabilized (i.e., the "failure to stabilize" claim for relief) by hospital personnel consistent with EMTALA requirements. Defendants also argue that EMTALA would not give rise to either a screening or stabilization cause of action because Mr. Money was admitted to Banner Hospital, (Doc. # 10 at 7-8.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' complaint fails with respect to Plaintiffs' EMTALA claims, because they merely reflect a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," which Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), prohibits. (Doc. # 9 at 5:24-25.)
On February 28, 2012, Banner Hospital and Dr. Thai filed a Motion to Stay Discovery (Doc. # 18) pending disposition of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. ## 9, 10.) Dr. Gandy joined in Banner Hospital's and Dr. Thai's Motion to Stay. (Doc. # 19.) As will be discussed in greater detail herein, whether a stay of discovery should or should not be granted herein is dependent on whether this court determines it is probable the underlying Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 10) will be granted.
Banner Hospital, Dr. Thai, and Dr. Gandy submit that discovery should be stayed herein for four reasons. First, Defendants argue that staying discovery is justified because the underlying motions to dismiss are potentially dispositive of the entire case. (Doc. # 18 at 2-3.)
Second, Defendants assert staying discovery is appropriate because the pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 10) can be decided without further discovery. (Id. at 3:7.) In that regard, Plaintiffs make only a passing reference for the need of additional discovery in their Opposition to the Motion for Stay (Doc. #20). At page 4, Plaintiffs state that "[w]ithout discovery to determine the policies and procedures of the Defendants, such a dispositive motion cannot be granted." (Id. at 4). Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Defendants' EMTALA Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15) only mentions in the conclusion that "this case must be permitted to proceed to discovery" (id. at 12), without stating what discovery Plaintiffs need to rebut Defendants' assertions that Plaintiffs have not stated a viable EMTALA claim.
However, the complaint alleged that "the examination provided to Kenneth was not comparable to the one offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms, namely for MI." (Doc. # 1 at 5, ¶47). This was not an allegation made on "information and belief." From this averment, the reader would assume that the pleader already knew what Banner Hospital's screening and stabilization policies and procedures were. Similarly, Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15) states that "[i]t is Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendants did not follow their "usual" screening procedures." (Id. at 4). It is seemingly contradictory, on the one hand, for Plaintiffs to allege Defendants' non-compliance with Banner Hospital's "usual" procedures "offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms" (Compl., Doc. #1 at ¶48) or that Defendants did not follow "their 'usual' screening procedures" while, on the other hand, to argue in their Opposition to the Motion to Stay that Plaintiffs need "discovery to determine the policies and procedures of Defendants." (Doc. # 20 at 4). The court also notes that Plaintiffs did not request the court to defer consideration of the Motions to Dismiss to enable Plaintiffs to undertake certain discovery.
Third, Defendants contend that a stay is warranted because forestalling the case pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss will not prejudice Plaintiffs. (Id. at 3:16.)
Fourth, and last, Defendants argue permitting discovery to proceed while the court considersthe Motion to Dismiss would...
To continue reading
Request your trial