Monger v. Purdue University

• Decision Date: 14 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. IP 96-0866 C M/S.,IP 96-0866 C M/S.
• Citation: 953 F.Supp. 260
• Parties: Shanae MONGER, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY, Gavriel Salvendy, as Professor and Agent for Purdue University, and Gavriel Salvendy, Individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

953 F.Supp. 260

Shanae MONGER, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY, Gavriel Salvendy, as Professor and Agent for Purdue University, and Gavriel Salvendy, Individually, Defendants.

No. IP 96-0866 C M/S.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

February 14, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John O. Moss, Jr., John O. Moss, Jr. & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Stephen R. Pennell, Deborah B. Trice, Stuart & Branigin, Lafayette, IN, for Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

McKINNEY, District Judge.

The present case involves serious allegations against one of our state universities and one of its professors. Plaintiff Shanae Monger has asserted that Gavriel Salvendy, a professor at Purdue University, sexually harassed her on October 29, 1993. Through an action filed May 16, 1996, Monger has stated a variety of claims against the University and Salvendy, in both his individual and his official capacities. These defendants now seek summary judgment, claiming that the applicable statute of limitations bars Monger from pursuing her claims against them. For reasons stated fully below, this Court now GRANTS the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In October of 1993, Monger was a student at Purdue University, and Salvendy was a Professor of Industrial Engineering in the University's School of Industrial Engineering. Prior to the alleged incident, Monger had worked for Salvendy as a student assistant. On October 29, 1993, Monger telephoned Salvendy to express interest in returning to work for him. Following this conversation, Monger went to Salvendy's office to continue this discussion. According to the verified complaint, Salvendy invited Monger to his office for this conversation. After Monger arrived, she and Salvendy got in Salvendy's car, and Salvendy drove her to a secluded, wooded area called "Happy Hollow." Here, Monger alleges, Salvendy sexually harassed her by touching her against her will on various parts of her body and indicating that he wanted to be with her privately. Monger has stated that she resisted Salvendy's advances. After this occurred, Salvendy took Monger back to her apartment, where she and her roommate discussed what had happened.

On March 16, 1994, Monger filed an internal complaint of sexual harassment pursuant to the University's Interim Procedures for Handling Complaints of Sexual Harassment.¹ As required by these Procedures, Dr. Judith M. Gappa, Purdue's Vice President of Human Relations, appointed a three-person Panel to investigate Monger's complaint. Salvendy submitted a written response to the complaint, denying that the incident had occurred. After completing the investigation, the Panel submitted its report to Dr. Gappa, who sent copies of the report to Monger and Salvendy on May 16, 1994. Dr. Gappa also reminded them that they could submit written comments about the report to her before she reviewed the Panel's findings. Both Monger and Salvendy provided such comments. In letters dated June 21, 1994, Dr. Gappa informed Monger and Salvendy that she concurred with the Panel's conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate Monger's internal complaint. Monger has denied receiving this letter. On April 22, 1994, while the Panel was conducting its investigation, Monger filed a Tort Claims Notice with the Indiana Attorney General regarding the incident with Salvendy. She filed the present action on May 16, 1996.

II. ANALYSIS

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." When the moving party has met this standard, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment— even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir.1992).

B. THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION

Through the present action, the plaintiff has relied upon a variety of legal theories, including assault, infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and two federal statutes—42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.² The defendants maintain that Indiana's two-year statute of limitations operates as a bar to these claims. According to section 34-1-2-2(1) of the Indiana Code, actions "[f]or injuries to person or character" must be commenced within two years of the date the cause of action accrued. To determine the accrual date, Indiana applies a form of discovery rule, meaning that the cause of action accrues on the date the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered that she had sustained injury as a result of some tortious conduct. Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ind.1992); City of Hobart Sewage Works. v. McCullough, 656 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) trans. denied. Treating the state law claims for assault, negligence, and emotional distress first, Monger knew that she had suffered these injuries on October 29, 1993—the date she alleges that Salvendy sexually harassed her.³ Indeed, immediately after Salvendy returned her to her apartment, she discussed the incident with her roommate, indicating that she knew the event had occurred and had not repressed the memory. Accordingly, her cause of action for these claims would have accrued on that date, and the two-year statute of limitations will operate as a bar unless the statute tolled for some reason.⁴

This same two-year statute of limitations bars Monger's federal claims as well. Treating the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim first, the Supreme Court has noted that the statutory text does not contain an explicit limitations period. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1941-42, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). When a federal statute does not identify a particular statute of limitations, a court should adopt "the statute governing an analogous cause of action under state law" to determine the applicable period. Id. at 271, 269, 105 S.Ct. at 1944, 1943. For section 1983 claims, the Wilson Court found the state personal injury statute of limitations to be the most appropriate. Id. at 276, 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1947, 1949; Farrell v. McDonough, 966 F.2d 279, 280 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1059, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993); see also Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279, 105 S.Ct. at 1948 ("[W]e are satisfied that Congress would not have characterized § 1983 as providing a cause of action analogous to state remedies for wrongs committed by public officials."). Consequently, Indiana's two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to Monger's section 1983 claim. Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2; see also Perez v. Sifel, 57 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir.1995) ("[T]he two-year Indiana statute of limitations for personal injuries [ ] applies to § 1983 claims.").

While courts look to state law to determine the length of the limitations period, the date of accrual of the cause of action remains a function of federal law. Lawshe v. Simpson, 16 F.3d 1475, 1478 (7th Cir.1994). Ultimately, though, this rule does not impact the present case, for the claim would accrue at the same time under state or federal law. As stated by the Seventh Circuit, "[s]ection 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated." Id. Here, Monger would have known of the injury to her constitutional rights on the date of the alleged attack. Her section 1983 claim accrued on October 29, 1993, and the two-year statute of limitations operates as a bar unless something tolled the statute.

Like section 1983, Title IX does not contain an explicit statute of limitations, so this Court must look to the limitations period of an analogous claim under Indiana law. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 729 (6th Cir.1996); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F.3d 615, 617 (8th Cir.1995). The courts of appeals to address this issue have consistently held that Title IX claims are most closely analogous to state law personal injury claims. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 729; Egerdahl, 72 F.3d at 618; see also Cetin v. Purdue University, Nos. 94-3112, 95-1254, 1996 WL 453229, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) ("We agree with the defendants that [the plaintiff's] Title IX claim falls outside of the limitations period, which is two years under the relevant statute of limitations, Ind.Code 34-1-2-2(1)."). This Court agrees and finds that Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to Monger's Title IX claim. According to the principles from Lawshe, 16 F.3d at 1478, Monger's Title IX claim accrued when she knew or had reason to know of her injury—October 29, 1997. Again, the statute of limitations bars this claim unless outside circumstances tolled the statute of limitations.

C. THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Despite the operation of the two-year statute of limitations, Monger could still pursue her present action if, as she claims, the facts of the case suggest that the statute should be tolled. Of course, the question of whether the statute tolled on Monger's state law claims hinges upon Indiana law. Likewise, tolling of the statute for the Title IX and section 1983 claims also depends upon...