Monger v. Rockingham Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co

Decision Date17 November 1898
Citation96 Va. 442,31 S.E. 609
PartiesMONGER . v. ROCKINGHAM HOME MUT. FIRE INS. CO.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

Mutual Fire Insurance—Constitutions—Original Certificates — Payment of Assessments—Waiver.

1. The constitution of a mutual fire insurance company provided that one could become a member by signing the constitution, or as heir to a deceased member, or by acquisition of the property by purchase, in which latter case the insurance would be canceled, if no notice was given within 10 days after the purchase. Certificates were issued as evidence of membership, on which were a description and valuation of the property, with the name of the insured, the date of the insurance, and the time it was to remain in force. In case of transfers because of death or purchase, the words "Transferred to, " followed by the name of the transferee, were written on the certificate. In the case at bar, one who had been devised a life estate in property insured it in her own name. After her death the property stood insured in the name of her husband, and assessments made out against him were paid by him. Thereafter he turned over the control of the property to the owner in fee, whose rights had accrued on the death of the life tenant, but who had permitted the husband to control the property in the meantime; and a certificate was issued to her, embracing all the property before insured, and several other items, which increased the amount of the insurance. Shortly prior to such transfer, assessments were made against said husband, who failed to pay them within 60 days, which was a cause of cancellation of the insurance, under the constitution. Held, that the owner must be regarded as an original member of the association, and not as a transferee, especially since the association made two demands on the husband for the payment of said assessments after the issuance of the certificate to the owner, and was not liable for the failure of said husband to pay such assessments.

2. The payment of assessments, some of which are received by the company without condition, after knowledge on the part of the latter of a cause of forfeiture of the policy, is evidence of a waiver of such forfeiture sufficient to require its submission to the jury.

Appeal from circuit court, Rockingham county.

Action by C. V. Monger against the Rockingham Home Mutual Fire Insurance Company. There was a judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

O. B. Roller and Martz, Sipe & Harris, for appellant.

W. Liggett, for appellee.

KEITH, P. The case is before us upon exceptions taken by C. V. Monger during the progress of the trial of an action brought by her in the circuit court of Rockingham county against the Rockingham Home Mutual Fire Insurance Company, in which judgment was rendered for the defendant

The mother of Mrs. Monger, who was Mrs. J. J. Showalter, was devisee for life, under her father's will, of certain real estate in the county of Rockingham, with the remainder to her daughter, Mrs. C. V. Monger. After the death of Mrs. Showalter the petitioner's father, J. J. Showalter, remained in the possession and control of the property of his daughter; they continuing after the daughter's marriage to reside together, and constitute one family. The buildings upon this property were during the lifetime of Mrs. Showalter insured in the Rockingham Home Mutual Fire Insurance Company. According to the laws of that company, property insured in it is subject to revaluation at intervals of five years.

The charter of the company provides, among other things, that "all persons subscribing to this charter of incorporation, and pledging themselves to be governed by any constitution, by-laws, regulations, or requirements adopted by said company in pursuance thereof, their executors, administrators, and assigns, and vendees, continuing to be insured therewith, shall thereby become members of said company during the time they shall remain insured therein, or until they shall withdraw from the company in accordance with its prescribed regulations."

By section 4, art. 3, of the constitution, It is provided that, "whenever a member of the company dies, his widow or other legal representatives shall be considered as holding the same relation to the company as that held by the deceased member, unless proper notice is given in thirty days that she or they wish to withdraw from the company. Then the property shall be stricken from the books, provided there are no charges against it."

By section 5, art. 3, of the constitution it Is provided that "whenever a member of this company sells, trades, or otherwise disposes of his property, the party buying, trading for, or otherwise obtaining said property shall notify the secretary in ten days thereafter that he wishes the insurance on said property con tinued in his name; otherwise It shall be stricken from the books. In the meantime the company will not be responsible for said property until it is properly transferred in the new owner's name."

The constitution also provides that whenever a member's property is burned the president shall, as soon as he is appraised of the fact, call the board of directors together, and, upon proof of loss, levy a tax upon each member in proportion to the amount of his property insured in the company, to meet such loss; and as soon as the assessment is fixed, it is the duty of the secretary to notify members, who are then required to pay promptly to the treasurer, who in turn pays It over to the member sustaining the loss. Upon joining the company, every person is required to waive the benefit of the homestead, bankrupt and all exemption laws, as to any such assessment upon his property.

By section 3, art 5, it is provided "that any member failing to pay over the amount of his or her assessment in 60 days after proper notification shall have 50 per cent. added thereto; it shall then be placed in an officer's hands for collection, and, when collected, the name of the delinquent member shall be stricken from the books; and, further, should the property of any member burn whilst he or she is delinquent neither he nor she shall receive pay therefor."

A person became a member of the company by signing the constitution, and pledging himself to be governed by it, or as heir of a deceased member, or by acquisition of the property by purchase, exchange, or otherwise, and giving proper notice as required by sections 4 and 5 of article 3, above quoted. In no other mode could membership be acquired in this company.

As evidence of membership, a certificate was issued, upon which a description and valuation of the property insured appear, with the name of the insured, the date of insurance, and the time...

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7 cases
  • Jackson v. United Benefit Life Ins. Company
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1939
    ...for the purpose of collecting premium and invalid for the purpose of indemnity. Kentucky Ins. Co. v. Stout (Ky.) 194 S.W. 318; Monger v. Davis, 31 S.E. 609. A waiver, made, is irrevocable. U. S. F. & G. v. Miller (Ky.) 34 S.W.2d 938. BLUME, Justice. RINER, Ch. J., and KIMBALL, J., concur. O......
  • Bene v. Fire Ins. Ass'n Of Franklin County
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • February 5, 1903
    ...instructions. "Where a right to rely upon a forfeiture has been once waived it is extinguished, and cannot be revived." Monger v. Insurance Co., 96 Va. 442, 31 S. E. 609. The company in that case was of the same character as the defendant association, and the provision in its charter as to ......
  • Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Mutual Sav. & Loan Co.
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • January 21, 1952
    ...by J. Rodney Fickel.' Where a right to rely upon a forfeiture has been once waived it cannot be revived. Monger v. Rockingham Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 96 Va. 442, 444, 31 S.E. 609. The general rule is 'where an insurer, with knowledge of the breach of a condition pays the amount of loss asc......
  • Home Beneficial Ass'n v. Field
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 22, 1934
    ...at the time, it has knowledge." 32 C. J. p. 1348. In support of the text, a page of authorities is cited. See, also, Monger v. Insurance Co., 96 Va. 442, 31 S. E. 609; Easley v. Valley Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n, 91 Va. 161, 21 S. E. 235. The time for an insurance company to speak is when it ac......
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