Monica Newman v. City of Payette, an Idaho Mun. Corp.
| Decision Date | 19 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:15-cv-00145-CWD |
| Parties | MONICA NEWMAN, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated; MATTHEW KEITH DOUGLAS, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated; and RUBY JUDINE MALMAN, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PAYETTE, an Idaho municipal corporation; CITY OF FRUITLAND, an Idaho municipal corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 25), filed July 10, 2015. Plaintiffs are dog owners seeking retrospective and prospective injunctive relief, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated, against the cities of Fruitland and Payette from enforcement of the cities' respective pitbull ordinances. Plaintiffs seek also a declaratory judgment finding portions of the ordinances unconstitutional.
During the scheduling conference, the Court and the parties determined that this matter might benefit from the early filing of a partial motion for summary judgment by Plaintiffs, with a second round of motions, if necessary, to be filed by December 31, 2015. (Dkt. 19.) On October 6, 2015, the Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion.
The motion before the Court is limited to the procedural due process claims asserted in Sections X and XIII of the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 24.) Plaintiffs contend the city ordinances applicable to the licensing of pit bull dogs enacted by the City of Payette and the City of Fruitland are unconstitutional. In response, Defendants assert Plaintiffs lack standing, and even if they do have standing, each city has a legitimate basis upon which to enact its ordinance. Because of the nature of the arguments, the Court will discuss the facts and analyze the standing argument first, to be followed by the relevant facts and analysis of the constitutional claims at issue with the pending motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 248.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the Court must not make credibility findings. Id. at 248, 255. Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed, however implausible. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On the other hand, the Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. McLaughlin v. Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or depositions excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2000).
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986). The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and show by its "affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue Defendants have improperly raised lack of standing in response to their summary judgment motion, because Defendants filedneither a cross motion for summary judgment nor a motion to dismiss. However, Plaintiffs have cited no authority precluding the Court from considering the cities' arguments in response to Plaintiffs' motion. See, e.g., Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educational Materials v. Noonan, 600 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1106 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (). Further, Plaintiffs' arguments raise form over function. Nothing prevents this Court from considering Plaintiffs' standing, because establishing standing is an essential part of the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is a component of the Court's jurisdiction, and the Court is obliged to consider it sua sponte to ensure the existence of an Article III case or controversy. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (). The Court is unable to resolve Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion unless they have standing to pursue their claims. And, if it appears Plaintiffs' standing does not adequately appear from the materials of record, their claims must be dismissed. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
Plaintiffs argue also the cities' failure to file a separate statement of material facts that they contend are not in dispute should result in the Court disregarding the cities' responses. While Plaintiffs are technically correct that Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1 requires the responding party to file a separate statement of facts, the rule states also that a party must file a separate statement "of all material facts which the responding party contendsare in dispute." The Cities' failure to file a separate statement signals to this Court that the facts set forth by Plaintiffs are not disputed.1
Plaintiff Monica Newman resides in Payette and has lived in the same place since December of 2014. However, during the hearing, counsel represented Newman has since moved from Payette and is no longer a resident of Payette (or for that matter Fruitland). She owns Archer, a mixed breed, neutered, male dog licensed by the City of Payette. Newman Decl. ¶ 4 (Dkt. 25-5.) Newman does not know Archer's breed composition, but she has heard comments from a number of people that Archer looks like a pit bull mix. Newman suffers from anxiety and fear when she takes Archer for walks, because a police officer might take him from her or arrest her because Archer looks like a pit bull. There is no evidence in the record, however, that any city official from Payette has ever approached Newman about Archer or questioned his breed.
Newman also has decided not to foster or adopt dogs from bully breed rescue organizations because of Payette's pit bull ordinance, which causes her emotional distress as a dog lover.
Plaintiff Ruby Judine Malman lives in Fruitland and is Newman's sister. Malman owns two dogs, Willow and Charlie (Dkt. 34-1), a Chihuahua and a Dalmatian/Labrador mix. Malman licensed her two dogs with the City of Fruitland in August of 2014. SecondMalman Decl. ¶3 (Dkt. 34-1.) Malman does not own a pit bull, and when she wanted a puppy in 2014, she decided to adopt a breed other than a pit bull or pit bull mix because of the Fruitland ordinance, although she states that she "would like to adopt a dog who could be found (by what standard I am uncertain) to meet the definitions of 'vicious dog' or 'pit bull.'"
Newman's and Malman's sibling relationship has been affected by the Fruitland pit bull ordinance. Newman used to bring Archer with her to visit Malman, but no longer does so because she fears Fruitland's pit pull ordinance might result in Archer being seized from her. Newman complains that the cities' pit bull ordinances are vague and have caused a chilling effect upon her ability to select a puppy of her choosing.
Plaintiff Matthew Douglas has been subjected to enforcement of the city of Payette's pit bull ordinance on two occasions. First, his female dog and puppies were subject to seizure in 2007 as "pit bulls" unless Douglas removed the dog and her puppies from Payette's city limits. At that time, Douglas delivered the dog and her puppies to the Idaho Humane Society, and surrendered them all. Now, Douglas owns Ratchet, his pet that Payette declared is a "pit bull." Douglas was told on July 7, 2014, to either remove Ratchet from the Payette city limits or he would be subject to criminal prosecution.
Douglas was criminally cited for harboring a vicious dog in violation of Payette Municipal Code § 6.08.070 and misdemeanor charges were filed against him on July 10, 2014. Prior to the July 25, 2014 arraignment hearing, a police officer, without first obtaining a warrant or giving Douglas his Miranda warnings, obtained a DNA swab from Ratchet's mouth. On or about August 1, 2014, Officer Silva received Wisdom Panel 2.0results from MARS Veterinary, claiming that a dog with the name "Unk" did "not yield enough high quality DNA to meet our minimum standards," and the sample "failed."
During the pretrial conference, the judge, the prosecutor, and Douglas appeared in chambers. The prosecutor showed Judge Jackson a picture of Ratchet taken on July 7, 2014. Apparently, the photograph left Judge Jackson with some doubts about Ratchet's breed history. Upon an oral request by the prosecutor, Judge Jackson ordered that Douglas submit Ratchet to a second DNA test, and the pretrial hearing was continued to October 29, 2014. A DNA sample was then obtained from Ratchet, which came back with no identifier other than "Unk", but this time described a...
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