Monica v. Myers

• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PAGÁN, J.
• Citation: Monica v. Myers, 319 Or.App. 376, 510 P.3d 238 (Or. App. 2022)
• Decision Date: 27 April 2022
• Docket Number: A172244
• Parties: Susan MONICA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Paula MYERS, Superintendent, Coffee Creek Correctional Facility, Defendant-Respondent.

319 Or.App. 376

510 P.3d 238

Susan MONICA, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Paula MYERS, Superintendent, Coffee Creek Correctional Facility, Defendant-Respondent.

A172244

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Submitted May 18, 2021.

April 27, 2022

Jedediah Peterson and O'Connor Weber, LLC, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Mooney, Presiding Judge, and Pagán, Judge, and DeVore, Senior Judge.^*

PAGÁN, J.

Petitioner murdered two men and left their bodies in her pigpen to be eaten by her pigs. A jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of murder, two counts of abuse of a corpse in the first degree, and identity theft. In this post-conviction relief appeal, she assigns error to the post-conviction court's denial of the following claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make meritorious arguments in the motion to suppress evidence obtained via search warrant; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach a state's witness with their criminal record; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to rebut evidence that petitioner used a shotgun to kill one of the victims; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to witnesses remarking on her credibility during the trial; and (5) trial counsel's cumulative errors constituted ineffective assistance of counsel warranting reversal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying criminal charges arose under the following circumstances. In January 2014, the son of a man named Haney reported him missing in Jackson County. Haney had been residing on petitioner's property, and so his son visited petitioner to find his father's belongings. He found most of his father's belongings intact—including vehicles and other items—but could not find his wallet. Law enforcement visited the property to see Haney's camper, and as they were leaving the camper, they noticed large pigs in a pen. Petitioner spontaneously told law enforcement that she was "in the process of trying to get a government grant for research with the pigs on how they consume human bodies." Law enforcement returned to the property a few days later and recorded the conversation they had with petitioner. During that exchange, petitioner stated that Haney "got all crazy" and destroyed a room on the property the last time she saw him. Law enforcement asked if they could look around the property, which prompted petitioner to joke about the officers needing a warrant. She then spontaneously stated, "I've threat - threatened to kill everybody and feed them to my pigs. But, um, the thing is pigs - pigs would probably eat you, but it's not going to be good for them." Petitioner again mentioned her interest in obtaining a grant to research pigs eating humans but then clarified that she was joking.

Law enforcement investigated Haney's food benefit card usage and found evidence suggesting that petitioner had been using the card. As a result, they obtained a warrant to search the property for evidence regarding identity theft. The warrant did not limit the search to any particular piece of the property. Petitioner owned nearly 20 acres of land, strewn with debris, burn and junk piles, animal enclosures, and various structures. When executing the warrant, officers spoke with petitioner, who admitted to using the benefit card. Petitioner claimed that Haney had given her the card previously to buy food and beer for him. Officers walked around the property with a video camera. Shortly after beginning the recording, while the recording officer was surveying the property before executing the search in earnest, the officer encountered a human leg. Officers arrested petitioner and applied for a new search warrant—this time for evidence of murder.

At the police station, petitioner told officers that she had found Haney "half eaten" by the pigs in her pigpen, with his "guts *** all over the place," but he was alive. She claimed that she had retrieved a rifle from her home and shot him in the head to end his suffering. She stated that he was moaning and moving his arm before she shot him. She claimed that she left him in the pen and went to feed other animals after shooting him. She explained that the reason she did not call police was her fear that the police would shoot her pigs. She returned to the pen a few days later, noting that the pigs do not eat clothes, and picked up his clothes and his remains to put in her burn barrel.

Petitioner also told officers about another body on her property, that of a man named Delicino. She told officers that Delicino was an alcoholic and described a confrontation with Delicino about a missing gun, resulting in a "tussle" over her .22 pistol. She claimed that during the melee he said that he did not want to return to prison and shot himself several times in the head. She left his body in the pigpen "until there was practically nothing left."

Law enforcement, while executing the second search warrant, found the remains of both Haney and Delicino in or around the locations that petitioner had described in her interview. Officers spoke with petitioner again, now having information about the bodies, and petitioner changed her story about Delicino, stating that she shot him, but in self-defense. Petitioner was charged with two counts of murder, two counts of abuse of a corpse in the first degree, and one count of identity theft.

Before trial, petitioner's trial counsel moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of executing the first search warrant. Counsel's argument focused on whether the use of the benefit card during the period that Haney was considered missing was sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Counsel did not argue that the search warrant was overly broad in allowing law enforcement to search the property beyond dwellings. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

During the jury trial, which took place in 2015, petitioner was allowed to represent herself, but was also allowed to use counsel when she felt it was necessary.¹ Petitioner's counsel gave an opening statement in which he stated, "Now make no mistake about it, she shot both of these individuals; that is a fact. But the shooting in themselves is not a murder. It is only murder if she caused their death and she did it intentionally." He also stated that "[t]he majority of this case is [petitioner's] statements. There's nobody else to say she told them otherwise or saw it. Her statements have many contradictions and some admitted lies; even on her behalf, she'll admit those."

The state called a witness, Farris, who testified that petitioner made incriminating statements to her when they were in jail together. Specifically, Farris testified that petitioner admitted to shooting Delicino during an argument and then leaving his body in the pigpen. Farris admitted during direct examination that she was in custody "for a while" on a probation violation, that she had other felony convictions, and that her most recent methamphetamine delivery conviction was in 2015. At the close of direct examination, petitioner's trial counsel indicated that he did not have any questions for the witness. The jury did not learn that, at the time of her testimony, Farris had convictions for burglary, theft, and delivery and possession of methamphetamine.

The state played multiple recordings of interviews between law enforcement and petitioner for the jury. During those interviews, petitioner's version of the events varied greatly, ranging from complete denials to admissions of killing the men but having one justification or another. Throughout the interviews, petitioner called herself a liar and stated that she did not believe her own stories. One of the interviewing detectives testified at trial regarding petitioner's changing stories. The detective testified that he was "mad at certain points with [petitioner], because [he] kept hearing the same story over and over, and using [petitioner's] own words, the stories were not probable." The detective also testified that he did not believe petitioner because she had lied to him repeatedly. That testimony was elicited during redirect examination, after petitioner's trial counsel had asked the detective if he believed petitioner when she was being interviewed, because he did not investigate any of the other potential suspects or "leads" petitioner provided in her interviews. Trial counsel did not object to the testimony.

Another detective testified to his experience interviewing many people over a period of time and his belief that petitioner, during her interviews, was not telling him the truth. Trial counsel objected and moved to strike that testimony. The court sustained the objection and admonished the witness not to discuss how he felt about what was said during the interview. Trial counsel did not move for a mistrial.

In all, the jury was presented with evidence that the remains of two men's bodies were found on petitioner's property, that she had admitted to killing them with various justifications, and that she had either allowed the men to be eaten by her pigs or put the men's bodies in the pigpen for the specific purpose of allowing the pigs to eat them. The jury heard from witnesses about how petitioner's explanations were not possible, let alone probable—such as someone shooting himself in the head five times. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.

Petitioner filed an unsuccessful direct appeal, State v. Monica , 287 Or. App. 465, 401 P.3d 1286, rev. den. , 362 Or.300, 408 P.3d 1078 (2017) (affirmed without opinion), and thereafter filed this post-conviction action in the circuit court, alleging in her petition that she was denied effective and adequate assistance of her trial counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth...