Monique P. v. Heartshare St. Vincent Servs. (In re Ty'Nayshia H.)

Decision Date01 March 2018
Docket Number5828
Citation71 N.Y.S.3d 72,159 A.D.3d 420
Parties IN RE TY'NAYSHIA H., A Dependent Child Under the Age of Eighteen Years, etc., Monique P., Respondent–Appellant, v. Heartshare St. Vincent Services, Petitioner–Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Andrew J. Baer, New York, for appellant.

Wingate, Kearney & Cullen, LLP, Brooklyn (Richard J. Cea of counsel), for respondent.

Dawne Mitchell, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Sara H. Reisberg of counsel), attorney for the child.

Andrias, J.P., Gesmer, Kern, Singh, Moulton, JJ.

Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Emily Olshansky, J.), entered on or about October 21, 2016, which granted petitioner agency's motion for summary judgment, terminated respondent mother's parental rights to the subject child on the ground that she suffers from an intellectual disability as defined in section 384–b(6)(b) of the Social Services Law (SSL), and committed custody and guardianship of the child to the agency and the Commissioner of Social Services, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The agency established that the mother has an intellectual disability as defined in SSL § 384–b(6)(b). The agency submitted the sworn testimony of the court-appointed psychologist at a prior proceeding involving the termination of the mother's parental rights to two of her other children; the clinical report prepared in connection with the psychologist's evaluation of the mother at the prior proceeding; and the court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of commitment in the prior proceeding. The evidence was entered without objection, and the order in the prior proceeding was issued just ten days prior to the filing of the instant summary judgment motion. The court-appointed psychologist testified that the mother has a developmental disability marked by deficits in cognitive and adaptive functioning that is not expected to appreciably remit, and that if her children were returned to her care, they would be at risk of becoming neglected children (see SSL § 384–b[6][b], [c] ).

In opposition, the mother contends that summary judgment was not appropriate because she was accepted for homemaking services shortly after the court terminated her parental rights to her sons, and thus, a hearing was required to determine her parenting capacity with such assistance. However, the court-appointed psychologist expressly stated that "considering [the mother's] own parental functioning," long-term...

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