Monk v. Ramsey

• Decision Date: 18 July 1969
• Citation: 223 Tenn. 247,1 Pack 247,443 S.W.2d 653
• Parties: , 223 Tenn. 247 Allen Lee MONK, Petitioner, v. James E. RAMSEY, Respondent. Allen Lee MONK, Petitioner, v. Sandra K. Ramsey MONK, Respondent.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 653

443 S.W.2d 653

1 Pack 247, 223 Tenn. 247

Allen Lee MONK, Petitioner, v. James E. RAMSEY, Respondent.

Allen Lee MONK, Petitioner, v. Sandra K. Ramsey MONK, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 18, 1969.

Swingle, Hardin & Fletcher, Greeneville, for petitioner.

Milligan, Silvers & Coleman, Greeneville, for respondents.

OPINION

CHATTIN, Justice.

Sandra K. Monk, a minor, recovered a judgment against her husband, Allen Lee Monk, for personal injuries sustained prior to their marriage while riding as a guest passenger in an automobile driven by Monk. Her father, James E. Ramsey, recovered a judgment for medical expenses and loss of services. The cases were consolidated for trial.

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting there, as he did in the trial court, the subsequent marriage of the parties extinguished Sandra's right of action against her husband's tort. Defendant, also, insisted the father's action was derivative of his daughter's and it was likewise extinguished by the marriage.

The Court of Appeals overruled defendant's contentions and affirmed the trial court.

We granted certiorari and the case has been very ably briefed and argued in this Court.

The accident and injuries to Sandra occurred on October 28, 1965. In June, 1966, Sandra and defendant, Allen Lee Monk, were married. The suits were filed on October 28, 1966.

At the trial, the trial judge required the parties to stipulate defendant carried a policy of public liability insurance protecting him in an amount exceeding the two judgments; and, upon that ground, allowed the two judgments to stand.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating the Insurance Company was the real party to the actions whose liability became fixed prior to the marriage of defendant, the nominal party.

Although the Court of Appeals undertook to distinguish the case of Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932), we think that case controls the question as to whether Sandra's suit was extinguished by her marriage.

In the Raines case, J. W. Raines permitted his son, Bill, to use his car to take his date to a theater. On the night of the accident it was dark and raining. The father told his son to limit his trip to the theater because of the weather conditions and no insurance was carried on the car.

Contrary to the instructions, the son drove the car with his date, Pauline Mercer, into Georgia. In returning to the home of Miss Mercer, the accident occurred from which she received injuries. She instituted an action against J. W. Raines and while the suit was pending she married Bill.

The Court held the subsequent marriage extinguished Pauline's antenuptial right of action for Bill's tort and thus her right of action against his father, resting upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, could not be maintained against J. W. Raines, the principal.

The Court went on to specifically say:

'The marital unity, which settled rules of law we have recognized through so many years, prevents the operation of those general statutes designed to remove particular disabilities of married women. The question is not whether disabilities have been removed but whether the long-prevailing rule of the law, declaring husband and wife to be one person, in legal contemplation, has been annulled. Until this rule is annulled by statute, all rights of action for antenuptial wrongs of the husband to the wife are extinguished by their marriage. Because marriage extinguished antenuptial actions for tort between husband and wife, the wife could not maintain an action against him for injury to her person committed before marriage or during coverture. Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462, 32 L.R.A. p. 848; Schouler's Husband and Wife, § 81; 30 C.J., 714, 715, note 71; Tobin v. Gelrich, 162 Tenn. 96, 34 S.W. (2d) 1058.'

The whole body of the common law on the subject of domestic relations has been adopted in this State and is in force, except insofar as it has been modified by statutes. McCorry v. King's Heirs, 22 Tenn. 267 (1842).

The common law governs in Tennessee unless changed by statute. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Allen, 220 Tenn. 222, 415 S.W.2d 632 (1967).

The fact defendant carried a standard liability insurance policy is immaterial.

However, plaintiffs insist the rule marriage extinguished antenuptial actions for tort between husband and wife was in effect abrogated by the Financial Responsibility Law. We disagree.

The common law rule under consideration is not mentioned nor referred to in the Financial Responsibility Law.

Rules of the common law are not repealed by implication, and if a statute does not include and cover such a case, it leaves the law as it was before its enactment. Pickens v. Daugherty, 217 Tenn. 349, 397 S.W.2d 815 (1965).

Moreover, the purpose of our Financial Responsibility Law is to protect our citizens whereby compensation may be collected for injuries caused by negligence of motorists operating automobiles without insurance or adequate insurance. Erwin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 232 F.Supp. 530 (1964).

From what we have hereinabove said, it is apparent these suits do not come within the purview of our Financial Responsibility Law.

Finally, defendant contends, since Sandra's action must fail, her father cannot maintain his suit for medical expenses and loss of services. We disagree.

Defendant relies on the case of Dudley v. Phillips, 218 Tenn. 648, 405 S.W.2d 468, 21 A.L.R.3d 462 (1966), wherein this...