Monlyn v. State, 82779
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM; ANSTEAD |
| Citation | 705 So.2d 1 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly S631, 23 Fla. L. Weekly S51 Broderick Wendell MONLYN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Docket Number | No. 82779,82779 |
| Decision Date | 09 October 1997 |
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v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1998.
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Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and David A. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Broderick Wendell Monlyn appeals his convictions of first-degree murder and other crimes and the sentence of death imposed for the crime of murder. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Monlyn was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed kidnapping on November 2, 1993. Following the jury's recommendation, the judge imposed a death sentence. The court found five aggravating circumstances: prior violent felony (robbery); commission during the course of or attempt to commit robbery or kidnapping; commission for financial gain; that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. The court found no statutory mitigation. As nonstatutory mitigation, the court found that Monlyn was affectionate and considerate toward his family, had been helpful to others, and had made a good adjustment to prison life. The court also noted Monlyn's good behavior at trial. The court found that
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the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigation.Monlyn lived across the road from the victim, Alton Watson. Monlyn had previously fished on Watson's property, and on one occasion Watson ordered him off the property with a rifle. Later, when Monlyn was in prison, he told an inmate that he was going to kill Watson. He told another inmate--Johnny Craddock--that he would kill the first person he saw in order to get a ride. He also stated that he intended to rob the victim and steal his truck and money.
Monlyn escaped from prison on October 6, 1992. He stole some clothes and money and a shotgun from his uncle. He spent a night in Watson's barn hiding from the police. Monlyn encountered Watson in the barn the next morning. Monlyn said that Watson surprised him and that both men grabbed for the shotgun and struggled over it. Monlyn testified that he was trying to get away when he grabbed the gun and hit Watson with it. He said they struggled from the barn into the yard until Watson stopped attacking him. At that point, Monlyn said, he tied Watson's feet together, gagged him, dragged him into the barn, and took his truck. Watson's wallet, containing no money, was found next to the body. A friend who had let Monlyn stay in her trailer called the police, and he was arrested.
Watson's body had over thirty blunt injury wounds, about ten of them defensive. The medical examiner described the bindings at trial, and testified that the cause of death was multiple blunt impact to the head.
Monlyn raises thirteen issues. He argues that it was (1) error to allow the medical examiner's testimony that Watson was still alive and suffered more head blows after being bound and gagged; (2) error to overrule Monlyn's objection when he was asked on cross-examination about the inconsistency between his testimony that he bit the victim and the medical examiner's testimony that there were only blunt injuries to the victim; (3) error not to grant a mistrial after the questions as to why Monlyn had not told anyone about his fight with victim and whether he realized that the victim would die without medical attention; (4) error to admit the victim's wife's testimony that the victim usually carried $200 to $300 in cash, (5) error to deny a motion for mistrial during the State's guilt-phase closing argument; (6) error to admit Johnny Craddock's testimony regarding Monlyn's statements made weeks before the homicides; (7) error to refuse to give Monlyn's requested circumstantial evidence instructions; (8) error to give the standard reasonable doubt instruction; (9) error to give an unconstitutionally vague instruction on the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator; (10) error to find that the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); (11) error to give the standard heinous, atrocious, or cruel instruction; (12) error not to give Monlyn's requested mitigation instruction; and (13) error not to instruct against doubling the pecuniary gain and robbery aggravators. After conducting an independent review of the entire record, we have found that there is competent and substantial evidence supporting the convictions and sentence. Turning to Monlyn's arguments, we find no reversible error and affirm the convictions and death sentence.
Monlyn's first argument, that it was error to allow the medical examiner's testimony that the victim was still alive and suffered more blows to the head after being bound and gagged, is without merit. The medical examiner testified that because there would be no reason to bind and gag a dead person, and two of the blows would have killed the victim within minutes, some of the blows were therefore inflicted after the victim was bound and gagged. Monlyn argues that this was a common-sense conclusion that should have been left to the jury. The state cites Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954 (Fla.1996), where we reiterated: "The determination of a witness's qualifications to express an expert opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error." Id at 960. We find no abuse of discretion in allowing the testimony: the medical examiner was qualified to testify as to the nature and extent of the blows. Even if there was error here, it would clearly have been harmless. The same information came in through Monlyn's own testimony. Monlyn was asked,
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"[I]f you had thought he was dead when he was outside on the grass there at the end of the struggle, would you have tied him up?" Monlyn responded, "No. If he had been unconscious, I would never have tied him up." Based on the medical examiner's testimony that two of the blows would have killed the victim within minutes, and Monlyn's testimony that the victim was conscious when he tied him up, it is clear that any error as to the admission of the testimony in question would have been clearly harmless.Monlyn's second claim is also meritless. Although the medical examiner testified that all of the wounds were blunt trauma injury wounds, Monlyn claimed during direct examination that he bit the victim and had seen a mark on the victim's hand. The state asked about the bite on cross-examination, and Monlyn argues that the questioning was impermissible. We have said numerous times that the "appropriate subjects of inquiry and the extent of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial court." Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983, 988 (Fla.1991). We find no abuse of...
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Goodwin v. State, No. 93
...287, 296 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 459, 145 L.Ed.2d 370, 68 U.S.L.W. 3307 (1999) (No. 98-9741); Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 957, 118 S.Ct. 2378, 141 L.Ed.2d 745 (1998); Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986); Bozeman ......
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Floyd v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., Case No. 3:09-cv-1017-J-34TEM
...have 'expressly approved courts which havePage 146exercised their discretion and not given the instruction.'") (quoting Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1997)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1049 (2005); Branch v. State, 685 So.2d 1250, 1252-53 (Fla. 1996) (holding it was not error to refuse ......
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Gosciminski v. State, SC09–2234.
...are given, an instruction on circumstantial evidence is ‘unnecessary.’ ”); Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145 (Fla.2002); Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.1997). 20. “Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimat......
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Ibar v. State, SC00-2043.
...show that the defendant followed the victim and her boyfriend to Crestview, it was inadmissible. See id. In contrast, in Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1 (Fla.1997), this Court found a hearsay statement made by the defendant to a fellow inmate to be admissible under this hearsay exception. An i......
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Goodwin v. State, No. 93
...287, 296 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 459, 145 L.Ed.2d 370, 68 U.S.L.W. 3307 (1999) (No. 98-9741); Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 957, 118 S.Ct. 2378, 141 L.Ed.2d 745 (1998); Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1986); Bozeman ......
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Floyd v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., Case No. 3:09-cv-1017-J-34TEM
...have 'expressly approved courts which havePage 146exercised their discretion and not given the instruction.'") (quoting Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1997)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1049 (2005); Branch v. State, 685 So.2d 1250, 1252-53 (Fla. 1996) (holding it was not error to refuse ......
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Gosciminski v. State, SC09–2234.
...are given, an instruction on circumstantial evidence is ‘unnecessary.’ ”); Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145 (Fla.2002); Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.1997). 20. “Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimat......
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Ibar v. State, SC00-2043.
...show that the defendant followed the victim and her boyfriend to Crestview, it was inadmissible. See id. In contrast, in Monlyn v. State, 705 So.2d 1 (Fla.1997), this Court found a hearsay statement made by the defendant to a fellow inmate to be admissible under this hearsay exception. An i......