Monnette v. United States

• Decision Date: 26 February 1962
• Docket Number: No. 18775.,18775.
• Citation: 299 F.2d 847
• Parties: Maynard Paul MONNETTE and Robert Christianson Noreng, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

299 F.2d 847 (1962)

Maynard Paul MONNETTE and Robert Christianson Noreng, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 18775.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

February 26, 1962.

Jos. P. Manners, Manners & Amoon, Miami, Fla., for appellants.

Robert W. Rust, Edmond J. Gong, Lavinia L. Redd, Asst. U. S. Attys., Edward F. Boardman, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for appellee.

Before JONES and BELL, Circuit Judges and SIMPSON, District Judge.

SIMPSON, District Judge.

Monnette and Noreng, Appellants, were tried before a jury, convicted and sentenced upon Counts 1 and 4 of a 5-count indictment¹ charging violation of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to non-tax paid distilled spirits, or "moonshine". Count 1 charged that they had under their control unregistered distilling apparatus (Sec. 5179(a) and 5601 (a) (1), Title 26 U.S.Code) and Count 4 charged possession of 105 gallons non-tax paid whiskey (Secs. 5205(a) and 5604(a) (1), Title 26 U.S.Code).

Two points are urged for reversal, (1) that the Government's evidence was obtained by illegal search, and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction as to either of the defendants. We affirm.

Monnette owned residential premises at 16200 N.W. 39th Place, Miami, Florida. On February 22, 1960, State Beverage Agents Hillidge and Kendall were patrolling in the northwest section of Miami, searching for an unregistered still reported in that area. The agents observed a 1950 Plymouth automobile parked in front of Monnette's building. Agent Kendall recognized the car as belonging to a suspected liquor violator, Tony Zamper. Further investigation revealed that the car was in fact owned by Zamper, and was being used by Robert Noreng, another suspected violator who had been seen by Agent Hillidge at another unregistered still four months earlier.

On the next day, February 23, agent Hillidge returned to the premises, accompanied by State Agent Russell. They sat in the car, from where agent Russell testified he could smell the odor of mash emanating from the building. Agent Hillidge, not immediately detecting the odor, went inside the fence and finally up to the front porch, from where he clearly detected the odor of mash. Three agents returned that evening. Again smelling the mash odor, they went upon the lot surrounding the house and looked through the back window.

The next day, February 24, Agent Hillidge went before a U. S. Commissioner and made an affidavit for issuance of a search warrant of the premises at 16200 N.W. 39th Place, Miami, Florida, setting forth as facts establishing grounds for issuance that he had information that a still was operated thereon, that a car used by a known liquor law violator was observed parked in front of the premises, and that he had smelled the odor of fermenting mash emanating from the building.

On the basis of this affidavit, the Commissioner issued the requested search warrant, directed to Federal investigators. A team of Federal and State agents kept the premises under surveillance during the next day, February 25. They observed Monnette arrive and remain briefly at about 8 A.M. After he left, the premises were empty until about 3 P.M. when Noreng arrived, also remained only briefly, and then drove away. Monnette and Noreng returned together at about 4:30 P.M., parking in the carport adjacent to the house. The agents observed them carrying objects into the house and then observed Noreng working on a piece of apparatus, which was not identifiable from where the agents were posted but which later proved to be a charcoal filter of the type used in a distilling operation.

At about 5 P.M. a group of agents drove through an empty lot and on to Monnette's property. On seeing the cars, Monnette and Noreng took flight, chased by the agents. Federal Agent Schurr then served the search warrant on the unoccupied premises. His search revealed a distilling apparatus which was set up in both bedrooms and the bathroom of the house. A complete search also revealed about one hundred gallons of moonshine whiskey and a quantity of fermenting mash.

Both Monnette and Noreng were caught within a few blocks of the house and taken into custody. Their indictment, trial, and conviction followed.

Prior to the trial, appellants moved to suppress the evidence obtained by the agent in their search of Monnette's building, on the ground that the search warrant was issued without probable cause and therefore invalid. Monnette, claiming ownership of the premises, had standing to raise this question. Noreng, charged with possession of property found within the premises also had standing.² Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).

Agent Hillidge, in his affidavit, set out facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant.³ A warrant may be issued upon "probable cause". That phrase has no inflexible meaning but it has been generally stated that there is probable cause when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is being committed in the place to be searched. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Trustworthy information, although technical hearsay, may furnish probable cause,⁴ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5 C.A.1958, cert. den. 358 U.S. 873, 79 S.Ct. 113, 3 L.Ed.2d 104). Agent Hillidge had personal knowledge that Noreng was a suspected liquor law violator after finding him at an unregistered still four months earlier. The information obtained from other agents that the 1950 Plymouth parked in front of Monnette's building was operated by Noreng was hearsay but trustworthy information and entitled to weight when the issue was not guilt but probable cause.⁵ The odor of mash emanating from the premises was a very strong factor in showing probable cause. This distinctive odor alone has been held to furnish probable cause for a search of the building from which the odor rises, McBride v. United States, 284 F. 416 (5 C.A.1922), cert. den. 261 U.S. 614, 43 S.Ct. 359, 67 L.Ed. 827, or at least to justify the issuance of a warrant to search that building, Johnson v. U. S., 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948), Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). The Johnson and Chapman cases condemned the hasty action of officers who invaded premises immediately after detecting the odor of narcotics in Johnson and an odor of mash in Chapman. The Court indicated that after detecting the odor, the proper procedure was to obtain a search warrant. This was the procedure followed by agent Hillidge. The U. S. Commissioner, a judicial magistrate, weighed and determined whether there was probable cause, Townsend v. United States, 253 F.2d 461, 465 (5 C.A.1958). It is argued that Agent Hillidge detected the mash odor only after an illegal search and the facts learned through an illegal search cannot justify the issuance of a valid search warrant. Agent Hillidge did go on the property of Monnette before he could definitely identify the mash odor. It is well settled, however, that a trespass upon the grounds surrounding a building does not constitute an illegal search. The protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the grounds. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924), Martin v. United States, 155 F.2d 503 (5 C.A.1946).

After strongly detecting the odor while standing near Monnette's property line, the agents did go up to the house and peer through the rear windows in an attempt to find further evidence. If the house was in fact the dwelling of Monnette, this peering into the dwelling was a trespass certainly and probably violated his right to privacy⁶ as well. Neither of these questions need concern us here, however, for the agents discovered nothing from their look into the house. The odor had been distinctly noticed and identified at the property line. The facts which established probable cause, as set out in Agent Hillidge's affidavit were not obtained by what might have been an illegal act.

We conclude: That the affidavit was sufficient;...