Monongalia Cnty. Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV04
| Decision Date | 16 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16CV04 |
| Citation | 234 F.Supp.3d 797 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | MONONGALIA COUNTY COAL COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, International Union and United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1702, Defendant. |
Daniel D. Fassio, Michael D. Glass, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.
Charles F. Donnelly, UMWA Legal Department, Charleston, WV, for Defendant.
Pending for consideration are cross motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, Monongalia County Coal Company ("Company"), and the defendants, United Mine Workers of America, International Union and United Mine Workers of America, Local Union 1702 (collectively "Union"). Finding that the Arbitrator's decision fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and instead reflects the Arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong, the Court grants the Company's motion (dkt. no. 15) and VACATES the Arbitrator's award.
The Company operates the Monongalia County Mine (the "Mine"), an underground coal mine located in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. The Union represents the Company's bargaining unit (union) employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The Company and the Union are bound by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") (dkt. no. 7–1) that governs the wages, hours, and working conditions of union employees at the Mine.
In 2015, the Company contracted with a third-party, Jennchem, to design, supply, and install a pumpable crib system1 in the Mine. This system requires workers to hang cylindrical bags from bolts installed in the mine roof at predetermined locations. The bags are then filled with a cementitious mixture, which dries quickly and forms a strong concrete-like pillar that provides support to the ceiling of the mine.
At the outset, union mine employees hung the bags and Jennchem employees filled them with the cement mixture. After problems arose with the bag hanging performed by the union employees, however, the Company decided that, because of Jennchem's familiarity and expertise with the product, Jennchem should perform the entire operation. When the Union objected, the Company countered that it was allowed to contract all of this work out to Jennchem under Article 1A, § (i) of the CBA. This Article provides in pertinent part as follows:
All construction of mine or mine related facilities including the erection of mine tipples and the sinking of mine shafts or slopes customarily performed by classified Employees of the Employer normally performing construction work in or about the mine in accordance with prior practice and custom, shall not be contracted out at any time unless all such Employees with necessary skills to perform the work are working no less than 5 days per week, or its equivalent for Employees working alternative schedules.
(dkt. no. 14 at 4).
The Company justified its decision to contract out the bag hanging to Jennchem based on the fact that, pursuant to Article 1A § (i), all union employees involved were working five days per week. The Union disagreed, arguing that, because hanging the bags was work previously performed by union workers, its members had suffered a loss of work. After the parties were unable to resolve the matter through the grievance process, the matter was referred for resolution to Arbitrator Betty Widgeon ("Arbitrator").
On July 10, 2015, the Arbitrator conducted a hearing with the parties at which the Company presented two arguments. It first contended that the installation of the pumpable crib bags was construction work under Article 1A, § (i) of the CBA. It next asserted that, because the Mine's union employees were working no less than five days per week, it was free to contract that work to Jennchem. Although the Union did not dispute that its members were working no less than five days per week, it contended the work involved was "maintenance" work under Article 1A, § (g)(2),2 which required the Company to use only union workers. Thus, it reasoned that, even if all union members were already working a full work schedule, the maintenance work would have resulted in overtime and additional payments into the employees' benefit fund.
The Arbitrator rendered a decision ("Decision") favorable to the Union on August 31, 2015. She found that the Company had violated the CBA by using Jennchem to complete bargaining unit work (dkt. no. 4). Specifically, her Decision concluded that the "installation of pumpable cribs does not fall into the construction exception, and because it is, at the very least, repair and maintenance work, it is Union work." Dkt. no. 4 at 4. The Decision also required the Company to cease and desist using outside contractors to hang the bags, and awarded the Union compensatory damages for the hours billed by Jennchem. Id.
Following the Decision, a dispute arose concerning the formula to be used in determining the amount of damages to be paid by the Company (dkt. no. 14–1). After additional briefing, the Arbitrator issued a Supplemental Decision, accepting the Union's position and basing her award of the hours due on the calculations and estimates supplied by the Union (dkt. no. 4–1). Accordingly, she ordered the Company to compensate the Union for 3,000 labor hours connected to the bargaining unit work performed by Jennchem. Id.
The Company filed suit against the Union on January 8, 2016 (dkt. no. 1). Its complaint challenges the Arbitrator's Decision on the basis that it 1) exceeded the scope of the Arbitrator's authority and power; 2) failed to draw its essence from the Agreement; 3) was based on the Arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong; 4) was arbitrary and capricious; and 5) conflicted with public policy interests by undermining enforcement of the Agreement. As a remedy, it sought to vacate the Arbitrator's award with prejudice.
The Union filed a combined answer and counterclaim on February 17, 2016, challenging the Court's jurisdiction to vacate the award because the Agreement provides for final and binding arbitration as the sole means of resolving disputes arising under the Agreement (dkt. no. 7). Its counterclaim seeks a declaration that the award is final, binding, and enforceable. It also asks the Court to compel enforcement of the award and to permanently enjoin the Company from utilizing third-party contractors in any manner inconsistent with the Agreement.
Both parties have moved for summary judgment (dkt. nos. 13 and 15), and those motions are fully briefed and ripe for review.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" establish that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc. , 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining its truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist sufficient to prevent judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has made the necessary showing, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring the non-moving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Judicial review of arbitration awards is "among the narrowest known to the law." PPG Indus. Inc. v. Int'l Chemical Workers Union Council of United Food and Comm'l Workers , 587 F.3d 648, 652 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Arbitration awards are presumptively valid. Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union , 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir. 1996). This is because the parties to a CBA "bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation and resolution of their dispute." Id. Consequently, courts generally defer to the arbitrator's reasoning and should not overturn their factual findings unless there has been fraud by the parties or dishonesty by the arbitrator. Id. Indeed, "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." PPG Indus. , 587 F.3d at 652 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc. , 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) ).
Nevertheless, courts should overturn arbitration awards when the "award violates well-settled and prevailing public policy, fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement or reflects the arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong." Mountaineer , 76 F.3d at 608 (citing Misco , 484 U.S. at 38, 108 S.Ct. 364 ). Thus, an "arbitrator cannot ‘ignore the plain language of the...
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