Monroe By and Through Broulette v. Soliz, 63643-5
| Decision Date | 15 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 63643-5,63643-5 |
| Citation | 939 P.2d 205,132 Wn.2d 414 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Antonial MONROE, a minor, by and through his legal guardian, Bernice BROULETTE, Respondents, v. Jean SOLIZ, Secretary, Department of Social and Health Services; and Chase Riveland, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Appellants. |
Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Edward Dee, Richard McCartan, Assistants, Olympia, for appellants.
Evergreen Legal Services, Patricia Arthur, Seattle, for respondents.
This class action suit challenges the constitutionality of RCW 13.40.280 which permits the Department of Social and Health Services, with the consent of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, to administratively transfer a juvenile offender from a detention facility to an adult prison. We uphold the constitutionality of the statute against claims that it unconstitutionally denies the right to jury trial, violates equal protection, and deprives juveniles of that process which is due, and we therefore reverse the trial court.
The juvenile court committed 17-year-old Antonial Monroe to a term of confinement at the Green Hill School, a detention facility for juvenile offenders operated by the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). While a resident, Monroe engaged in extreme misconduct including assaults against the staff and other residents. DSHS impaneled an administrative hearing pursuant to RCW 13.40.280 1 which concluded that Monroe was "a continuing and serious threat to the safety of others at the institution." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 91. Monroe was then eligible for placement in an institution operated by the Department of Corrections (DOC) and integrated with adult inmates.
Monroe then sued Jean Soliz, then Secretary of DSHS, and Chase Riveland, then Secretary of DOC, to prevent his transfer. The trial court certified the cause as a class action, the class consisting of "all juveniles currently or in the future incarcerated at a facility operated by the Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration." CP at 314-15. The parties stipulated to a series of facts for purposes of cross-motions on summary judgment. 2 In a lengthy decision, the trial court granted summary judgment to offender Monroe holding the statute violated his constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution and under article I, section 21 of the state constitution, and violated his constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. The State appealed directly to this court which retained review.
Review of a summary judgment requires this court to engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Marincovich v. Tarabochia, 114 Wash.2d 271, 274, 787 P.2d 562 (1990). We review questions of law de novo. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wash.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994). This is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of this statute which raises purely legal questions.
Monroe argues RCW 13.40.280 violates his right to trial by jury because it permits the state to punish a juvenile in the same manner as a convicted criminal by incarcerating the juvenile in an adult prison. He argues the two systems have different goals, purposes, procedures and punishments, they are functionally distinct, and the state therefore cannot place a juvenile in an adult prison without benefit of a trial by jury.
We disagree. The statute does not deprive Monroe and the class he represents of his right to a jury trial because he has none in a juvenile proceeding. The nature of incarceration remains juvenile regardless of the custody venue. This state statute merely changes that venue.
The difference between Washington's juvenile justice and adult criminal systems are well-defined in our law. A juvenile is any individual who is under the chronological age of 18 years. RCW 13.04.011. Juveniles do not commit "crimes." Instead they commit "offenses" or "violations," which the Legislature has defined as acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime. RCW 13.40.020(19). RCW 13.04.030 provides the juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to have committed offenses, except in certain specified cases, or when the juvenile court transfers jurisdiction to adult criminal court pursuant to RCW 13.40.110.
The purpose of the juvenile justice system is ostensibly to establish a system having primary responsibility for, and responding to, the needs of offenders, as well as to hold juveniles responsible for their offenses. State v. Rice, 98 Wash.2d 384, 392, 655 P.2d 1145 (1982). The critical distinction between the two systems lies in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977's (JJA) policy of responding to the needs of juvenile offenders. Rice, 98 Wash.2d at 392, 655 P.2d 1145. We have in the past found such a policy as rehabilitative in nature, whereas the criminal system is punitive. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 4, 743 P.2d 240 (1987). Such differences have led us to consistently conclude the right to a jury trial does not extend to juveniles adjudicated in juvenile proceedings. See Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); State v. Lawley, 91 Wash.2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979); Schaaf, 109 Wash.2d 1, 743 P.2d 240.
Monroe's basic claim is that the administrative transfer of a juvenile from a detention facility to an adult prison alters the focus of the juvenile's incarceration, changing it from rehabilitative to punitive. Thus, Monroe argues, because he would be punished if housed in the adult prison, the law affords him a right to a jury trial. We believe this overstates the nature of the administrative transfer. At the heart of the issue is whether the place of a person's confinement defines the nature of the proceeding. RCW 13.40.280 does not, and cannot, substantively convert a juvenile proceeding to a criminal one. The basis for the juvenile's custody has not changed. The statute merely permits the State to change the place of confinement based upon an administrative determination that the juvenile "presents a continuing and serious threat to the safety of others in the institution." RCW 13.40.280(2).
While an inmate's place of confinement may be an indicium of the nature of the proceeding, it is not the sole indicium, nor is it dispositive. Housing a juvenile in an adult prison does not substantively change the nature of the juvenile's detention. A criminal conviction carries far more serious ramifications for an individual than a juvenile adjudication, no matter where the juvenile serves his time.
By proceeding in a juvenile court the State protects offenders "against [the] consequences of adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights, [and] the use of adjudication against him in subsequent proceedings...." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). 3 Washington law permits the State to destroy all juvenile records when a juvenile offender attains the age of 23, while an adult conviction is permanently engraved on the defendant's record. RCW 13.50.050(23)(a). The State can imprison the adult offender until the end of his term regardless of the age of the prisoner; however, the sentence for a juvenile offender, no matter how callous or brutal he may have been, cannot extend beyond the age of 21. RCW 13.40.300.
Moreover, even after DSHS transfers a dangerous juvenile like Monroe to DOC, the two agencies may subsequently agree to return him to the juvenile institution at any time. RCW 13.40.280(6). A convicted criminal in the adult system has no such opportunity. In addition, once the juvenile court declines jurisdiction over a defendant and transfers him to adult court, the State treats him as an adult for all future offenses. State v. Mitchell, 32 Wash.App. 499, 500, 648 P.2d 456 (1982); see also State v. Holland, 30 Wash.App. 366, 373, 635 P.2d 142 (1981) (), aff'd, 98 Wash.2d 507, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983). A transferred juvenile, on the other hand, who is released and commits another offense is not automatically subject to adult prosecution.
All told, an adult criminal conviction and an administrative transfer of a juvenile to adult prison are entirely different. An administrative transfer does not convert a juvenile adjudication into an adult conviction. Where the adult offender retains the right to jury trial, the juvenile retains the rights, protections, and benefits inherent in the juvenile justice system no matter where he is incarcerated.
The behavior of the young person at issue here can no longer be controlled by the staff at a juvenile institution. 4 An administrative panel has determined he represents a continuous and serious threat to the safety of the staff and other residents in the institution. He must be housed in a secure facility to protect the safety of not only the staff but also other residents. If the only secure facility capable of dealing with such an individual is an adult prison then that is where the State must keep him.
The Legislature enacted the statute in recognition of "the ever-increasing severity of offenses committed by juvenile offenders residing in this State's juvenile detention facilities and the increasing aggressive nature of detained juveniles due to drugs and gang-related violence." RCW 13.40.280 (Purpose--1989, ch. 410). Its purpose "is to provide necessary protection to state employees and juvenile residents of these institutions from assaults committed against them by juvenile detainees." Id. The statute facially designates an appropriate place of confinement for the juvenile offender who manifests an uncontrollable and aggressive nature....
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