Monroe Cnty. v. Boathouse Apartments, LLC

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Citation: Monroe Cnty. v. Boathouse Apartments, LLC, 150 N.E.3d 1045 (Ind. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 16 June 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PL-177
• Parties: MONROE COUNTY, Indiana and Monroe County Plan Commission, Appellant-Plaintiffs, v. BOATHOUSE APARTMENTS, LLC, Appellee-Defendant.

150 N.E.3d 1045

MONROE COUNTY, Indiana and Monroe County Plan Commission, Appellant-Plaintiffs,

v.BOATHOUSE APARTMENTS, LLC, Appellee-Defendant.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PL-177

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED June 16, 2020

Publication Ordered June 30, 2020

Case Summary

[1] On February 3, 2017, Monroe County, Indiana, and the Monroe County Plan Commission (collectively, "the County") filed a complaint in the Monroe Circuit Court, seeking a monetary penalty against Boathouse Apartments, LLC ("Boathouse"), for alleged violations of certain Monroe County ordinances. Boathouse subsequently filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County's claims. The trial court granted Boathouse's motion to dismiss. Because we conclude that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the County's claims, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Boathouse owns three lots ("the Boathouse Property") within the Lakes Neighborhood Planned Unit Development in Bloomington. During 2016, Boathouse began a project to construct six buildings of townhome apartments on the Boathouse Property. In completing the project, Boathouse was required to comply with the use and occupancy requirements of the Monroe County Code of Ordinances ("the Monroe County Code").

[3] On February 3, 2017, the County filed a complaint seeking a monetary penalty against Boathouse, alleging that Boathouse had violated the use and occupancy requirements of the Monroe County Code. Specifically, the County alleged that Boathouse had permitted tenants to occupy the apartment units before a land use certificate and certificate of occupancy were issued. Boathouse answered and filed affirmative defenses to the complaint on April 4, 2017.

[4] On October 14, 2019, Boathouse filed a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, claiming that the County had failed to comply with applicable ordinances in bringing its claims against Boathouse and "[t]his failure deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction over these claims." Appellants' App. Vol. II p. 76. As such, Boathouse requested "that the Court grant its Motion to Dismiss because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear [the County's] claims." Appellants' App. Vol. II p. 76. The County filed both a brief and a supplemental brief in opposition to Boathouse's motion to dismiss. On January 6, 2020, the trial court, ruling on a paper record, issued an order granting Boathouse's motion and dismissing the County's lawsuit.

Discussion and Decision

[5] The County contends that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the County's claims. Where, as here, the facts before the trial court are not in dispute, "the question of subject matter jurisdiction is purely one of law." GKN Co. v. Magness , 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001). "Under those circumstances no deference is afforded the trial court's conclusion because "appellate courts independently, and without the slightest deference to trial court determinations, evaluate those issues they deem to be questions of law." Id. "Thus, we review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where the facts before the trial court are undisputed." Id.

[6] Subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutional or statutory power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs. So, in determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the only relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner's claim falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute.

State v. Reinhart , 112 N.E.3d 705, 711–12 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). "Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter jurisdiction." Lakes & Rivers Transfer, a Div. of Jack Gray v. Rudolph Robinson Steel Co. , 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). "All circuit courts have: (1) original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases." Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2(a).

"The Monroe circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction" and, as such, has the authority to maintain a civil docket. Ind. Code § 33-33-53-2(a).

[7] The County contends that statutory authority expressly confers subject matter jurisdiction over the County's claims against Boathouse to the trial court. For its part, Boathouse contends that the County's alleged failure to comply with local ordinances relating to enforcement of the Monroe County Code "deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction" over the County's claims. Appellee's Br. p. 16. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the County.

[8] "The Indiana General Assembly, through statutes, has both authorized local units of government to create ordinances and established the manner in which those ordinances are to be enforced." Boss v. State , 944 N.E.2d 16, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In doing so, the General Assembly "specifically withheld from [local] units, however, the power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting" a violation of a local ordinance. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The General Assembly instead gave this power to the courts.

[9] In support of its contention that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County's claims against it, Boathouse cites to the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Ballman v. Duffecy , 230 Ind. 220, 102 N.E.2d 646 (1952). In Ballman , the Supreme Court considered whether a failure to comply with certain statutes prior to filing suit divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The applicable statutes in effect at the time set forth certain prerequisites for seeking an appeal of a decision of a board of zoning appeals. 230 Ind. at 224, 102 N.E.2d at 647. Concluding that a party's failure to follow the statutory prerequisites prior to filing suit divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, the Ballman court held as follows:

This court has heretofore said that a court in acquiring jurisdiction must not only have jurisdiction of the parties and the general subject of the controversy respecting real property, but must have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the particular case. A failure to comply with the statute is jurisdictional, and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the parties or the particular case.

230 Ind. at 229, 102 N.E.2d at 650 (internal citations omitted).¹

[10] Boathouse asserts that the holding in Ballman supports its contention that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the County's claims because the County failed to satisfy the requirements of certain local ordinances before filing its lawsuit.² We disagree. While a motion for dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) has been found appropriate where a party failed to satisfy a statutorily mandated prerequisites for filing suit, see id. , 230 Ind. at 229, 102 N.E.2d at 650 ; In re Petition to Annex Approximately 7,806 Acres of Real Estate into City of Jeffersonville , 891 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we have held that when the relevant statutes do not include any prerequisite for filing suit, a Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle to bring a challenge to the suit. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of Brownsburg , 32 N.E.3d 798, 804–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[11] The statutes at issue in this case do not contain any prerequisites for filing suit. Indiana Code section 36-1-6-4(a) provides, in relevant part, that a municipal corporation "may bring a civil action" if a person or entity "violates an ordinance regulating or prohibiting a condition or use of property." Further, Indiana Code sections 36-7-4-1013 and 36-7-4-1014 detail remedies for enforcement and allowable actions for violations of ordinances. Specifically, Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1013(a) provides that if, after conducting an investigation into an alleged violation of an ordinance, a municipal attorney or an attorney representing the county comes to the reasonable belief that an entity has violated an ordinance, "the municipal attorney or an attorney representing the county may file a complaint against the person and prosecute the alleged violation under IC 36-1-6." Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1014 provides as follows:

(a) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may bring an action under IC 36-1-6 to enforce any ordinance adopted or action taken under this chapter.

(b) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or any enforcement official designated in the zoning ordinance may also bring an action to enforce:

(1) conditions imposed by the commission or board of zoning appeals under this chapter; or

(2) covenants made in connection with a subdivision plat, a development plan, or a PUD district ordinance (as defined in section 1503 of this chapter).

* * * *

(d) The plan commission, board of zoning appeals, or designated enforcement official may invoke any legal, equitable, or special remedy in an action described in subsection (a) or (b).

(e) An action for the levy of a fine or penalty for enforcement of a zoning ordinance may be brought in any court located within the jurisdiction of the plan commission or board of zoning appeals.

[12] The above-quoted statutory sections clearly indicate that actions such as that brought by the County, which seeks penalties for alleged violations of the certain County ordinances, may be brought in court, with Indiana Code section 36-7-4-1014 allowing for the action to be brought in "any court located within the jurisdiction." The statutes do not contain any prerequisites for filing suit in the trial court.

As such, we conclude that Boathouse's reliance on the Indiana Supreme Court's holding in Ballman is misplaced as it is...