Monroe Cnty. v. Boathouse Apartments, LLC

• Decision Date: 15 September 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-PL-55
• Citation: 177 N.E.3d 1201
• Parties: MONROE COUNTY, Indiana, and Monroe County Plan Commission, Appellant-Plaintiffs, v. BOATHOUSE APARTMENTS, LLC, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

177 N.E.3d 1201

MONROE COUNTY, Indiana, and Monroe County Plan Commission, Appellant-Plaintiffs,

v.BOATHOUSE APARTMENTS, LLC, Appellee-Defendant.

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-PL-55

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED September 15, 2021

Publication Ordered October 21, 2021

Rehearing Denied November 23, 2021

Attorney for Appellants: David B. Schilling, Lee F. Baker, Monroe County Legal Department, Bloomington, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: William J. Beggs, Ryan M. Heeb, Bunger & Robertson, Bloomington, Indiana

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Monroe County and the Monroe County Plan Commission (collectively, the "County") appeal the Monroe Circuit Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Boathouse Apartments, LLC (the "Developer"), as well as the court's denial of the County's cross motion for summary judgment.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The undisputed facts show that the Developer owns three lots in the Lakes Neighborhood Planned Unit Development in Bloomington, Indiana (the "Property"). In 2016, after the County issued the Developer an improvement location permit, the Developer began constructing townhome apartments on the Property. The improvement location permit detailed that the townhomes "must be installed correctly before a Land Use certificate will be issued," that a "Land Use Certificate must be obtained from the Planning Department before a Certificate of Occupancy can be issued by the Building Department," and that "[b]oth must be issued before the property can be occupied." Appellant's App. Vol. III, pp. 44, 54.

[4] On August 3, 2016, after several months of construction, the County's building inspector inspected the townhomes to determine whether the construction complied with the use and occupancy requirements noted in the improvement location permit and set forth in County ordinances (the "Monroe County Code").¹ Upon completing this inspection, the building inspector provided inspection reports listing several construction deficiencies for the Developer to correct or complete. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 105–16. The County informed the Developer that it would not grant final inspection approval until the deficiencies were corrected, and the County reminded the Developer that "a final inspection approval [is] required prior to occupancy of the apartments." Appellant's App., Vol. III, p. 81.

[5] On August 6, just three days later, residential tenants began occupying several of the townhomes. The Developer had not yet obtained a final inspection approval, a land use certificate, or a certificate of occupancy. Id. at 53, 55, 68–70. The County did not learn that tenants occupied the townhomes until mid-September, when the County inspected the townhomes for a second time. Id. at 71. During that inspection on September 14 and 15, an employee from the County's planning department observed that curtains had been hung in several of the townhomes’ windows, that patio furniture had been placed in the yards, and that people entered and exited the townhomes. Id.

[6] On September 19, the planning department employee communicated her findings to the assistant planning director, who in turn apprised the county attorney. Upon receiving this information, the county attorney assured the planning department that he would "look into preparing an action against the developer." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 78.

[7] The next day, the County completed a third inspection; this time, for the specific purpose of identifying Monroe County Code violations. The County's building inspector noted that "a number of the apartments were being occupied." Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 81. Final inspection approval was not granted at that time because "several features required by the Monroe County Building Code still had not been installed or completed." Id. The building inspector issued updated inspection reports noting the still-uncompleted construction tasks and identifying more than one dozen occupied townhomes. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 111–16. The updated inspection reports also stated that "Planning Department approval was required." Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 81.

[8] By September 26, the townhomes still "did not satisfy the Zoning Ordinance requirements for the issuance of Land Use Certificates." Id. at 72. The planning department employee emailed the Developer a list of unresolved construction deficiencies, emphasizing again that the specified tasks "must be completed in order to receive a conditional Land Use Certificate," which "is required prior to the [certificate of occupancy] for the townhomes." Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 117–121, 124, 126.

[9] Communication between the Developer and the County continued for several weeks. Indeed, on September 30, the Developer met with members of the County's planning department to discuss the lingering construction deficiencies. Id. at 102. On November 22, the County sent the Developer an updated list of outstanding tasks and again reiterated that "[c]omplete installation of all improvements is required before a Land Use Certificate (LUC) can be issued." Id. at 121. The County also reemphasized that the issuance of a land use certificate "is required before the property will be considered compliant with Monroe County Zoning Ordinance." Id.

[10] Tenants continued occupying the townhomes while the County and the Developer continued to communicate. But the townhomes still had not been approved for occupancy. So, on February 2, 2017, the County filed a two-count complaint against the Developer. Id. at 125.

[11] The County's complaint sought a monetary penalty against the Developer and alleged that the Developer violated two parts of the Monroe County Code: the building provisions (the "Building Code") and the zoning provisions (the "Zoning Ordinance"). Appellant's App. Vol. III, p. 36. In its answer to the County's complaint, the Developer twice admitted that "some Units were occupied in August, 2016."² Id. at 53, 55.

[12] Several months later, the Developer moved for summary judgment. The County responded with a cross motion for summary judgment. Both parties designated evidentiary materials in support of their motions. The designated evidence included a written list—which the Developer had prepared and sent to the County—specifying townhomes that were occupied between August 6, 2016, and March 2, 2017. Id. at 68–70.

[13] The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ summary judgment motions and, on January 16, 2021, granted summary judgment to the Developer and denied the County's cross motion for summary judgment. Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 17–18. In its summary judgment order, the trial court described the County's claims as "not credible" and "not believable," and concluded that the County's behavior "belies any assertion that they thought they were behaving properly from the beginning of this case." Id.

[14] The County now appeals.

Standard of Review

[15] We review a summary judgment order using the same standard applied by the trial court. Alexander v. Linkmeyer Dev. II, LLC , 119 N.E.3d 603, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). When a challenge to summary judgment raises questions of law, we review them de novo.

City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd. v. Curry , 68 N.E.3d 581, 585 (Ind. 2017). We owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. HDNet LLC v. N. Am. Boxing Council , 972 N.E.2d 920, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[16] The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that the material facts—the facts affecting the outcome of the case—are undisputed. See Hughley v. State , 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). If this burden is met, the nonmoving party must come forward with contrary evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Converse v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., Inc. , 120 N.E.3d 621, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). If the nonmoving party fails to do so, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted. Id. As our supreme court has pointed out, however, summary judgment is a blunt instrument by which the non-prevailing party is prevented from having its day in court. Hughley , 15 N.E.3d at 1003. Accordingly, we err on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits to avoid the risk of short-circuiting meritorious claims. Id. at 1004.

[17] Here, the County responded to the Developer's motion for summary judgment with its own cross motion for summary judgment. Cross motions for summary judgment do not affect our standard of review. Alexander , at 612. We simply review each motion independently and construe the facts in favor of the nonmoving party in each instance. Id.

[18] We review each party's summary judgment claims in turn.

Developer's Motion for Summary Judgment

[19] As the party moving for summary judgment, the Developer attempted to satisfy its burden by asserting that, regardless of whether it violated the ordinances, the County improperly filed its complaint without first following prerequisite procedures required by the ordinances. Specifically, the Developer argues that "there is no genuine issue of material fact Monroe County filed suit without complying with the applicable ordinances," Appellee's Br. at 20, and that, as a matter of law, the County "exceeded its authority, rendering this action invalid and void," id. at 16. We do not agree.

[20] To determine whether the County exceeded the scope of its authority under the Building Code and Zoning Code, we turn first to the Home Rule Act, which implements our state's policy of granting municipalities "all the powers that they need for the effective operation of government as to local affairs." Ind. Code § 36-1-3-2 ; City of Charlestown v. Charlestown Pleasant Ridge Neighborhood Ass'n...