Monroe v. Brown
Decision Date | 09 March 2004 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 03-T-188-N. |
Citation | 307 F.Supp.2d 1268 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Parties | Thomas C. MONROE, Jr., as Executor of the Estate of Helen M. Monroe, and Individually, Plaintiff, v. Michael BROWN and Southern A.G. Carriers, Inc., Defendants. |
Richard A. Lawrence, Lynwood Scott Johnson, Jr., L. Scott Johnson, Jr., Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.
Randall C. Morgan, Doy Leale McCall, III, Hill Hill Carter Franco Cole & Black, Montgomery, AL, for defendants.
This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident in which a tractor-trailer, driven by defendant Michael Brown and owned by defendant Southern A.G. Carriers, Inc., rear-ended a pickup truck which was being driven by plaintiff Thomas C. Monroe, Jr. and in which his now-deceased wife Helen M. Monroe was a passenger. Mr. Monroe, in his capacity as executor of the estate of Mrs. Monroe and in his individual capacity, alleges that Brown and Southern wantonly and negligently caused the accident. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332(a) (diversity jurisdiction), 1441(a) (removal jurisdiction), and 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction). The case is now before the court on Brown and Southern's motion for summary judgment on Monroe's wantonness claim. For the reasons that follow, the court will deny Brown and Southern's motion.
On October 17, 2001, a tractor-trailer driven by Brown rear-ended the Monroes' pickup truck in Montgomery, Alabama. At the time of the accident, Mr. Monroe was driving the truck, and Mrs. Monroe was a passenger. The accident occurred at the intersection of Route 231 (also called the Troy Highway) and Bell Road. Prior to the accident, Brown was traveling north on Route 231 when Mr. Monroe merged on to Route 231 in front of him. After merging, Mr. Monroe accelerated to 45 miles-per-hour, and Brown followed behind him.
As he approached the traffic light at the intersection of Route 231 and Bell Road, Mr. Monroe stepped on the brake for a short time to signal to drivers behind him that he was stopping; this was his regular practice. Next, he took his foot off the brake, let the car roll, and then brought the car to a stop at the traffic light when he saw the traffic light turn red. The Monroes were stopped at the traffic light long enough for Mrs. Monroe to reach into the car's console to get a glass of water. It was then that Brown's tractor-trailer hit the Monroes' pickup truck from behind.
Brown testified that, as he approached the intersection, he took his foot off the accelerator in anticipation of stopping and saw the traffic light turn from green to yellow. One or two seconds after he saw the traffic light turn yellow, he saw the Monroes' brake lights come on for a few seconds and saw their truck slow down. Brown then applied his own brakes. Next, he saw the Monroes' brake lights go off, and he thought he saw the Monroes' pickup pulling away from him. At this point Brown accelerated because he thought that the Monroes had decided to drive through the intersection while the traffic signal was yellow, and he decided he would follow them through the intersection. However, Mr. Monroe then applied his brakes and came to a stop. Brown applied his brakes in an attempt to stop his truck, but he could not stop before he hit the back of the Monroes' pickup truck.
There is neither evidence that Brown was speeding at the time of the accident nor that alcohol or drugs played any part in the accident. There is evidence that Brown knew from his training that it takes a tractor-trailer 80 to 120 yards, on average, to come to a stop.
On January 10, 2003, the Monroes filed this lawsuit against Brown and Southern in an Alabama state court. They alleged that Brown and Southern negligently and wantonly caused Brown's vehicle to collide with theirs. Mrs. Monroe sought compensatory and punitive damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, mental anguish, permanent injuries and disabilities, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions; Mr. Monroe sought damages for loss of consortium.
Brown and Southern removed the case to this court on February 18, 2003, and the court denied the Monroes' subsequent motion to remand on April 7, 2003. Monroe v. Brown, 256 F.Supp.2d 1292 (M.D.Ala.2003) ( ).
On May 20, 2003, Mrs. Monroe died of causes unrelated to the accident, and Mr. Monroe subsequently filed an amended complaint, in which he named himself as sole plaintiff but in two capacities, as executor of Mrs. Monroe's estate and in his individual capacity. The amended complaint contains the same allegations as the original complaint and also contains a new allegation that Brown and Southern "negligently and/or wantonly" caused Mr. Monroe to suffer medical expenses, mental anguish, and property damage to his vehicle; in other words, Mr Monroe now seeks more than just loss-of-consortium damages.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Under Rule 56, the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir.1993) (discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The non-mo6ing party must affirmatively set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In doing so, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Brown and Southern move for summary judgment on only the wantonness claim. Specifically, they argue that Mr. Monroe may have sufficient evidence to go to trial on the negligence claim, but he does not have evidence sufficient to support the wantonness claim.
Lynn Strickland Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So.2d 142, 145 (Ala.1987), overruled on other grounds, Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So.2d 1250, 1256 (Ala.1998).
Negligence refers "only to that legal delinquency which results whenever a man fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit, whether it be slight, ordinary, or great." Lynn Strickland Sales, 510 So.2d at 146 (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.1979)). In other words, negligence "is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the doing of something that a reasonably prudent person would not have done under the same or similar circumstances." Ford Motor Co. v. Burdeshaw, 661 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1995). "Negligence is usually characterized as an inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a lack of due care." Lynn Strickland, 510 So.2d at 145.
Wantonness, on the other hand, is statutorily defined as "conduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others," 1975 Ala.Code § 6-11-20(b)(3), and has been defined by the Supreme Court of Alabama as "the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result." Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 723 So.2d at 1256. The distinction between negligence and wantonness thus lies in the state of mind of the defendant. Lynn Strickland, 510 So.2d at 145. However, "[t]o prove wantonness, it is not essential to prove that the defendant entertained a specific design or intent to injure the plaintiff." Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 723 So.2d at 1256.
To survive summary judgment, then, Mr. Monroe must establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether Brown (1) acted consciously when he attempted to drive through the intersection before the light changed from yellow to red, and (2) was conscious, based on existing conditions, that injury was a likely or probably result of his actions. In considering Brown and Southern's summary-judgment motion, the court is mindful of the Supreme Court of Alabama's admonition that "[w]antonness should be submitted to the jury unless there is a total lack of evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer wantonness." McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534 So.2d 228, 231 (Ala.1988).
There is evidence that Brown acted consciously when he attempted to drive through the intersection at Route 231 and Bell Road before the traffic light changed. Brown said as much in his deposition: he saw that the signal was yellow, he thought that Mr. Monroe had decided to drive through the intersection before the light turned red, and he decided to accelerate to follow Mr. Monroe through the intersection.
Brown's conscious decision to accelerate in order to get through the intersection before the light...
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