Monroe v. Burleson

• Decision Date: 09 April 1945
• Docket Number: No. 56.,56.
• Citation: 311 Mich. 76,18 N.W.2d 371
• Parties: MONROE v. BURLESON, Judge of Police Court.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

311 Mich. 76

18 N.W.2d 371

MONROE

v.BURLESON, Judge of Police Court.

No. 56.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 9, 1945.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Kent County; William B. Brown, judge.

Certiorari proceeding by Marceil Monroe against Edward G. Burleson, Judge of the Police Court of Grand Rapids, to review a judgment of the police court denying plaintiff the right to appeal from a conviction of assault and battery. From a judgment of the circuit court vacating the order of the police court refusing plaintiff the right to appeal, the prosecuting attorney took an appeal in the nature of mandamus for an order to set aside the judgment entered in the circuit court.

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

Before the Entire Bench.

Menso R. Bolt, Pros. Atty., and Adrian W. Verspoor, Asst. Pros. Atty., both of Grand Rapids, for defendant and appellant.

Fred P. Geib, of Grand Rapids, for plaintiff and appellee.

NORTH, Justice.

Complaint was made in the police court of Grand Rapids charging Mrs. Marceil Monroe, plaintiff herein, with having committed assault and battery upon one Mary E. Miller. A warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused; and she thereafter appeared before the judge of the police court of Grand Rapids, and upon being informed as to the charge made against her pleaded guilty thereto. Thereupon Mrs. Monroe was sentenced to serve 45 days in the Kent county jail. Prior to the passing of the sentence the accused had not been represented by counsel. But on the same day sentence was passed (June 6, 1944) she obtained counsel who forthwith made an oral application that Mrs. Monroe be allowed to withdraw her plea of guilty, that the sentence imposed be set aside, and that the case be set for trial. This oral motion was denied. The next day a formal written motion was filed whereby the same relief was sought. Upon the expiration of the four days' notice of hearing given to the prosecuting attorney this motion was heard and denied. Thereupon counsel for the accused applied to the circuit court of Kent county for a writ of certiorari which was granted and Mrs. Monroe, who theretofore had been denied bail by the judge of the police court, was released on her own recognizance. The return of the judge of the police court in the certiorari matter contains the following:

‘That thereafter, and on the 12th day of June 1944, * * * the said respondent for the first time did (orally) make a claim of appeal from the original sentence of the Court ‘* * *. That thereafter, and on the 16th day of June, 1944, the said respondent did file in said Court and Cause written papers entitled ‘Claim of right to appeal’.'

The meritorious question here presented is whether Marceil Monroe had, under the circumstances of this case, a right to appeal from her conviction in the police court to the circuit court of Kent county. For reasons hereinafter noted, the judge of the police court denied such right of appeal.Upon hearing the certiorari proceedings the circuit judge held:

‘An order may be prepared vacating and holding for naught the order of the Court below refusing petitioner-appellant Marceil Monroe the right to appeal and said order may further provide that the return of the records and files in the case of People of State of Michigan vs. Marceil Monroe returned under the writ of certiorari herein may stand and be treated in this court as a return upon an appeal seasonably made and allowed in the court below, and that proceedings may be had in the Circuit Court * * * in the same manner as though an appeal had been properly and seasonably allowed and perfected as provided by the Criminal Code (Code of Criminal Procedure) of the State of Michigan.’

From the judgment entered in the circuit court in accordance with the foregoing finding, the prosecuting attorney has taken this appeal in the nature of mandamus praying that the circuit judge be ordered to set aside the judgment entered in the circuit court, and that the case be remanded to the police court of Grand Rapids for execution of sentence.

One of the grounds of this appeal is appellant's claim that after having pleaded guilty in the police court of Grand Rapids Mrs. Monroe had no right of appeal, this by reason of two statutory provisions hereinafter noted. One of these provided that a defendant who pleaded guilty to an offense in the police court should not have a right of appeal, and the other provided that in all criminal cases an appeal from the police court, if taken at all, must be taken and perfected within twenty-four hours after sentence was pronounced. Appellee asserts that these provisions are not applicable to or controlling of the instant case.

The present Grand Rapids police court was created by Act No. 76, Pub.Acts 1879, and now functions under that act as amended. The act is entitled: ‘An Act to establish and organize a municipal court in the city of Grand Rapids to be known and called ‘The police court of Grand Rapids,’ * * *.' It is to be noted that Act No. 76, Pub.Acts 1879, was enacted prior to the adoption of the Michigan 1908 Constitution which by Art. 5, § 30, restricts the power of the legislature to pass socalled local acts. The validity of Act No. 76, Pub.Acts 1879, as amended prior to 1908 is not questioned on the ground of being violative of Art. 5, § 30, of the 1908 Michigan Constitution. At the time the 1908 Michigan Constitution became effective, the Grand Rapids police court act in section 7 provided:

‘The practice in said court may be the same as practice in courts of justices of the peace in criminal cases, and the laws of this State relative to such practice, and the procedure before justices of the peace in criminal cases shall, except where herein otherwise provided, extend to said police court, so far as is consistent with the practice of said court.’ See 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 16405; Stat.Ann. § 27.3717.

Prior to the adoption of the 1908 Constitution there was no provision in the statutes that one who pleaded guilty in the Grand Rapids police court should have no right of appeal; nor has there ever been any direct amendment to the Grand Rapids police court act by which such a provision was attempted to be embodied therein.

However, the legislature of 1913 passed an act entitled: ‘An Act to fix the term of office and the compensation of the judge, clerk and bailiff, and to limit the time for appeal of police courts in cities of this State of a population of not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants nor more than two hundred thousand inhabitants, and to repeal all other acts or parts of inconsistent with this act.’ See Act 353, Pub.Acts 1913. This act was amended by Act No. 132, Pub.Acts 1927; and it is in section 6 of this amendatory act that the legislature embodied the provision: ‘That no appeal may be taken by any defendant who shall have been convicted upon a plea of guilty in said police court.’

It should be noted that at the time Act No. 353, Pub.Acts 1913, and the amendment thereto of 1927 were passed the population of Grand Rapids was between 100,000 and 200,000; and therefore Grand Rapids came within the population limitations of these acts. It is by reason of this circumlocution in legislation that appellant now claims Mrs. Monroe after she entered her plea of guilty had no right of appeal. Appellee challenges the soundness of this contention on the ground that at least as to the quoted provision in the 1927 amendment the legislation is unconstitutional as being a local act not approved by the electors and pertaining to a subject matter to which a general act would be applicable.

This squarely presents the question of the constitutionality of the provision in § 6 of Act No. 132, Pub.Acts 1927, that one who enters a plea of guilty in a police court shall not have a right of appeal, provided such police court is located in a city having a population of not less than 100,000 nor more than 200,000. As noted above the pertinent constitutional provision is...