Monroe v. Cnty. of Orange
| Decision Date | 27 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-CV-1957 (KMK) |
| Parties | JOHN A. MONROE, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, and ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Appearances:
Jimmy M. Santos, Esq.
Law Offices of Jimmy M. Santos, PLLC
Cornwall, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff
Kellie E. Lagitch, Esq.
Office of the Orange County Attorney
Goshen, NY
Counsel for Defendants
Plaintiff John Monroe ("Plaintiff"), a former correction officer employed by the Orange County Sheriff's Office (the "OCSO"), brings this action against the OCSO and the County of Orange (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting claims for unlawful termination and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and retaliatory discharge in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA").1 Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons to follow, Defendants' Motion is denied in part and granted in part.
The following facts are taken from the Parties' statements of material facts and the documents contained in the record.
Sometime as early as the year 2000, Plaintiff's now-wife, Josephine Monroe, noticed that Plaintiff appeared to suffer from symptoms that resembled a panic or anxiety attack, such as having sweaty palms, general discomfort, a rapid heartbeat, and unsteady breathing. (Aff. of Josephine Monroe ("Josephine Monroe Aff.") ¶¶ 2-3 (Dkt. No. 40).) To the best of her knowledge, around 2004, Plaintiff was then diagnosed as having panic disorder with agoraphobia. (Id. ¶ 4.) Between these events, Plaintiff began working as a correction officer with the OCSO's corrections division, sometime around November 1, 2001. (Defs.' Rule 56.1(a) Statement ( ) ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 33); Pl.'s Counter-Statement of Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 ("Pl.'s 56.1") ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 42).) In connection with that position, Plaintiff went through two appointments on provisional status followed by a probationary period, and then achieved permanent status as a correction officer on August 23, 2004. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 1-3, Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 1-3.)
Beginning in 2011, Plaintiff's attendance began to lag: That year, he was absent from work due to an unspecified illness at least 32 times. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 6.) Similarly, Plaintiff was absent for a considerable portion of the first half of the next calendar year, usingsick time, vacation time, "chart time," and personal time to miss work from March 28, 2012 through June 29, 2012. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 9.)2 During that period of time, Plaintiff would call the OCSO to let them know he would be out on a particular day, (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 11; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 11); however, the Parties dispute whether Plaintiff also advised the OCSO that he intended to be absent for three months: According to Defendants, he did not, (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 10 (citing Decl. of Kellie E. Lagitch ("Lagitch Decl.") Ex. J ("Pl.'s Dep. Tr.") 56-57 (Dkt. No. 29))), but, according to Plaintiff, sometime between March and June 2012, Plaintiff discussed with Colonel Dominick Orsino ("Colonel Orsino") that it would be a good idea for Plaintiff to take an extended leave of absence due to his panic disorder, (see Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 10 (citing Pl.'s Dep. Tr. 86-88; Aff. of John Monroe ("Pl.'s Aff.") ¶ 15 (Dkt. No. 39); Josephine Monroe Aff. ¶ 6); see also Pl.'s Rule 56.1(b) Statement of Additional Facts Which Pl. Contends Shows There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact ("Pl.'s Counter 56.1") ¶ 70 (Dkt. No. 42)).3 Around that same time, on May 23, 2012, Plaintiff also began treatment with Dr. Linden Schild ("Dr. Schild") for his anxiety/panic disorder and ADHD, (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 12), switching to her from his previous psychiatrist, Dr. Shreyas Baxi, because his symptoms had worsened. (Pl.'s Counter56.1 ¶ 69 (citing, inter alia, Pl.'s Aff. ¶¶ 12-16)).4 According to Plaintiff, Dr. Schild had him begin a new medication regimen and set of breathing techniques, after which Plaintiff's panic disorder symptoms improved. (Id. ¶ 72 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶¶ 16-18).)
Despite Plaintiff's ongoing treatment, the OCSO did not receive any record indicating that Plaintiff was seeing a psychiatrist until receiving a letter dated June 13, 2012 from Dr. Schild, (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 12-14; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 12-14)), in which he noted that Plaintiff "presented for follow up on 6/12/12, and . . . reported significant improvement," and recommended that Plaintiff return to work full duty on June 19, 2012, (see Lagitch Decl. Ex. L ("Dr. Schild's June 13, 2012 Letter")).5 Rather than resuming work on June 19, 2012, Plaintiff took an additional five vacation days and four more personal days, ultimately returning to work at the OCSO on June 30, 2012. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 15.) Shortly before doing so, according to Plaintiff, Colonel Orsino agreed to allow Plaintiff to work at housing unit posts with fewer inmates and no minors. (See Pl.'s Counter 56.1 ¶ 71 ().) Indeed, Plaintiff was assigned to units with fewer inmates, (see DiMarco Dep. Tr. 24-25), and, between July 1, 2012 and August 14, 2012, Plaintiff did not have a panic attack, (see Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 18)). Despite this putative temporary accommodation, Plaintiff asserts that he never requested being reassigned to a different permanent position, (see Pl.'s Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 78, 81-82 (citing, inter alia, Pl.'s Aff. ¶¶ 25-27)), and Defendants' employees neither asked Plaintiff what accommodations he wasrequesting or could benefit from, (id. ¶ 79 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 23); see also id. ¶ 81 (), nor asked his doctors for any information, (id. ¶ 80 (citing Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 24)).
On August 14, 2012 at 3:15 p.m., Sergeant Keith Kiszka ("Sergeant Kiszka") directed Plaintiff to report to Bravo-2, a housing unit with up to 56 inmates, in order to relieve the day shift and avoid any overtime. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 17; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was also directed to start the logbook and, consistent with established policy, perform an inmate headcount at shift change. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 17-18.) Upon being told to report to Bravo-2, Plaintiff began to hyperventilate and breathe heavily, and he was ultimately relieved of his post in Bravo-2 just 10 minutes later at 3:25, whereupon he returned to the Command-2 Office to meet with Sergeant Kiszka and Lieutenant Domenic DiMarco ("Lieutenant DiMarco"). (See Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 19-20; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 19-20.) There, Plaintiff told Sergeant Kiszka and Lieutenant DiMarco that he "had a panic attack when he heard he was going to Bravo-2," and, indeed, was still in the throes of an anxiety attack upon his return to the Command-2 Office. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 20; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 20.) Accordingly, Lieutenant DiMarco directed Plaintiff to report to medical to have his blood pressure checked, and, once Plaintiff returned, Sergeant Kiszka and Lieutenant DiMarco told Plaintiff—who was still experiencing the symptoms of a panic attack—to see his own physician and to "return to work with a note clearing [Plaintiff] for his own safety." (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 20-21; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 20-21.)
That evening, Plaintiff drove to see Dr. Schild at 6:30 p.m. for the first time since their June 12, 2012 appointment, and said that he was ready to return to work, "but not the largest dorms, and not working with minors." (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 23-24, 26; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 23-24, 26.)Plaintiff left their session with a note indicating that he was ready to return to work as the "symptoms" of his panic attack "had resolved," although Plaintiff continued experiencing symptoms of the panic attack that evening until 9:00 pm or 10:00 pm, after leaving Dr. Schild's office. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 25-27; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 25-27; Lagitch Decl. Ex. Q ("Dr. Schild's Aug. 14, 2012 Letter").) Before driving home, Plaintiff returned to the correctional facility to give Sergeant Kiszka the note, which also indicated that "the risk of future, similar episodes [could] be reduced if [Plaintiff] [was] assigned dorms of [fewer] than 30 inmates, and which [would] not contain minors." (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 27; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 27; Dr. Schild's Aug. 14, 2012 Letter.)
When Plaintiff arrived to work the next day, August 15, 2012, he was told that Captain Mele wanted to see him. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 28; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 28.) During that meeting, Plaintiff, as he had done before, relayed his concerns that he would become anxious the night before he had to return to work because "anything could happen," including "inmate fights, stabbings, attempted suicides," and inmate threats. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 29; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 29.)6 In the course of that conversation, according to Plaintiff, Captain Mele throughout told him that Dr. Schild's August 14, 2012 letter "'[wasn't] going to fly,'" posited that "this was [not] the job for [Plaintiff]," and discussed with Plaintiff that he should go back to working at a car dealership, but said that there was "no more talking to [Plaintiff's] wife" about whether he would leave his job. (See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. 121-25.) Similarly, Captain Mele testified that he told Plaintiff that Colonel Orsino indicated that Plaintiff had to work "full active duty . . . with no restrictions." (See Santos Decl. Ex. 4("Mele Dep. Tr."), at 58.)7 According to Plaintiff, Captain Mele said that Plaintiff could return in six months, gave him a piece of paper, and instructed him to write a letter of resignation, (see Pl.'s Dep. Tr. 125; see also Santos Decl. Ex. 15 ("First Resignation Letter")), before coming back and telling him to add the phrase "for personal reasons," (see Pl.'s Dep. Tr. 126; see also Santos Decl. Ex. 16 ("Second Resignation Letter"), although, according to...
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