Monroe v. Cooper

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: RUGG
• Citation: Monroe v. Cooper, 235 Mass. 33, 126 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1920)
• Decision Date: 26 February 1920
• Parties: MONROE v. COOPER.

235 Mass. 33

126 N.E. 286

MONROE

v.COOPER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 26, 1920.

Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Petition by William I. Monroe, executor, for probate of the will of Elizabeth T. Marshall. From decree approving and allowing the will, Frederick F. Read, testatrix's creditor, appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court, Emma S. Read, his executrix, being substituted as appellant on his death, and Helen S. Cooper for her as administratrix on her death. From judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court dismissing the appeal, the deceased creditor's representative appeals. Affirmed.

Frank Hendrick, of New York City (Ballard & Little, of Boston, of counsel), for appellant Cooper.

Hugh D. McLellan, of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

The single question presented on this record is whether one having no other interest than that of creditor has a right to appeal from a decree of the probate court allowing the last will and testament of his deceased debtor. The decision must turn on the point whether such creditor is ‘a person aggrieved’ by such a decree. Only persons so aggrieved are given the right to appeal under R. L. c. 162, § 9.

Numerous cases have arisen calling for the definition of the words ‘person aggrieved’ as used in this statute in their application to various states of facts. It is not necessary to review these decisions. It is enough to say that, in order for one to be aggrieved in this sense, it must appear that he has some pecuniary interest, some personal right, or some public or official duty resting upon him, affected by the decree. Smith v. Bradstreet, 16 Pick. 264;Lawless v. Reagan, 128 Mass. 592, 593;Leyland v. Leyland, 186 Mass. 420, 71 N. E. 794;Ensign v. Faxon, 224 Mass. 145, 112 N. E. 948;Hayden v. Keown, 232 Mass. 259, 122 N. E. 264;Kline v. Shapley, 232 Mass. 500, 122 N. E. 641;Crowell v. Davis, 233 Mass. 136, 123 N. E. 611.

Whether his debtor dies testate or intestate is a matter of no substantial interest to any creditor. The property of a decedent must be applied to the payment of his debts before either next of kin or heirs at law in the case of intestacy, or the legatees or devisees of a testator, can share in his estate. A will cannot give to either devisee or legatee rights superior to a creditor. It follows that a creditor is not aggrieved in any legal signification by the allowance of the will of his debtor. See Putney v. Fletcher, 140 Mass. 596, 5 N. E. 640,Nesbit v. Cande, 206 Mass. 437, 92 N. E. 766, and Swan v. Tapley, 216 Mass. 61, 102 N. E. 916, for somewhat analogous cases.

It is not necessary to determine whether...