Monroe v. First Natl. Life Ins. Co.

Decision Date02 May 1932
Docket Number14,059
Citation19 La.App. 700,141 So. 471
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
PartiesMONROE v. FIRST NATL. LIFE INS. CO

Appeal from the First City Court of New Orleans, Section "B". Hon. Val J. Stentz, Judge.

Action by Clem Monroe against the First National Life Insurance Company.

There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

Judgment reversed and rendered.

Judgment reversed and rendered.

A. H Reed and Henry J. Wyman, of New Orleans, attorneys for plaintiff, appellee.

Normann McMahon & Breckwoldt, of New Orleans, attorneys for defendant, appellant.

HIGGINS J.

OPINION

HIGGINS, J.

Clem Monroe claims the sum of $ 84 for twelve weeks' disability under an insurance policy issued in his favor by the defendant and, also, a penalty for a like amount and $ 50 additional for attorney's fees under Act No. 310 of 1910, alleging that the disability was the result of an accident on April 14, 1931.

The defense is that the disability resulted from the intentional act of one James Edwards in wounding plaintiff with a pistol by shooting him in the thigh, which risk is specially excepted from coverage by clause 9 of the conditions of the policy sued upon reading, in part, as follows:

"Disability or death benefits will not be paid * * * at any time for disability or death resulting from * * * an intentional act of any person other than the insured. * * *"

There was judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $ 84 and rejecting his demand for the penalty and attorney's fees. Defendant has appealed.

It is admitted that plaintiff received his injuries as a result of being shot by James Edwards, who was caught by the plaintiff in the act of stealing phonograph records belonging either to the plaintiff or his employer. It is also conceded that the period of disability for which claim of indemnity is made was twelve weeks.

The plaintiff contends, first, that Edwards shot him unintentionally while trying to shoot one Arthur Baptiste, and, secondly, that at the time of the trouble Edwards was so drunk as to be incapable of forming any rational intent.

It appears to be well settled that the intentional injury clauses usually inserted in health and accident policies are reasonable and, hence, are binding upon the parties to the contract. Couch on Insurance, sec. 1240; Vance on Insurance (2d Ed.) 896; Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 6, 5364.

The law is clear that, when a person is injured by another, who has the intention to injure a third party and not the person injured, the intentional injury clause cannot be successfully interposed as a defense against the injured party claiming the insurance benefit. Couch on Insurance, sec. 1240; Vance on Insurance (2d. Ed.) 897; Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 6, 5370; Mah See v. North American Acc. Ins. Co., 190 Cal. 421, 213 P. 42, 26 A. L. R. 123; General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 P. 1085, 8 A. L. R. 318; National Life Ins. Co. v. Coughlin, 72 Colo. 440, 212 P. 486; Cooper v. National Life Ins. Co., 212 Mo.App. 266, 253 S.W. 465; Newsome v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Ga. 785, 85 S.E. 1035.

Defendant concedes that the overwhelming weight of authority is that the intentional injury clause of an accident policy cannot be invoked where the person causing the injury is so insane or drunk as to be incapable of forming any rational intent. Couch on Insurance, sec. 1240; Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) vol. 6, 5372; Berger v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. (C. C.) 88 F. 241; Corley v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 46 C.C.A. 278, 105 F. 854; Marceau v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 101 Cal. 338, 35 P. 856, 36 P. 813; Markland v. Clover Leaf Casualty Co. (Mo. App.) 209 S.W. 602; Zimmerman v. Southern Surety Co. (Mo. App.) 241 S.W. 95; Northwestern Society v. Dudley, 27 Ind.App. 327, 61 N.E. 207; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Houston, 3 Wilson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) sec. 429, page 508.

The first question is: Did Edwards intentionally shoot the plaintiff, or unintentionally or accidentally shoot him?

The plaintiff testified that he was employed in a soft drink establishment, and that James Edwards came into the place about 2 o'clock in the morning, accompanied by some women, and that all the parties were very drunk; that they danced for awhile and then one of the women told him that Edwards was stealing the phonograph records; that he asked Edwards to surrender the records and threatened to call the police if he did not do so; that Edwards drew a knife but plaintiff took it away from him; that Edwards then went into the front room, where Arthur Baptiste was, and said to him "I am going to kill all three of you ---"; that Edwards shot at Baptiste and the bullet came through a curtain into the next room, where plaintiff was, and entered his thigh, breaking the bone, and that they then took the gun away from Edwards and caused him to be arrested. On cross-examination counsel for the...

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2 cases
  • California-Western States Life Ins. v. Sanford, Civ. A. No. 80-3673.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • May 29, 1981
    ...from taking under the policy. Restatement, supra, Comment d; Couch, supra, § 27:155 at 704. See Monroe v. First National Life Insurance Co., 19 La.App. 700, 141 So. 471 (1932) (acknowledging that homicidal but insane beneficiaries may recover proceeds under a policy provision similar to the......
  • Davis v. Unity Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • November 28, 1949
    ...and, hence, no recovery can be had for injuries or death so inflicted. 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 772, p. 800; Monroe v. First National Life Ins. Co., 19 La.App. 700, 141 So. 471. Plaintiff's counsel argues that the clause can avail the insurer nothing. His position is that the policy is misle......

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