Monroe v. Freight All Kinds, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-03238-SRB |
| Parties | PETER MONROE, Plaintiff, v. FREIGHT ALL KINDS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendant American Productions d/b/a Janco Limited's ("Janco") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. #158.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
For the purpose of resolving the pending motion, the following facts are uncontroverted or deemed uncontroverted by the Court.1 Additional facts relevant to the parties' arguments are set forth in Section III. Defendant Herkon Productions, LLC ("Herkon") produces a traveling show known as Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer: The Musical (the "Musical"). Herkon requires trucking services in order to move stage equipment and sets from city to city.
Janco is a professional trucking company and interstate motor carrier that specializes in transporting equipment and sets for theatrical and musical tours. Janco provided—and Herkon accepted—a quote for picking up, transporting, and delivering stage equipment and sets for the Musical's 2017 tour. In order to transport all of the equipment, Janco needed two separate drivers to operate two separate tractor-trailers.
For the first tractor-trailer, Janco supplied its own driver, tractor, and trailer. For the second tractor-trailer, Janco supplied the trailer but needed to find a driver and tractor. Janco and Defendant FAK Logistics, Inc. ("FAK") entered into a broker agreement in which FAK agreed to supply the second tractor and driver. (Doc. #172-8.) FAK obtained the second tractor, and the second driver, Defendant Michael Johnson ("Johnson"), by contracting with Defendant Trans Pacific Transportation, Inc. ("Trans Pacific").2 Although Trans Pacific directly paid Johnson, his compensation was based on a percentage of what FAK paid to Trans Pacific.
The first tractor-trailer for the tour was operated by Janco employee Lee Radford ("Radford"). Radford was the designated "lead driver." Johnson operated the second tractor-trailer. During the time relevant to this lawsuit, Johnson testified that he did not use GPS to get to his destination. Instead, he "just followed" Radford. (Doc. #173-6, p. 17.) On December 2, 2017, Radford and Johnson made their way through Springfield, Missouri, to deliver equipment for the Musical.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff Peter Monroe ("Monroe") was on a bicycle at an intersection. As Johnson made a right-hand turn from Walnut Street onto Hammons Parkway, his back wheels struck Monroe and drug him several yards. Monroe allegedly suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident.
On August 3, 2018, Monroe filed this lawsuit against Defendants. Monroe's Third Amended Complaint asserts the following claims against Janco: negligence (Count XIV), negligent hiring/retention (Count XV), negligent training (Count XVI), negligent supervision(Count XVII), negligent entrustment (Count XVIII), and negligence per se (Count XIX).3 Monroe alleges, in part, that Janco is vicariously liable for Johnson's acts and omissions under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Janco now moves for summary judgment on each count. Janco argues that the facts of this case do not support vicarious liability, and that there is no evidence that it owed or breached a duty to Monroe. Monroe opposes the motion, and the parties' arguments are addressed below.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of identifying "the basis for its motion, and must identify those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quotations and alterations omitted). Once the moving party makes this showing, "the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quotations omitted). If there is a genuine dispute as to the facts, those facts must "be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. (quotations omitted).
First, Janco argues that it (Doc. #166, p. 8.) Janco relies on several facts in support of this argument, including that: its broker agreement with FAK states that FAK has control over drivers, Johnson drove under the authority of FAK, Johnson was paid by Trans Pacific, and Trans Pacific owned the tractor involved in the accident. Monroe points to other facts in the record which he contends support a finding of vicarious liability against Janco. Monroe further contends that vicarious liability is supported because Janco and Johnson had an agency relationship. As explained below, the Court agrees with Monroe.
Under Missouri law, an employer or principal "is liable under the theory of respondeat superior for damages attributable to the misconduct of an employee or agent acting within the course and scope of the employment or agency." McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. banc 1995). "In order to establish a principal/agent relationship, the principal must have a 'right to control' the agent." Blunkall v. Heavy & Specialized Haulers, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 534, 541 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). A "principal does not need to control or direct every movement, rather only those necessary to accomplish the final result." Id. Additionally, a written agency contract is not required; an "agency relationship may be created by words and conduct." Id. "An agency relationship may . . . exist even if the parties did not intend the relationship." Id.
In contrast, respondeat superior does not attach if an individual is merely an independent contractor. "An independent contractor is one who contracts with another to do something for him but is neither controlled by the other nor subject to the other's control with respect to hisphysical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Scott v. SSM Healthcare St. Louis, 70 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002) (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). "If there is no right to control, there is no liability; those rendering services but retaining control over their own movements are not servants." Lee v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 81 S.W.3d 625, 631 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).4
"Whether a party is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior depends on the facts and circumstances in evidence in each particular case and no single test is conclusive of the issue of the party's interest in the activity and the right to control." Id. In general, "the relationship of principal-agent or employer-employee is a question of fact to be determined by the jury when, from the evidence adduced on the question, there may be a fair difference of opinion as to the existence of the relationship." Johnson v. Bi-State Develop. Agency, 793 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Mo. banc 1990).
Upon review of the record, the Court finds disputed material facts on the issue of vicarious liability. Viewed in a light most favorable to Monroe, the record supports a findingthat Janco controlled Johnson's movements. Janco employee Lee Radford was the "lead driver" for the delivery of Herkon's equipment. Johnson was supposed to, and in fact did, follow Radford as the two traveled through Springfield. Moreover, Janco's corporate representative testified that it was in Janco's best interests for Johnson to timely arrive in each city. Janco's corporate representative further testified that Janco had the authority to replace Johnson if he failed to carry out his job duties. Janco owned the trailer being hauled by Johnson. Finally, the trailer contained equipment owned by Herkon, which was Janco's client. (See Doc. #166-2, pp. 72-73.) Taken together, the evidence presented by Monroe could support a finding of vicarious liability.
To be sure, Janco offers evidence that could support a contrary finding. However, summary judgment is not warranted when more than "one reasonable conclusion can be drawn" regarding vicarious liability. Huggins v. FedEx Ground Pack. Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying Missouri law); see also Johnson, 793 S.W.2d at 867-68. Therefore, the Court denies Janco's request for summary judgment on this issue.
Janco argues that summary judgment is warranted on Monroe's claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment. These arguments are addressed below.
Janco argues that it did not owe or breach any duties to Monroe. According to Janco, "[t]he duties owed to the general public by those engaged in motor carrier interstate commerce has been prescribed by the legislative branch and is promulgated through the" Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ("FMCSR"). (Doc. #166, p. 11 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 504, 508, 31131, 31132-34, 31136-37, 31144, 31149, 31151, 31502; 49 C.F.R. Parts 300-399).) Janco contendsthat Monroe has not produced any evidence that it violated the FMCSRs, that it was not responsible for the hiring, training, supervising, or entrusting of Johnson, and that there is no evidence that any alleged breach caused the accident. For the reasons discussed below, the Court...
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