Monroe v. Freight All Kinds Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-03238-SRB |
| Parties | PETER MONROE, Plaintiff, v. FREIGHT ALL KINDS INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendant FAK Logistics, Inc.'s ("FAK") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. #161.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
For the purpose of resolving the pending motion, the following facts are uncontroverted or deemed uncontroverted by the Court.1 Additional facts relevant to the parties' arguments are set forth in Section III. Defendant Herkon Productions, LLC ("Herkon") produces a traveling show known as Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer: The Musical (the "Musical"). Herkon requires trucking services in order to move stage equipment and sets from city to city.
Defendant American Productions d/b/a Janco Limited ("Janco") is a professional trucking company and interstate motor carrier that specializes in transporting equipment and sets for theatrical and musical tours. Janco provided—and Herkon accepted—a quote for picking up, transporting, and delivering stage equipment and sets for the Musical's 2017 tour. In order totransport all of the equipment, Janco needed two separate drivers to operate two separate tractor-trailers.
For the first tractor-trailer, Janco supplied its own driver, tractor, and trailer. For the second tractor-trailer, Janco supplied the trailer but needed to find a driver and tractor. Janco and FAK entered into a broker agreement in which FAK agreed to supply the second tractor and driver. (Doc. #172-8.) FAK obtained the second tractor, and the second driver, Defendant Michael Johnson ("Johnson"), by contracting with Defendant Trans Pacific Transportation, Inc. ("Trans Pacific").2 Although Trans Pacific directly paid Johnson, his compensation was based on a percentage of what FAK paid to Trans Pacific.
The first tractor-trailer for the tour was operated by Janco employee Lee Radford ("Radford"). Radford was the designated "lead driver." Johnson operated the second tractor-trailer. During the times relevant to this lawsuit, Johnson testified that he did not use GPS to get to his destinations. Instead, he "just followed" Radford. (Doc. #173-6, p. 17.) On December 2, 2017, Radford and Johnson made their way through Springfield, Missouri, to deliver equipment for the Musical.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff Peter Monroe ("Monroe") was on a bicycle at an intersection. As Johnson made a right-hand turn from Walnut Street onto Hammons Parkway, his back wheels struck Monroe and drug him several yards. Monroe allegedly suffered severe injuries as a result of the accident.
On August 3, 2018, Monroe filed this suit against Defendants. Monroe's Third Amended Complaint asserts the following claims against FAK: negligence (Count II), negligenthiring/retention (Count III), negligent training (Count IV), negligent supervision (Count V), negligent entrustment (Count VI), and negligence per se (Count VII).3 Among other relief, each count requests an award of punitive damages.
FAK now moves for partial summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. FAK admits that it is vicariously liable for Johnson's acts and omissions if he was negligent. Based on that admission, FAK argues that Monroe is precluded from proceeding against FAK on any other claim. FAK alternatively argues that Monroe's negligence claims depend upon violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ("FMCSR") but that Monroe lacks evidence of any such violations. Monroe opposes the motion, and the parties' arguments are addressed below.
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of identifying "the basis for its motion, and must identify those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quotations and alterations omitted). Once the moving party makes this showing, "the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quotations omitted). If there is agenuine dispute as to the facts, those facts must "be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. (quotations omitted).
FAK's first argument is that because it has admitted vicarious liability, summary judgment is warranted on Counts II-VI. FAK relies upon McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. banc 1995), which held that "once an employer has admitted respondeat superior liability for a driver's negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against an employer on any other theory of imputed liability." Id. at 826. McHaffie explained that "[i]f all of the theories for attaching liability to one person for the negligence of another were recognized and all pleaded in one case where the imputation of negligence is admitted, the evidence laboriously submitted to establish other theories serves no real purpose." Id.
However, in dicta, McHaffie recognized that Id.
Missouri courts have subsequently held that there is a punitive damages exception to McHaffie's general rule. Bell v. Redjal, 569 S.W.3d 70, 81-82 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019); Wilson v.Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013).4 In Wilson, the court explained that:
The rationale for the Court's holding in McHaffie was that, where vicarious liability was admitted and none of the direct liability theories could prevail in the absence of proof of the employee's negligence, the employer's liability was necessarily fixed by the negligence of the employee. Thus, any additional evidence supporting direct liability claims could serve only to waste time and possibly prejudice the defendants. The same cannot be said, however, when a claim for punitive damages based upon the direct liability theories is raised. If an employer's hiring, training, supervision, or entrustment practices can be characterized as demonstrating complete indifference or a conscious disregard for the safety of others, then the plaintiff would be required to present additional evidence, above and beyond demonstrating the employee's negligence, to support a claim for punitive damages. Unlike in the McHaffie scenario, this evidence would have a relevant, non-prejudicial purpose. And because the primary concern in McHaffie was the introduction of extraneous, potentially prejudicial evidence, we believe that the rule announced in McHaffie does not apply where punitive damages are claimed against the employer, thus making the additional evidence both relevant and material.
Wilson, 400 S.W.3d at 393 (citations omitted).
The facts of this case fit within the framework set forth in Wilson. Monroe asserts direct claims against FAK for negligence, negligent hiring/training/supervision/entrustment.5 These claims allege that FAK committed negligent acts apart from those committed by Johnson. Monroe also seeks punitive damages against FAK on each claim.
In its suggestions in support, FAK failed to move for summary judgment on Monroe's request for punitive damages. FAK's reply brief argues that Monroe "has not presented anyevidence of acts or conduct by FAK that rises to the level of punitive damages." (Doc. #182, p. 4.) The Court need not consider this argument because it was raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Substation K, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., Case No. 4:19-cv-00031-SRB, 2020 WL 3039127, at *2 n.2 (W.D. Mo. June 5, 2020). Nonetheless, on the current record the Court finds that Monroe's request for punitive damages survives summary judgment. Therefore, the Court rejects FAK's argument that McHaffie precludes Monroe's direct claims against FAK. See also Kyles, 2015 WL 6143953, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 19, 2015) ().
FAK argues that summary judgment is warranted on Monroe's claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment. These arguments are addressed below.
FAK argues that even if McHaffie does not apply, "the undisputed facts demonstrate there is no breach of any legally recognized duty causally related to the incident." (Doc. #162, p. 7.) In support, FAK claims that "[a] motor carrier's duty to the general public has been prescribed by the legislative branch and is promulgated through the FMCSR." (Doc. #162, p. 10 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 504, 508, 31131, 31132-34, 31136-37, 31144, 31149, 31151, 31502; 49 C.F.R. Parts 300-399).) FAK argues that summary judgment is warranted because Monroe relies solely on duties under the FMCSR, but has not produced any evidence that FAK breached such duties. Monroe responds that his negligence claims arise under state, not federal law, and can be based on violations of the FMCSR, industry standards,...
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