Monroe v. Horwitch
Decision Date | 26 June 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 13831,13831 |
Citation | 576 A.2d 1280,215 Conn. 469 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Nadine O. MONROE v. Daniel B. HORWITCH. |
Nadine O. Monroe, pro se.
Gregory A. Benoit, Waterford, for appellee (defendant).
Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.
The plaintiff, Nadine O. Monroe, commenced this action in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New London by filing a "Complaint/Presentment" against the defendant, Daniel B. Horwitch, who is the statewide bar counsel. 1 In the presentment portion of the plaintiff's action, she sought to present the defendant to the court for discipline. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had denied grievance complainants "due process and equal protection of the law" by failing to enforce time limits for the processing of grievance complaints. In addition, she alleged that the defendant had unconstitutionally exercised "judicial powers of a judge" by dismissing complaints, issuing reprimands to lawyers and deciding which complaints should be acted upon by the court. The remaining portion of the plaintiff's complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the dismissal of complaints and the issuing of reprimands by the defendant and/or the statewide grievance committee was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial discretion and power. See General Statutes § 51-90 et seq.
The defendant moved to dismiss the "Complaint/Presentment" claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction regarding the presentment portion of the complaint because the plaintiff could not directly request the court to discipline an attorney, and because the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the presentment. With respect to the declaratory judgment portion of the plaintiff's action, the defendant also argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to meet the requirements imposed by Practice Book § 390. 2
On October 30, 1989, after oral argument, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff did not have standing and had failed to follow the grievance procedure as set forth in General Statutes § 51-90e. 3 The plaintiff has now appealed that ruling to this court, arguing: (1) that the trial court, by dismissing her pro se complaint/presentment on the ground that a private party cannot file a grievance against an attorney in the Superior Court, denied her due process of law and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the United States and Connecticut constitutions; (2) that the trial court should not have ruled that she needed standing to file a complaint/presentment in the Superior Court; (3) that the judiciary has the inherent and exclusive jurisdiction to regulate and to discipline attorneys; and (4) that the trial court should have ruled that the statutes establishing the grievance procedure in this state are unconstitutional. Because we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff cannot directly request the court to discipline an attorney, and that she lacks standing to bring the allegations in her "Complaint/Presentment," we hold that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff is a private citizen who is attempting to act as a representative of persons who she claims are dissatisfied with the statewide grievance committee's handling of their complaints. The plaintiff herself has not filed a grievance complaint against an attorney since 1985. While we laud the plaintiff's concern for assuring that all attorneys in Connecticut conduct themselves in accordance with applicable ethical standards, she has not, under our long established doctrine of standing, presented a justiciable controversy before this court.
Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981). Christ-Janer v. A.F. Conte & Co., 8 Conn.App. 83, 90, 511 A.2d 1017 (1986).
We conclude that the plaintiff has not established a colorable claim of direct injury. She is simply a member of the general public who has not demonstrated how she was harmed in a unique fashion by the present structure and functioning of the statewide grievance process. We therefore hold that the trial court correctly concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's "Presentment/Complaint."
Furthermore, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiff could not directly present an attorney to the Superior Court for discipline, but rather was required to follow the grievance procedure as set forth in § 51-90e. The plaintiff argues, however, that § 51-90e confers upon her the right to file a presentment against an attorney directly in the Superior Court because it provides in part: "Any person may file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct." The plaintiff, however, ignores the remaining portion of § 51-90e that states: "A complaint against an attorney shall be filed with the state-wide bar counsel." (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "shall" connotes that the requirement is mandatory rather than permissive. Caulkins v. Petrillo, 200 Conn. 713, 717, 513 A.2d 43 (1986). The statute is clear and unambiguous, and therefore is not subject to modification by means of construction. Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57-58, 480 A.2d 425 (1984). Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintiff could not directly present an attorney to the Superior Court for discipline.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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...class. Because he is not aggrieved by this disparity in treatment, he has no standing to challenge it. See Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469, 473, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990) (requiring claimant to make a "colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or......
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...members of the general public who have failed to demonstrate how they have been harmed in some unique way. Cf. Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469, 473, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990) (because plaintiff is "simply a member of the general public who has not demonstrated how she was harmed in a unique fa......
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...is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.” Monroe v. Horwitch, 215 Conn. 469, 473, 576 A.2d 1280 (1990). “The terms ‘aggrievement’ and ‘standing’ have been used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut jurisprudenc......
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1990 Connecticut Supreme Court Review
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