Monroe v. Precythe
| Decision Date | 11 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:19-cv-00392-JAR,4:19-cv-00392-JAR |
| Parties | JASON MONROE, Plaintiff, v. ANNE PRECYTHE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiff Jason Monroe's amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the amended complaint, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must "accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) ().
When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A "liberal construction" means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant currently incarcerated at the Farmington Correctional Center (FCC) in Farmington, Missouri. On February 28, 2019, he filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1). The complaint named twenty separate defendants: Paul Blair; Bill Bowyer; Anita Clarke; Shannon Clubb; Alan Earls; Lindell Edmonds; Unknown Ezersky; Unknown Griffin; M. Hinkle; Coel Jackson; Kristin Johnson; Teri Lawson; George Lombardi; Mark Mills; Brady Payne; Unknown Pickett; Anne Precythe; Stephen Spitzmiller; Ian Wallace; and Tammi White.
In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that he suffered paruresis, a social anxiety disorder that makes him unable to provide urine specimens for purposes of urinalyses. (Docket No. 1 at 7). As a result, plaintiff claimed that he was terminated from the Missouri Sex Offender Program (MOSOP) and was not allowed parole. (Docket No. 1 at 11-12). Plaintiff generally stated that defendants had not conducted urinalysis procedures in a manner consistent with "Policy D5-7.1" of the Missouri Department of Corrections (MODOC). (Docket No. 1 at 7). Specifically, plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to the use of a catheter for urinary analysis. (Docket No. 1 at 11). Plaintiff claimed that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his "medical/mental health needs," which amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. (Docket No. 1 at 10). He also alleged that his due process rights had been violated. (Docket No. 1 at 12).
Plaintiff sought an order forcing MODOC to adhere to Policy D5-7.1 and to create a policy to accommodate offenders suffering from paruresis. (Docket No. 1 at 9). He also requested immediate release from custody, as well as monetary damages.
On March 2, 2019, plaintiff sent a letter to the Court that was construed as a motion to amend by interlineation. (Docket No. 2). In the motion, plaintiff sought to add four more defendants.
The Court denied plaintiff's motion to amend by interlineation on July 18, 2019. (Docket No. 6). The Court also noted certain deficiencies in the complaint, including the failure to assert factual allegations against various defendants, and a heavy reliance on legal conclusions. Because plaintiff was a self-represented litigant, the Court gave him the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff was provided instructions on how to do so, and he was sent a copy of the Court's civil rights complaint form. He was given thirty days in which to comply, and was advised that failure to submit an amended complaint would result in the dismissal of his action. The Courtalso advised plaintiff that when his amended complaint was received, it would be reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court further noted that the filing of an amended complaint would completely replace the original complaint.
On August 5, 2019, plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint.
Plaintiff's amended complaint is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is handwritten on a Court-provided form. The amended complaint is thirty-four pages long, and contains an additional thirty-four pages of exhibits, which include informal resolution requests (IRR), IRR responses, grievances, grievance responses, grievance appeals, grievance appeal responses, a classification hearing form, and a number of letters from Scott O'Kelley, who is MODOC's assistant division director for mental health services.1
The amended complaint names eighteen separate defendants:2 MODOC Director Anne Precythe; Warden Terri Lawson; Assistant Warden Bill Bowyer; Sergeant Unknown Ezersky; Caseworker Kristen Johnson; Functional Unit Manager (FUM) M. Hinkle; Caseworker Unknown Pickett; Sergeant Unknown Griffith; Ex-MODOC Director George Lombardi; MOSOP Assistant Clinical Director Erin Gould; Manger of MOSOP Operations Steve Pfister; MOSOP Clinical Director Amy Griffith; Therapist Dena Boyd; Therapist E. Engers; Caseworker Lindell Edmonds; Caseworker Robert Killian; Caseworker Unknown White; and MODOC Assistant Division Director of Mental Health Services Scott O'Kelley. (Docket No. 7 at 2-6). Defendants Precythe, Lawson, Lombardi, Gould, Pfister, Amy Griffith, and O'Kelley are sued in both their official andindividual capacities. Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which defendant Johnson is sued. The remaining defendants are sued in their individual capacities only.
Plaintiff's amended complaint is long, names numerous defendants, and encompasses several different incidents occurring from 2016 to 2019. The general thrust of plaintiff's amended complaint is that he was wrongfully terminated from MOSOP because he was unable to provide a urine sample, was later reinstated to MOSOP when the warden expunged his conduct violations, but was eventually terminated from MOSOP a second time, which plaintiff believes was retaliatory.
In the amended complaint, plaintiff states that he has been an inmate at FCC since December 2015. (Docket No. 7 at 6). During that time, he states that he has been subjected to eight attempted urine specimen collections. On four occasions, he has been able to give a sample, twice by catheter, and twice by urinating without observation. On December 2, 2016, however, no accommodation was given, and he received a conduct violation. This resulted in him being placed in disciplinary segregation. On December 22, 2016, another collection was attempted without an accommodation, and again he received a conduct violation. The December 22, 2016 conduct violation was later dismissed because plaintiff had a medical lay-in. Specifically, plaintiff states that he suffers from paruresis, a mental health condition that makes him unable to urinate in the presence of others. (Docket No. 7 at 7).
On January 15, 2018 and January 21, 2018, two further collections were attempted without an accommodation. (Docket No. 7 at 6). On January 26, 2018, plaintiff was found guilty of the resulting conduct violations. As a result, he was placed in disciplinary segregation for fifteen days, was referred to administrative segregation indefinitely, was terminated from MOSOP, and lost his "time credit date" of October 5, 2018. (Docket No. 7 at 7). Plaintiff states that defendants failed tocomply with MODOC Policy D5-7.1, which provides that hair testing may be used for inmates who cannot provide a sample due to medical or mental health reasons.
Plaintiff filed an IRR, and then a grievance, challenging the conduct violations he was issued on January 15, 2018 and January 21, 2018. On March 7, 2018, the warden overturned the conduct violations. It was also recommended that plaintiff be transferred back to MOSOP. Plaintiff states that he rejoined MOSOP on March 8, 2018, but that he was not "returned to the same curriculum group or point of progress." (Docket No. 7 at 7-8).
Plaintiff states that he "confronted" Therapist Boyd in the third week of March 2018. (Docket No. 7 at 8). According to plaintiff, Boyd informed him that he had been reassessed, and that his quickest way to complete the program was to start over. Plaintiff...
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