Monroe v. Riverside Reg'l Jail

Decision Date11 February 2022
Docket Number1:21cv524 (TSE/TCB)
PartiesOrlando O. Monroe, Plaintiff, v. Riverside Regional Jail, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

T. S Ellis, III United States District Judge

Orlando O. Monroe ("Monroe" or "Plaintiff), proceeding pro se, filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his constitutional rights were violated while detained at the Riverside Regional Jail ("RRJ") on December 29, 2020. by RRJ; Larry Leabough, RRJ's Superintendent; Lt. Herman Massenburg; and Maj. Charles Armstrong, [Dkt. No. 1]. The Court screened the complaint on June 23, 2021, and found that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and directed Monroe to file an amended complaint. [Dkt. No. 11]. Monroe filed an amended complaint on July 7, 2021, which named three defendants: Leabough, Massenburg, and Armstrong. [Dkt. No 15]. The Court screened the amended complaint on July 9, 2021 and dismissed defendant Leabough without prejudice, and directed that defendants Massenburg and Armstrong be served. [Dkt. No. 17].[1]

The amended complaint alleges that on December 29, 2020, at approximately 4:28 p.m., Monroe, an inmate at the RRJ, was sprayed with oleoresin capsicum spray (“OC") by Massenburg. Sgt. Taylor helped Monroe wash his eyes out at a sink, and Armstrong took over assisting Monroe at the sink. Armstrong attempted to place Monroe in handcuffs. Monroe resisted, and Armstrong took Monroe (and himself) to the floor. A video of the incident (without audio) has been provided to Monroe and submitted to the Court as an exhibit in support of the motion for summary judgment.

Monroe alleges that Massenburg used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by spraying him with OC, and that Armstrong used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment in using a "leg sweep" to subdue him while applying handcuffs. Defendants Massenburg and Taylor filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by exhibits on October 28, 2021 [Dkt. Nos. 32-33, 33-1 through 33-5, 36], arguing that their use of force was justified and reasonable, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has been afforded the opportunity to file responsive materials pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison. 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) [Dkt. No. 32], and he has done so. [Dkt. Nos. 38-42, 50]. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted.

I. Pending Motions

Monroe has filed motions for witnesses, the video of the incident, RRJ documents, appointment of counsel, and for the Court to investigate. [Dkt. Nos. 19, 30, 38, 39-40, 41]. Monroe has a copy of the video and he relies upon that video in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The motion for the video [Dkt. No. 30] therefore must be denied as moot.

Monroe has also filed several conclusory motions with the names of "witnesses" [Dkt. Nos. 19, 39, 40], a request for documents [Dkt. No. 38], appointment of a lawyer [Dkt. Nos 39, 40], a request for an investigation [Dkt. No. 41], and two responses expressly opposing the motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. Nos. 45. 48].

Concerning his motion for appointment of counsel, Monroe "does not have a general right to counsel in a § 1983 action." Evans v. Kuplinski. 713 Fed.Appx. 167, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989)). The Court's power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is discretionary, and, to qualify, an indigent claimant must present "exceptional circumstances." Id. Exceptional circumstances exist where a "pro se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it." See Whisenant. 739 F.2d at 163 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of counsel). Here, Monroe set forth allegations that stated a claim, and has responded to the motion for summary judgment. Because Monroe has not set forth exceptional circumstances and does not appear to lack capacity to pursue his claims, Monroe's motions for appointment of counsel [Dkt. Nos. 39, 40], will be denied.

The purpose for filing motions that list witnesses is unclear, as is his request for documents from RRJ. [Dkt. Nos. 19, 38 -40]. In response to a motion for summary judgment, if the "nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that ... it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition," a "court may ... defer considering the motion or ... allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery." Fed. R. Civ, P. 56(d). If the nonmovant so shows, then the Court may defer or deny the motion. Hodgin v. UTC Fire & Sec, Americas Corp., 885 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2018). Monroe, however, has not submitted a declaration or affidavit averring that anything associated with his various motions is essential to support his opposition to the motion for summaiy judgment. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (failing to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit "is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.") (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954. 961 (4th Cir. 1996)).

In addition to the absence of an affidavit or declaration, Monroe's motions do not establish any relevance of the information sought to the defendants' motion for summary judgment - in which: (i) Massenburg argues his use of the OC was reasonable; (ii) Armstrong argues his use of the leg sweep was justified; and (iii) both defendants argue that each is also entitled to qualified immunity. In short, there is no averment that any evidence sought is essential for a response to the motion for summary judgment. Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006) (where a motion for summary judgment is pending, requests for discovery should be denied "if the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment").[2] To the contrary, Monroe's position in his most recent filing is that the video (alone) establishes that his rights were "violated." [Dkt. No. 48 at 5]. Accordingly, the motions will be denied. [Dkt. Nos. 19, 3 8-40] .[3]

II. Statement Of Undisputed Facts

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56, set forth a statement of material facts that they contend are undisputed. Monroe has not provided any sworn or verified statements to contest the Defendants' undisputed facts, which are based upon affidavits and an authenticated and unchallenged video. Accordingly, Monroe has failed to rebut any of the facts set forth in Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Gholson v. Murray, 953 F.Supp. 709, 714 (E.D. Va. 1997), and the Court accepts Defendants' statement of facts as true. See Integrated Direct Mktg.. LLC v. May. 129 F.Supp.3d 336, 345 (E.D. Va. 2015) ("In determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its listing of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine facts in opposition to the motion.") (quoting E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B)), affd, 690 Fed.Appx. 822 (4th Cir. 2017); see also JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings. 473 F.Supp.2d 705, 707 (E.D. Va. 2007) (movant's statement of undisputed facts is deemed admitted where nonmovanf s response fails to ''identify with any specificity which facts, if any, were disputed") (citing E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 56(B)).[4]

1. Massenburg served in the Work Release and Home and Electronic Monitoring Program at Riverside Regional Jail ("RRJ") [Dkt. No. 33-2 at ¶ 3], and has worked at RRJ since April 20, 1998 [Id.]. At all times relevant in the Amended Complaint, Massenburg was the Housing Unit Manager for Housing Unit 4D. [Id.].

2. On May 14, 2020, Monroe was arrested and became an inmate at RRJ [Id at ¶ 4]. On August 16, 2021, Monroe was transferred from RRJ to St. Bride's Correctional Center. [Id].

3. On December 29, 2020, Monroe was housed in Housing Unit 4D. [Id. at ¶ 5].[5] At approximately 4:25 p.m. that day, Massenburg entered Unit 4D and stood behind the Officer's station during pill call. [Id.]. At that time, the daily announcement was made, which instructed inmates to return to their cells after they picked up their medication due to COVID-19 protocols. [Id.].

4. Massenburg was behind the Officer's station when Monroe approached him while holding a tray. [Id. at ¶ 6]; (Video at 6:07).[6] Monroe asked when the COVID-19 protocol would end and Massenburg told Monroe to "lock down" and return back to his cell as Monroe had been instructed to do by the daily announcement. [Dkt. No. 33-2 at ¶ 6]. Monroe was offended by Massenburg's response and did not comply and return to his cell. [Id.]. Massenburg then repeated his instruction to "lockdown" and pointed toward Monroe's cell. [Id.]; (Video at 6:13).

5. Monroe stepped closer to the Officer's station where Massenburg was positioned and placed his tray on the Officer's station countertop. [Dkt. No. 33-2 at ¶ 7]; (Video at 6:15-17). Massenburg then left the Officer's station, and as he approached Monroe, Monroe pulled up his pants and clinched his fists by his side. [Dkt. No. 33-2 at ¶ 8]; (Video at 6:17-19). Massenburg again advised him to "lockdown" and pointed toward Monroe's cell. [Dkt. No. 33-2 at ¶ 7]; (Vi...

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