Monroe v. Saul

Decision Date27 March 2020
Docket NumberNo. 4:19-CV-73-RJ,4:19-CV-73-RJ
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
PartiesGEORGE G. MONROE, Plaintiff/Claimant, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
ORDER

This matter is before the court on Claimant George G. Monroe's ("Claimant's") motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. R 12(c), [DE-28], and Defendant's motion for remand for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), [DE-34]. Claimant filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the denial of his applications for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments. Claimant responded to Defendant's motion, and the time for filing a reply has expired. [DE-35]. Accordingly, the pending motions are ripe for adjudication. Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the motions and memoranda submitted by the parties, Claimant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is allowed, Defendant's motion for remand for further administrative proceedings is allowed, and the case is remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) for further proceedings.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Claimant protectively filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on October 19, 2007, and he protectively filed an application for SSI on October 25, 2007, alleging disability beginning December 8, 2006. (R. 269-77). Both claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 113-16). A hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Richard L. Leopold was held on October 29, 2009, at which Claimant, represented by counsel, and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (R. 911-41). On March 12, 2010, ALJ Leopold issued a decision denying Claimant's request for benefits. (R. 117-33). On March 31, 2011 the Appeals Council granted Claimant's request for review and remanded the case to another ALJ. (R. 166-69).

A hearing before ALJ McArthur Allen was held on November 29, 2011. (R. 942-96). ALJ Allen issued a decision denying Claimant's request for benefits on February 7, 2012. (R. 1050-73). On February 20, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review. (1074-77). Claimant filed a complaint in this court, and on August 11, 2016, Judge Louise W. Flanagan adopted the recommendation of Magistrate Judge James E. Gates to affirm the Commissioner's final decision. Monroe v. Colvin, No. 7:13-CV-74-FL, 2014 WL 7404136, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2014), rev'd, 826 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2016). The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that ALJ Leopold's decision was not binding because it never became final and that ALJ Allen erred in discussing the RFC and weighing Claimant's testimony. Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 191 (4th Cir. 2016). On August 11, 2016, the district court remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. (R. 1084).

A third hearing was held on November 1, 2017 before ALJ Rebecca Adams. (R. 997-1049). ALJ Adams issued a decision denying Claimant's request for benefits on May 23, 2018. (R. 884-909). On March 25, 2019, the Office of Appellate Operations of the Social Security Administration issued a letter to Claimant explaining that they found no reason to assumejurisdiction, as ALJ Adams's decision was supported by substantial evidence and complied with the court remand. (R. 877-83). Claimant then filed a complaint in this court seeking review of ALJ Adams's now-final administrative decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of judicial review of a final agency decision regarding disability benefits under the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). "The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). While substantial evidence is not a "large or considerable amount of evidence," Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988), it is "more than a mere scintilla . . . and somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws, 368 F.2d at 642. "In reviewing for substantial evidence, [the court should not] undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996), superseded by regulation on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)). Rather, in conducting the "substantial evidence" inquiry, the court's review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained his or her findings and rationale in crediting the evidence. Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997).

III. DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

The disability determination is based on a five-step sequential evaluation process as set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 under which the ALJ is to evaluate a claim:

The claimant (1) must not be engaged in "substantial gainful activity," i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a "severe" impairment that (3) meets or exceeds [in severity] the "listings" of specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity to (4) perform . . . past work or (5) any other work.

Albright v. Comm'r of the SSA, 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). "If an applicant's claim fails at any step of the process, the ALJ need not advance to the subsequent steps." Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant. Id. At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that other work exists in the national economy which the claimant can perform. Id.

When assessing the severity of mental impairments, the ALJ must do so in accordance with the "special technique" described in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)-(c) and 416.920a(b)-(c). This regulatory scheme identifies four broad functional areas in which the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from a claimant's mental impairment(s): understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. Id. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). The ALJ is required to incorporate into his written decision pertinent findings and conclusions based on the "special technique." Id. §§ 404.1520a(e)(3), 416.920a(e)(3).

In this case, Claimant filed a motion for judgement on the pleadings asking the court to reverse the Commissioner's decision and remand the case to the Commissioner to award benefits or, in the alternative, to remand the case to the Commissioner for a hearing. Pl.'s Mot. [DE-28] at 1-2. Claimant alleges the following errors in ALJ Adams's decision: (1) ALJ Adams erred inconcluding that Claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity beginning in October 2015; (2) ALJ Adams should have evaluated the impairments found to be severe by ALJ Allen and included ALJ Allen's other findings in her decision; (3) ALJ Adams erred in weighing the medical opinions; (4) ALJ Adams did not sufficiently consider Claimant's diagnosis of narcolepsy with cataplexy; (5) ALJ Adams erred in weighing Claimant's testimony; (6) ALJ Adams erred in formulating the RFC; and (6) the hypothetical questions posed to the VE were insufficient. Pl.'s Mem. [DE-29] at 22-41. Claimant also contends that remand for the award of benefits rather than for another hearing is appropriate because the record is fully developed and the case has been pending for more than thirteen years. Id. at 43.

IV. ALJ'S FINDINGS

Applying the above-described sequential evaluation process, ALJ Adams found Claimant "not disabled" as defined in the Act. At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had engaged in substantial gainful employment in October 2015, and Claimant requested a closed period. (R. 890). Next, the ALJ determined Claimant had the following severe impairments: history of seizure disorder, sleep apnea, narcolepsy, anxiety disorder, and mood disorder. Id. The ALJ also found Claimant had nonsevere impairments of asthma, uveitis, obesity, and sarcoidosis. Id. However, at step three, the ALJ concluded these impairments were not severe enough, either individually or in combination, to meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 891-93). Applying the technique prescribed by the regulations, the ALJ found that Claimant's mental impairments have resulted in moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; and concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace and a mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. (R. 891-92).

Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Claimant's RFC, finding Claimant had the ability to perform sedentary work1 and that he cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he cannot be exposed to any workplace hazards; he must avoid all exposure to extreme heat and respiratory irritants; he can occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors but cannot interact with the public; he can understand, remember, and carry out instructions that are limited to simple routine tasks, but not at production pace; and his ability to deal with workplace changes is limited to those involving simple work-related decisions only. (...

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